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Abstract 
This thesis examines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the context of International 
Oil Companies operating in Iraq. International oil companies are the focus for examining 
CSR because the oil and gas industry is the backbone of the Iraqi economy and the primary 
source of government revenue. 
Corporate social responsibility requires corporations to act as good corporate citizens. At the 
very minimum, corporations, in addition to complying with their legal obligations, should be 
responsible for negative externalities created by their activities; otherwise the community 
bears these costs rather than the corporation. Corporations should act responsibly to avoid 
negative impacts of its activities on society, its employees, the natural environment as well as 
respecting human rights, and taking measures to combat corruption and bribery. 
This is justified according to the key theories of corporate governance. It is now generally 
accepted that, according to stakeholder theory, corporations should take into account the 
interests of stakeholders who may be seriously harmed by the corporation’s activities. 
Although the primary concern of corporations is to maximise profits for the shareholder, 
modern elaborations of the shareholder primacy theory, namely enlightened shareholder 
value and enhanced shareholder welfare, now recognise that recognising stakeholder interests 
is important for a corporation’s long-term sustainable development. Consequently, directors, 
in for example, the UK and the US are required to promote the long-term success of the 
company taking into account the concerns and interests of relevant stakeholders and the 
social and environmental impact of the company’s activities. 
Putting aside negative externalities, CSR does not require corporations to contribute to social 
welfare in ways that do not advance the long-term sustainability or reputation of the 
corporation. The thesis argues that, for Iraq, a broader conception of CSR should be used to 
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require International Oil Companies to positively contribute to community welfare by 
assisting with local infrastructure, training and local content. This is because Iraq and its 
citizens have not fairly shared in Iraq’s oil wealth.  The thesis argues that Iraq can learn from 
other developing countries which, rather than relying on voluntary CSR, have legislatively 
required large corporations (and International Oil Companies) to contribute to development 
and social welfare. This approach recommends imposing legal obligations on International 
Oil Companies through oil contracts and where possible by legislation. This approach 
recognises the limitations of CSR based on voluntary conduct and its principal concerns with 
negative externalities.    
The thesis proposes a framework for implementing CSR in the oil industry which responds to 
the Iraqi context and makes recommendations for future policies and the imposition of legal 
obligations on International Oil Companies not only to avoid negative externalities but 
requiring them to positively contribute to social welfare.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background  
This thesis investigates the relevance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to the oil 
industry in Iraq. Its particular focus is on the role of CSR in International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) in the Iraqi oil and gas industry, referred to collectively throughout as the ‘oil 
industry.’1 Several reasons motivated the choice of the oil and gas industry in Iraq.2 First, the 
oil sector is the backbone of the Iraqi economy and the key to its future, as Iraq holds the 
world’s fifth largest proven reserves of petroleum,3 and the world’s third-largest oil exporter.4 
Oil exports contribute around 90 per cent of central government revenue.5 Second, Iraq 
opened up its oil and gas sector to foreign investment in 2009 and currently, many 
international oil companies invest in Iraq, see Appendix 1. Third, oil and gas infrastructure in 
Iraq is spread across the country and through areas with high biological diversity, high 
population and areas of cultural heritage. Many Iraqi giant oil fields are located on or close to 
the southern marshlands which are places of international cultural heritage, see discussion at 
2.7.1 and Figure 2.2. Given that oil and gas activities create a wide range of negative impacts 
on the environment and local communities, further protection for the environment, society 
                                                             
1 Domestic Oil refineries are not considered, see 2.4. 
2 The thesis excludes the oil industry in the Iraqi Kurdistan region because of the continuing constitutional 
dispute between the Central Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government on the control on investment 
in the oil resources located in the Kurdistan region. For the full discussion on the legal dispute between the 
Centre Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government see chapter two at 2.5.1. 
3 United States Energy Information Administration, Iraq Country Overview (2018) 
<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=IRQ>. 
4 See The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Crude Oil Exports, 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2242rank.html>.  
5 For the full explanation on the role of oil in the Iraqi economy see chapter two at 2.2. 
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and cultural heritage from harm caused by IOCs activities beyond current legislative and 
contractual requirements, as CSR requires (see below), is a very important step.  
The term corporate social responsibility used in the thesis is in its generally accepted sense of 
voluntary conduct of corporations acting as good corporate citizens because it is the right 
thing to do. Corporate social responsibility so defined does not include activities for which a 
corporation has legal obligations as every corporation is required to comply with its legal 
obligations. The thesis in chapter four explores what being a good corporate citizen (CSR) 
requires. It is now generally accepted that corporations should take into account the interests 
of stakeholders who may be seriously harmed by the corporation’s activities, (stakeholder 
theory).6 As a good corporate citizen, a corporation is expected to be responsible for any 
negative externalities created by their activities, for otherwise, the cost of redressing them 
falls on the community at large.7 CSR is seen as a multidimensional concept which requires 
the corporation to consider the interests of stakeholders and take into account the impact of 
its activities on society, employees and the natural environment as well as requiring respect 
for human rights, and taking measures to combat corruption and bribery.8  It is now accepted 
that taking into account stakeholder and community interests may contribute to sustainability, 
reputation and long term interests of a corporation. Despite this, there is still a tendency in 
some quarters to view shareholder value maximisation as the guiding objective of the 
corporation at the expense of stakeholder and community interests. However, more recent 
elaborations of shareholder primacy appear to acknowledge broader responsibilities through 
what has been termed, enlightened shareholder value, enhanced shareholder welfare and the 
recent US Warren Bill on Accountable Capitalism, discussed in chapter three.  
                                                             
6 Edwin Mujih, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Gower, 2012) 39.  
7 Gerlinde Berger-Walliser and Inara Scott, ‘Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Globalization and Regulatory Hardening’ (2018) 55(1) American Business Law Journal 167, 218.  
8 See, Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L 330/1, para 6; see also 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.  
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Corporate social responsibility continues to be the subject of debate since it was first 
discussed in the early 1950s.9 Advocates argue that CSR is part of a strategic management 
approach and necessary for the contemporary operations of companies to minimise harm to 
stakeholders not just shareholders.10 CSR opponents argue that the only social responsibility 
of business is to maximise shareholders wealth, not social welfare.11 The thesis explores these 
arguments in chapter three and argues that CSR should not be seen as in conflict with 
shareholders’ interests but rather as a means for protecting their long-term interests and an 
increasingly important in the way corporations do business.12 Moreover, large Companies 
have CSR policies which are reported in annual sustainability reports and report on non-
financial performance.13 
More recently, governments have become increasingly proactive in promoting CSR,14 to the 
extent that the state has become a major CSR driver.15 It is now standard practice in 
developed countries to have regulations promoting companies’ accountability and 
transparency (eg EU, US, Canada and Australia).16 Many developing countries have gone 
                                                             
9 For a review of a history of CSR see, Archie Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts 
and Practices’ in Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams, Jeremy Moon, and Donald Siegel (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2008) 19.  
10 Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A stakeholder Approach, (Pitman, 1984).  
11 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’, New York Times (13 
September 1970). 
12 Doreen McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate 
Accountability’, in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 9, 9.  
13 See chapter four, section 4.6. 
14 Josep Lozano, Laura Albareda,Tamyko Ysa, Heike Roscher and Manila Marcuccio, Governments and 
Corporate Social Responsibility : Public Policies Beyond Regulation and Voluntary Compliance (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 42; Anna Peters and Daniela Röß, The Role of Governments in Promoting Corporate 
Responsibility and Private Sector Engagement in Development (United Nations Global Compact, 2010) 12; 
Reinhard Steurer, ‘Soft Instruments, Few Networks: How ‘New Governance’ Materializes in Public Policies on 
Corporate Social Responsibility Across Europe’, (2011) 21 Environmental Policy and Governance 270, 290.  
15 Jeremy Moon, ‘Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative 
Perspective’ (Research Paper No 20-2004, International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, 2004) 17; 
Reinhard Steurer, ‘The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies 
on CSR in Europe’ (2010) 43(1) Policy Sciences 49, 72.  
16 See chapter five, section 5.4.  
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further by requiring contribution to community welfare and sustainable development (eg 
India, Brazil, Tanzania, and Nigeria). This is discussed in chapter five.17 
As the thesis focus on the implementation of CSR in IOCs in Iraq, this requires an 
understanding of regulatory problems in developing countries where priority is given to 
economic issues over issues of social responsibility. This is evidenced by the shortcomings in 
laws relating to issues like human rights and environmental protection.18 There are serious 
issues related to regulatory enforcement and the capacity of government to both make and 
enforce laws.19 Activities of IOCs have caused significant harm to host communities in 
developing countries (eg in India, Nigeria, Ecuador and others) without compensation to 
those that have been harmed.20 As the discussion in chapter four will show, the costs of IOCs 
activities have been externalised to the community or the state. An issue discussed in chapter 
four examines whether the solution is to retain the voluntary CSR approach or whether the 
State should legislatively intervene so as to require IOCs to be held responsible for negative 
externalities. 
The oil and gas sector are among the leading industries supporting CSR, mostly due to the 
highly visible adverse effects of oil operations on the environment and society and pressure 
by civil society and international organisations.21 Critics point to the self-serving nature of 
CSR initiatives in this sector which can be used to generate competitive advantage,22 improve 
the company’s reputation,23 and provide legitimacy and positive approval in markets where 
                                                             
17 See chapter five, section 5.5.  
18 Mujih, above n 6, 1.  
19 Ibid.  
20 See the full discussion on the negative externalities of oil and gas operations in chapter four at 4.3.  
21 Jedrzej Frynas, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: oil multinational and social challenges (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 6.  
22 Michael Porter and Mark Krame, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy’ (2002) Harvard 
Business Review 1, 15; Philippe Gugler and Jacylyn Shi, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility for Developing 
Country Multinational Corporation: Lost War in Pertaining Global Competitiveness’ (2009)87 Journal of 
Business Ethics 3, 24.    
23 Prakash Sethi, Terrence Martell and Mert Demir, ‘Building Corporate Reputation Through Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Reports: The Case of Extractive Industries’ (2016) 19(3) Corporate Reputation Review 
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products are standardised.24 Chapter four examines what may be needed in order for positive 
CSR to be effective for local communities. In other words, corporations see the rendering of 
CSR as a major element of brand and product differentiation so as to gain a competitive edge 
over their rivals.25 This is explored further in the thesis. The thesis aims to identify suitable 
approaches for Iraq to limit the negative impacts of the oil and gas industry and protect the 
environment and Iraqi society. The central research questions are: first how can international 
oil companies be made responsible for the negative impacts of their operations on the 
community, the environment and other stakeholders? Secondly, if CSR is defined as 
voluntary conduct, are there regulatory alternatives which can hold IOCs responsible for 
negative externalities caused by their operations and maximise social welfare? Thirdly, how 
can IOC compliance with legal requirements and voluntary CSR in the oil industry be 
monitored. The thesis draws on the experience of other countries, particularly oil-producing 
countries such as Nigeria, and, responding to the Iraqi context, makes recommendations for 
the protection of stakeholders. 
The methodology employed in the thesis is primarily analytical based on positivist doctrinal 
approach involving the collection and analysis of primary source materials from Iraq. These 
include legislation and regulations relating specifically to the Iraqi oil industry. It will also 
involve the collection and analysis of standard form contracts which are used in the Iraqi oil 
industry. The thesis will also involve some comparative aspects. First it will examine and 
evaluate primary source materials from countries particularly oil producing countries such as 
Nigeria which have imposed positive ‘CSR’ like obligations on the oil industry so as to 
benefit the community. India has also been selected as a comparator. The thesis also 
examines the statutory requirement that large Indian corporations are required to contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
219, 243; C Maden et al, ‘Linking Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Reputation: a Study on 
Understanding Behavioral Consequences’ (2012) 58 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 655, 664.  
24 See discussion in chapter four at 4.2.2.  
25 Frynas, above n 21, 115-133.  
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the welfare of the society. These comparators provide lessons for Iraq on possible approaches 
which will ensure that International Oil Companies act responsibly in their operations and 
contribute to the Iraqi society.  
The next section outlines the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Thesis Structure  
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. After this introductory chapter, chapter two 
provides an overview of the oil and gas industry in Iraq (oil and gas reserves, production and 
the importance of oil to the Iraqi economy) and the legal framework applying to this industry. 
If CSR is to be accorded some form of official recognition in Iraq, it is important to 
understand how the regulatory system operates. It next provides a brief description of the 
constitutional framework (the division of power between the federal authority and regional 
authorities) and the legal framework of investment and the scope of investment laws. The 
chapter continues with specific provisions regulating the industry including constitutional 
provisions, the Draft Oil and Gas Law as well as the standard Technical Services Contract 
(TSC) which sets out the contractual arrangements between the State-owned Oil Companies 
and the relevant International Oil Company. The chapter also addresses the structure of the 
oil industry in Iraq and the role of the Ministry of Oil and the state-owned oil companies in 
managing the sector and large oil fields.  
Finally, the chapter addresses the question why oil companies operating in Iraq should 
engage in corporate social responsibility and discusses multiple rationales for the 
implementation of CSR in this industry. Understanding these reasons contributes to 
developing an appropriate strategy to implement CSR in the oil and gas industry, discussed 
further in chapter six. This introductory material sets the context for examination of CSR in 
relation to international oil companies in Iraq. 
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Chapter three examines the correlation between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility. Central to the discussion are the shareholder primacy and stakeholder models 
of governance as well as the more recent elaborations of enlightened shareholder value, 
enhanced shareholder welfare, and the US Warren Bill on Accountable Capitalism. The 
chapter then looks more closely at who are stakeholders for these purposes.  
The chapter also describes the different types of Iraqi companies including state-owned oil 
corporations which play an active role in joint management committees with international oil 
companies. This is necessary to provide a foundation for the examination of whether the 
contemporary corporate governance framework and its implementation in Iraq can assist in 
promoting corporate social responsibility. The chapter also provides the backdrop for 
discussion of CSR in the following chapter. 
Chapter four analyses the concept of corporate social responsibility and the key debates. It 
commences by discussing what corporate social responsibility is and its rationales and 
examines the view that corporations should be responsible for negative externalities, that is, 
the harm caused by their operations for which the community pays. This is then 
contextualised to the negative impacts of oil and gas operations. The chapter then discusses 
possible solutions to the problem of negative externalities, ranging from hard law solutions, 
pressure by the community and international institutions. The chapter thereafter inquires 
whether CSR requires that corporations should be responsible not only for negative 
externalities but also should contribute to social welfare. The term ‘positive CSR’ is used 
here to describe contributions to social welfare. The chapter examines strategies for 
implementing positive CSR such as community consultation and public-private partnerships 
and concludes with discussion of the benefits of CSR reporting (non-financial reporting) and 
the comply-or-explain approach. 
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Chapter five analyses the recent CSR practice internationally and domestically. This is in 
order to propose an approach to regulate CSR in the oil industry that is a good fit for Iraq. 
The chapter commences by showing how international instruments have set standards for 
CSR and the importance of bilateral trade and investment agreements to this issue. It then 
investigates how CSR can be implemented at the national level through government policies 
as a primary tool for promoting CSR. It thereafter proceeds to discuss different approaches 
that have been used to implement CSR in selected jurisdictions. Policy and legislative 
approaches are contrasted with examples of where CSR is relevant to the awarding of oil and 
gas contracts and incorporation of CSR like clauses into those contracts.  
Building on the discussion in the previous chapters, chapter six focuses on the feasibility of 
implementing CSR in the oil and gas industry in Iraq. It aims to identify what approach 
would be suitable for implementing CSR in Iraq with the emphasis on IOCs. The chapter then 
examines a framework for CSR in the oil industry in responding to the Iraqi context. This 
includes corporate governance and stakeholder protection, training, local content and 
development projects for community welfare. The chapter also recommends a framework for 
monitoring IOC compliance with legal requirements and implementing voluntary CSR in the 
oil industry followed by conclusion.  
The concluding chapter, chapter seven, draws together the threads of the argument set out in 
this thesis. It summarises the key findings of the thesis and makes recommendations for 
future policy in Iraq. This includes developing a national policy to implement CSR, including 
CSR requirements in bilateral agreements, developing legal requirements for stakeholder 
protection and social welfare, CSR clauses in oil and gas contracts, and developing a 
mechanism to monitor CSR in the oil industry. In closing, it examines the way forward for 
CSR in the oil industry in Iraq. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IRAQI CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction  
As the oil industry is the backbone of the Iraqi economy, this chapter sets the context for the 
thesis and the discussion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in this industry. With this 
in mind, this chapter starts with an overview of the oil and gas industry in Iraq, oil and gas 
reserves, production and the importance of oil to the Iraqi economy. Iraq is the second-largest 
oil producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As a member 
of OPEC, Iraq’s share in the oil market is governed by the OPEC regional agreement. When 
the oil price fell dramatically in 2017, Iraq as a member of OPEC, complied with the OPEC 
decision to reduce oil production. This had a serious impact on the Iraqi economy, see 2.7.2. 
In Iraq, similar to other oil producing countries in the region, most national companies 
operating in the oil and gas sector are 100 per cent owned and managed by the Ministry of 
Oil (referred to generically in the thesis as state-owned oil companies). The regulatory 
framework for the oil industry authorises the Ministry of Oil to develop and implement the oil 
policy for the whole sector. The Ministry of Oil deals with any state-owned oil company as 
part of a ministry’s department. As a result, there is no separation between the roles and 
responsibilities of the government as an owner and the government as a manager and the 
board of directors in a state-owned oil company is not fully independent in making decisions 
(see discussion at 2.6.2 and 3.5).   
Major oil fields are managed through joint ventures between the Ministry of Oil (through 
Iraqi State-owned Oil Companies) and international oil companies (IOCs). The Iraqi 
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government (through its state-owned corporations) retains significant interests in these 
ventures, usually 25 per cent interest (see 2.5.3). This is important to the argument that IOCs 
should engage more fully in CSR initiatives. Brief reference is made to the process leading up 
to the awarding of oil contracts (bidding rounds at 2.2.2) and the contractual framework 
provided by Technical Services Contracts (at 2.5.3). This information is important to the 
argument (in chapter 6) that Technical Services Contracts are one possible mechanism for 
implementation of CSR in Iraq.  
To place in context the need to recognise CSR in Iraq, it is necessary to understand how the 
Iraqi regulatory system operates. With this in mind the chapter provides a brief description of 
the constitutional framework, and the division of power between the federal authority and 
regional authorities (2.3). It continues with a brief description of the legal framework of 
investment and the scope of investment laws (2.4). 
The chapter then turns its attention to the legal framework applying to the oil and gas sector 
in Iraq including constitutional provisions regulating the industry and the Draft Oil and Gas 
Law. It also provides a brief discussion of the standard Technical Services Contract (TSC) 
which sets out the contractual arrangements between the State-owned Oil Companies and 
IOCs (2.5.3). Any recommendations relating to CSR in the oil industry need to recognise the 
role of the Iraqi state in managing oil resources through the Ministry of Oil and State Owned 
Oil Companies and its potential successor the Iraqi National Oil Company (2.6). Finally, the 
chapter addresses the question why oil companies operating in Iraq should engage in 
corporate social responsibility and discusses multiple rationales for the implementation of 
CSR in this industry (2.7). Understanding these reasons contributes to developing an 
appropriate strategy to implement CSR in the oil and gas industry, discussed further in 
chapter six. This introductory material sets the context for examination of CSR in relation to 
international oil companies in Iraq. 
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2.2. Overview of the Oil Industry in Iraq 
    2.2.1 Oil and Gas Reserves and Large Oil Fields  
Iraq holds the world’s fifth largest proven reserves of petroleum (143 billion barrels of oil)1 
and the world’s 13th largest natural gas reserves (almost 112 trillion cubic feet of natural gas)2 
as well as significant scope for further discoveries. These oil and gas reserves give Iraq an 
important place in the global oil supply and represent a significant contribution to the stability 
of global oil markets.3 In 2018, Iraq is the world’s third-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia 
and Russia4 with an export volume of 3.8 million barrels per day.5 According to the latest 
available figures, oil exports account for 99 per cent of total Iraqi exports, and nearly 90 per 
cent of central government revenue.6 Iraq has the added advantage of having one of the 
lowest extraction costs assisted by its ‘relatively uncomplicated geology and its multiple, 
onshore super giant oil fields located close to coastal ports.’7 This has made Iraq’s oil 
industry very attractive for foreign investment (see the discussion at 2.7.2 below). Oil is 
crucial to the economic growth and the development of Iraq. Success in developing these 
natural resources and effective management of the resulting revenues can strengthen the 
                                                             
1 World Bank, Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic (Report No 112333-IQ, 3 February 2017) 13 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/pdf/IRAQ-SCD-FINAL-cleared-
02132017.pdf>. 
2 International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report (9 October 2012) 
18 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO_2012_Iraq_Energy_OutlookFINAL.pdf>. 
3 Ibid, 119.  
4 See, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Crude Oil Exports 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2242rank.html>.  
5 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2017) 8 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2017_13062017.pdf>. 
Note that, at the time of writing, Iraq only exports crude oil but no gas or other refined products. 
6 World Bank, Iraq Economic Monitor from War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery (2018) 5 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/771451524124058858/pdf/125406-WP-PUBLIC-P163016-Iraq-
Economic-Monitor-text-Spring-2018-4-18-18web.pdf>. 
7 World Bank, Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic, above n 1, 13.  
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country’s present and future prosperity.8 A brief description of large Iraqi oil fields and 
international investment is referred to next.   
Iraq has 84 discovered oil and gas fields, many of them are located in the south of the 
country9 as shown in Figure 2.1 below. Six of them (Kirkuk, Majnoon, Rumaila, Zubair, 
West Qurnah I, and West Qurnah II) are considered as supergiant fields, each containing 
more than 5 billion barrels of oil. Another 16 out of them are deemed large, each contains 
between 500 million and five billion barrels of oil.10 Significant amounts of Iraqi oil reserves 
are concentrated in these supergiant and large oil fields.11 Appendix 1 gives further 
information about these oil fields and their current status and investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 International Energy Agency, above n 2, 11.  
9 Some oil fields (north Rumaila, West Qurnah, Majnoon, and Halfaya) and oil exploration areas are close to the 
Iraqi southern marshlands which are World Heritage areas, and habitat to an indigenous group and diverse range 
of flora and fauna. As a result, oil exploration and extraction in these areas may threaten the integrity of the 
ecosystem of these Marshes (see the full discussion on this issue at 4.3.2). 
10 For specific information about all Iraqi oil and gas fields see, Ghanim Anaz, Iraq Oil and Gas Industry in the 
Twentieth Century (Nottingham University Press, 2012) 223-302. 
11 The total reserves in these oil fields are estimated at 112 billion out of 143 billion barrels of oil, the current 
total reserves of oil in Iraq. Ibid, 223.  
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Figure 2.1: Iraqi Southern Oil Fields   
 
Source: International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook (2012) 
 
 
However, wars and a decade of sanctions restricted Iraq’s ability to turn these vast oil and gas 
reserves into commercial production. For instance, in 2005, out of the 84 discovered oil fields 
only 17 have been developed and put into production.12 Significant investment was required 
to reconstruct Iraq’s oil industry and increase oil production. This was beyond the capacity of 
the Iraqi government which lacked modern technology, equipment and expertise. Therefore, 
Iraq opened up its oil and gas sector to foreign investments through licensing rounds. The 
next section examines the licensing regime for operations in the oil and gas sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Lawrence Kumins, ‘Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues’ (Congressional Research 
Service, 13 April 2005) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21626.pdf>. 
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     2.2.2 Oil and Gas Licensing Rounds  
Iraq opened up its oil and gas sector to foreign investment in 2009. The general strategy was 
to use a highly competitive licensing round system based on specific criteria.13 The Iraqi 
government through the Ministry of Oil administered this process and held five licensing 
rounds. While the initial four rounds were to further developing currently producing large oil 
fields or to develop discovered but undeveloped oil fields,14 the fifth licensing round, 
conducted in early 2018, was for rehabilitation and development of 11 new exploration 
blocks.15 
Oil companies who passed the prequalification stage were also evaluated on their corporate 
social responsibility policies including training, health, safety and environmental protection.16 
The Iraqi government used CSR as a competitive standard to select companies for licences to 
invest in the oil and gas sector. These CSR requirements became a condition in signed 
contracts for companies awarded licences, see chapter 5 at 5.6, chapter 6 at 6.3.  
As a result of these licensing rounds, many international oil companies obtained licenses to 
invest in the Iraqi oil industry and signed oil contracts with the government. Examples 
include BP, Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, Lukoil and many others, see Appendix 1. An overview 
of these oil contracts is given below at 2.5.3. 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 The industry-related evaluation criteria include technical, financial and legal capabilities. See Ministry of Oil, 
Features of Service Contracts for Licensing Rounds  
<http://www.moo.oil.gov.iq/PCLD/PCLD/contractus&company.html>. 
14 Anaz, above n 10, 224.  
15 Ministry of Oil, The Ministry of Oil Declares for 11 Exploration Blocks to be Developed & Rehabilitated (1 
April 2018) <https://oil.gov.iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1055>. 
16 Ministry of Oil, Features of Service Contracts for Licensing Rounds, above n 13.  
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2.3 Constitutional Framework  
The current Iraqi Constitution was adopted on the 15th of October 2005 by a referendum.17 
The Constitution was drafted in 2005 by an Iraqi Constitutional Committee established by the 
transitional government that assumed power after handover of authority from the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in June 2004.18 This section provides a brief overview of the 
constitutional framework of the state and governance system, the distribution of powers 
between the branches of government, and the identification of federal authorities’ powers and 
those held by regional authorities.  
Central to the state’s form and governance system are the fundamental principles set out in 
the first section of the Constitution, Articles 1 and 13. Article 1 declares Iraq to be 
[A] single federal,...state in which the system of government is republican, representative, 
parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.19 
 Article 13 of the Constitution states that  
[1] This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq and shall be binding in all 
parts of Iraq without exception. [2] No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. 
Any text in any regional constitutions or any other legal text that contradicts this Constitution 
shall be considered void.20  
                                                             
17 The new governing document was passed by 79 per cent voting in support out of 63 per cent turnout of all 
eligible voters. See, Jonathan Steele, ‘Iraqi constitution yes vote approved by UN’ The Guardian (26 October 
2005) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/26/iraq.unitednations>; Nic Robertson and Ingrid 
Formanek, ‘Iraqi constitution passes, officials say’ CNN (26 October 2005)  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/25/iraq.constitution/>. 
18 See Sharon Otterman, ‘Q&A: Drafting Iraq's Constitution’ The New York Times (12 May 2005) 
<https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_051205.html>. 
19 Iraqi Constitution 2005, art 1.   
20 Ibid, art 13.  
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The combined effect of those two articles is to provide a unified nation and to give the 
constitution priority over laws at the federal or regional level. Although the Constitution 
explicitly states that Iraq is a federated system, the emphasis is on a unified Iraq.  
In practise, however, Iraq is divided into 18 political and administrative governorates, also 
known as ‘provinces’.21 Three of them are located in the north of the country constituted as 
the Kurdistan Region. The rest remain so-called ‘governorates not incorporated into 
regions.’22 The contemporary Iraqi Constitution recognises the Kurdistan Region which 
formalizes the country's only formal autonomous region at present. The independence of the 
Kurdistan region dates back to 1992, and the Constitution of 2005 confirms that. The region 
is officially governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has its own regional 
parliament. In the following section (see 2.5.1) the federal authorities’ powers and those held 
by KRG in terms of controlling the oil sector are discussed in more detail.  
In relation to the federal government, and the separation of power principle, there are the 
three branches in the form of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, as well as 
numerous independent bodies.23 The Council of Representatives represents the legislative 
branch which consists largely of members directly elected by the Iraqi people.24 It has many 
common legislative powers, as well as an authority to elect the President of the Republic and 
the Prime Minister.25 
The judicial branch has administrative and adjudicative functions. The Higher Juridical 
Council is charged with managing and supervising the federal judiciary, nominating the Chief 
                                                             
21 Iraq is divided to 18 administrative units each called a governorate.  
22 According to the Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region, No 21 of 2008, as amended in 2010, 
governorates not incorporated into regions have ability to set up a region through a referendum process. 
However, this is not expected to occur, at least in the near future. This is because (a) oil and gas reserves are 
mostly located in the southern governorates while the western governorates have few proven reserves and (b) 
this creates an unstable political situation (see 2.5.2 below).  
23 Iraqi Constitution 2005, art 47.  
24 Ibid, arts 48, 49. 
25 Ibid, art 61.  
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Justice of the Federal Supreme Court and the members of the lower federal courts, as well as 
the chief state prosecutor, and preparing the federal judiciary’s budget for submission to the 
Council of Representatives.26 The adjudicative aspect has been assigned to Federal Supreme 
Court as an independent judicial body. The Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions, the application of federal law, the settling of disputes between the 
federal government and regional governmental entities, and disputes between regional 
entities themselves.27  
The executive branch is composed of the President of the Republic and the Council of 
Ministers (ie the Cabinet).28 The Prime Minister holds most of the executive authority and 
appoints the Council of Ministers which acts as a cabinet.29 The President holds ceremonial 
powers only. The Ministers’ powers, combined with those of the President, provide complete 
authority over the executive branch.  
There are two categories of provisions relating to the relationship between the federal and 
regional authorities or governorates. The first are powers defined as ‘exclusive’ to the federal 
government. The second are concurrent powers where federal authorities share competence 
with subsidiary governmental units. There are, also, explicit provisions for oil and gas which 
are discussed in the following section (see 2.5.1). A lengthy list of powers is designated as 
‘exclusive’ to the federal government and is contained in Article 110 of the Constitution. 
Generally, exclusive powers include both diplomatic and economic foreign policy matters, 
national security concerns and border protection, fiscal policy and commercial issues 
                                                             
26 Ibid, art 91. 
27 Ibid, art 93. The highest courts in Iraq are the Federal Supreme Court, which is responsible for constitutional 
issues, and the Court of Cassation, which is the court of last resort for all cases except security-related case and 
adjudicates over cases involving Government officials and jurisdictional conflict between subordinate courts. 
See footnote n 52 below for the role of the Federal Supreme Court in the dispute between the central 
governmental authorities and those of the region of Kurdistan over the right to enter into oil and gas 
development agreements. 
28 Iraqi Constitution 2005, art 66. 
29 Ibid, art 78-80.   
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involving national budget of the State and administration of the central bank, citizenship and 
population affairs.30  
Article 114 of the Constitution lists concurrent powers where federal authority is shared with 
regional and governorates that are not organized into regions. These include management of 
customs, regulating the main sources of electric energy, developing an environmental policy, 
regulating the internal water resources policy, formulating public health and education policy, 
as well as, the preparation for development and planning policy.31  
Article 115, provides that powers not restricted as exclusive powers of the federal 
government are within the competence of the governorates not incorporated into regions. 
Moreover, Article 115(2) gives priority to the laws of regions and governorates not organized 
into regions in the event of a conflict with federal measures.32  
These provisions are important to the discussion of the reach of federal oil legislation (Draft 
Oil and Gas Law) particularly with regard to the Kurdistan region, see 2.5.2 below. Attention 
is now turned to explore legal framework of investment in Iraq, investment laws and their 
application to the oil industry.   
2.4 The Legal Framework for Investment  
The main Iraqi law dealing with investment is the Investment Law 200633 and related 
regulations.34 The Iraqi Investment Law requires investors to obtain investment licences from 
the National Investment Commission,35 or from the regional or provincial commissions.36 All 
                                                             
30 Ibid, art 110.  
31 Ibid, art 114.  
32 Ibid, art 115.  
33 Investment Law No 13 of 2006, amended in 2010.  
34 Investment Regulation No 2 of 2009 and Regulation of Sale and Lease of Real Estate and Landed Property of 
the State and Public Sector for Investment Purposes No 7 of 2010.  
35 Investment Law 2006, art 4. The National Investment Commission, established in 2007, is responsible for 
federal strategic investment projects and drawing up national investment policies, identifying key areas for 
investment and preparing a list of investment opportunities, as well as issuing instructions, guidelines and 
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areas of investments (eg manufacturing industries, agriculture, infrastructure projects, health 
etc) are subject to the provisions of this law except for investment in oil and gas extraction or 
production and investment in banks and insurance companies.37 The Kurdistan Region has a 
separate investment law38 that governs all areas of investment except for investments in oil 
and gas extraction or production.39 The general investment laws in Iraq and in Kurdistan 
Region (ie Investment Law 2006 and Law of Investment in Kurdistan Region 2006 
respectively) do not regulate investment in the oil and gas extraction or production. It was 
noted in chapter one that industry-specific laws which govern investment in the oil and gas 
extraction and production in Kurdistan are not discussed because this thesis excludes 
Kurdistan Region. The relevant federal law is discussed below. 
Investing in oil refining is subject to the Law of Private Investment in Crude Oil Refining 
2007.40 This law allows companies from private sector (Iraqi companies other than state-
owned or foreign companies)41 to establish and own crude oil refineries as well as operating 
and managing these facilities. Marketing refined products has to be through the national 
marketing oil company (The State Organization for Marketing of Oil) only.42 Notably, neither 
the Investment Law (as a general investment law) nor the Law of Private Investment in Crude 
Oil Refining (as a specific law) refer to corporate social responsibility. Chapter six of this 
thesis provides in-depth analysis of how far, if at all, the regulatory framework should 
recognise and monitor CSR in the oil industry.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
monitoring the implementation of these guidelines. The Commission identifies profitable investment projects 
that address Iraq's most critical needs and facilitate the procedures for obtaining investment licenses.  
36 The Investment Law allows regions and governorates (see above) to establish Provincial Investment 
Commissions that are responsible for planning local investment and have the authority to granting investment 
licences (in coordination with the National Investment Commission) in areas of their jurisdiction, ibid, art 5. 
37 Investment Law 2006, art 29. This law applies to all investors (whether they are Iraqi or foreign investors) 
who obtain investment licenses.  See Investment Regulation No 2 of 2009 art 1(1). 
38 Law of Investment in Kurdistan Region No 4 of 2006.  
39 Ibid, art 2.  
40 Law of Private Investment in Crude Oil Refining No 64 of 2007 as amended in 2011.  
41 Ibid, art 2(2). According to this article, the refining company does not vest the land of the project.   
42 State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) is a state-owned company that has the exclusive right to export 
and import all crude oil and refined products from and to Iraq. Currently, Iraq only exports crude oil, not refined 
products or gas.  
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The next section discusses the regulatory framework governing the oil industry, particularly 
oil and gas extraction or production. As noted earlier oil refining is governed by separate 
legislation. The discussion includes an overview of constitutional provisions regulating the 
oil industry and the disputes between the Federal Government and Kurdistan Region 
Government, the Draft Oil and Gas Law and petroleum contracts. 
2.5 The Legal Framework Governing Iraq's Oil and Gas Industry  
     2.5.1 Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Oil and Gas Industry  
The Iraqi Constitution contains several provisions that address the control and distribution of 
natural resources.43 Article 111 states that ‘oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in 
all the regions and governorates.’44 This indicates that any particular group, geographical or 
political region do not have exclusive ownership of any specific resources. The Constitution, 
in Article 112, reconfirms this principle and emphasises equitable revenue-sharing:  
[1] The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall 
undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it 
distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts 
of the country... 
[2] The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall 
together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way 
that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the 
market principles and encouraging investment.45 
This article also assigns to the Federal Government the role of the management of oil and gas 
extracted from ‘present fields’ and the formulation of long-term strategic policies on the 
                                                             
43 For further explanation on Iraqi constitutional provision on oil resources see, Muhammed Mazeel, Iraq 
Constitution: Petroleum Resources Legislation and International Policy (Diplomica Verlag, 2010) 10-15. 
44 Iraqi Constitution 2005, art 111. 
45 Ibid, art 112. 
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utilisation and development of the nation’s oil and gas resources.46 However, there is room 
for different interpretations of this article. There is a substantial dispute between the Federal 
Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on the constitutional authority 
of KRG to take legal action over oil produced from the region, specifically the legitimacy of 
oil contracts awarded by the KRG to International Oil Companies (IOCs) without the 
approval of the Federal Government.47 The relevant constitutional provisions were subject to 
opposing interpretation by the two authorities.48 This controversial issue stemmed from the 
ambiguity of the Constitution’s text, in particular that the term ‘present fields’ referred to in 
Article 112 (above) was not defined. It is not clear if the term only includes fields that were 
producing at the time the Constitution was enacted in 2005 or if it also extends to the ‘future’ 
fields. From the KRG’s point of view, the term ‘present fields’ does not include newly 
discovered oil or gas fields (after 2005) or fields where discovery has been made but 
production is pending.49 This view is built on the fact that the constitutional wording says 
nothing about ‘non-producing and future fields.’ 
Based on this perspective, the KRG enacted its own oil and gas law which was approved by 
the Kurdistan National Assembly in August 2007, along with a Production Sharing Contract 
model.50 The differences between the Technical Services Contract model currently used by 
the Federal Government, and the alternative Production Sharing Contract model used by the 
KRG, are referred to below (see 2.5.3). Consequently, the KRG has signed Production 
                                                             
46 Ibid. 
47 For further discussion concerning the dispute between the Federal Government and the KRG see Rex Zedalis, 
The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq Current Reality and Future Prospects (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 46-52; Peter Cameron, ‘Contracts and Constitutions: The Kurdish Factor in the Development of Oil 
in Iraq’ (2011) 5(1) International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 81, 99.  
48 Cameron, above n 47. 
49 The KRG claims that it has an exclusive authority under Article 112 and Article 115 of the Constitution to 
manage oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 whether 
they are new or they are discovered pre 2005 but not in production, see Kurdistan Regional Government, 
Statement by Kurdistan Regional Government in Response to Federal Ministry of Oil Announcement (25 May 
2014) <http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=51600>. 
50 Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq No 22 of 2007.  
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Sharing Contracts with several IOCs for fields in the Kurdish region and has exported oil 
independently,51 ignoring the Federal Government’s legal opinion on the matter. The Federal 
Government has insisted that the Constitution does not allow the KRG to adopt unilateral and 
permanent measures over the management of the oil fields, and therefore any oil contract 
signed with IOCs is 'illegal' until reviewed and approved by the federal Ministry of Oil.52 In 
addition, the Federal Government considers the IOCs that signed contracts with KRG (like 
ExxonMobil, Repsol Exploration and Sinopec International Petroleum) are not qualified to 
invest in the oil sector in the rest of the country in the future.53 Countless claims and 
conflicting statements have been made on this subject by both sides during the last few years 
and continue. These disagreements over the control of oil fields located in the region and 
other outstanding issues has contributed significantly to the deadlock between the Federal 
Government and the KRG in enacting national legislation on oil and gas. This is explained 
next.  
     2.5.2 Draft Oil and Gas Law  
The critical requirement for long-term stability of oil investment and development in Iraq is 
the adoption of a modern oil and gas law and a unified petroleum resource management 
policy based on the Constitution. At present, Iraq does not have modern oil laws.54 A Draft 
Oil and Gas Law was approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Council of 
                                                             
51 US, Doing Business in Iraq (2013) 19 
<https://www.trade.gov/iraq/build/groups/public/@tg_iqtf/documents/webcontent/tg_iqtf_004087.pdf>. 
52 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil requested, on 27 September 2012, a legal opinion from the Federal Supreme Court 
on Article112 of the Constitution and whether or not, it gives regional and producing governorates the power to 
manage and sign contracts, to develop oil and gas resources, without the Federal Government ratification. In its 
decision on 9 October 2012, the court considered this matter as a dispute and held that the Ministry of Oil could 
file a lawsuit against such regional and producing government. See Federal Supreme Court, case No 
74/Federal/2012 (9/10/2012) (constitutional interpretation).  
53 Ministry of Oil, Features of Service Contracts for Licensing Rounds 
<http://www.moo.oil.gov.iq/PCLD/PCLD/contractus&company.html>. 
54 The Law for the Conservation of Hydrocarbon Wealth No 84 of 1985 does not meet the modern requirements 
of the oil industry.  
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Representatives for approval in 2007.55 The draft is part of a legislative package that also 
includes three companion pieces of legislation addressing revenue sharing, the creation of the 
Iraqi National Oil Company and reorganisation of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.56 The discussion 
in this section will focus on the obstacles that prevent the enactment of this law and some of 
the difficulties with the proposed law.   
Political incompatibility is the main reason.57 This may be related to the ethnic diversity in 
Iraq and the concentration of oil reserves in the south of the country. The Kurds in northern 
Iraq prefer a stronger management role for the regional authorities (Kurdistan Regional 
Government) in relation to resources in their region. However, the Sunnis in the west and 
central Iraq, and Shiites in the south prefer a stronger role for the central government.58 This 
is because most oil and gas reserves are located in the southern governorates (see Figure 2.1 
and the discussion on the large oil fields at 2.2.1 above) where the majority are Shiites; the 
western governorates, where the majority are Sunnis, have few proven reserves. This uneven 
distribution of oil reserves has also led to concerns about revenue sharing provisions in the 
proposed law. A stronger role for the central government in managing the oil industry could 
lead to a more equitable distribution of oil wealth for all citizens. The different interpretations 
of the Constitution and the classification of old versus new oil fields, as well as the role of 
outside investors who entered into Production Sharing Contracts with the Kurdish authorities 
                                                             
55 The Draft Oil and Gas Law was first approved by the Council of Ministers in February 2007 and was 
submitted to the Council of Representatives for an expected vote in May 2007. Then, with no vote in May, a 
slightly modified version was resubmitted to the Council of Representatives in July 2007, where it was heavily 
criticised.  
56 For detailed explanation on the content of Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007 see Susan Sakmar, ‘The Status of the 
Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law’ (2008) 30(2) Houston Journal of International Law 289, 314.  
57 Daniel Behn, ‘Sharing Iraq's Oil: Analyzing Production-Sharing Contracts Under the Final Draft Petroleum 
Law’ (SSRN, 17 September 2007) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976407>. 
58 Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno, ‘Why Iraqis Cannot Agree on an Oil Law’, Council on Foreign Relations 
(22 February 2008) <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-iraqis-cannot-agree-oil-law>. 
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ignoring the ban of the central government (as explained in the previous section), have also 
divided Iraqi politicians.59  
The other controversial issue is that the proposed law is based on Production Sharing 
Contracts as the mechanism for foreign investment in the oil industry.60 Under the Draft Oil 
and Gas Law, the Production Sharing Contracts allows IOCs to develop specific areas of 
Iraq’s petroleum sector in exchange for a share of the oil profits. Because of the Production 
Sharing Contracts contract is a form of oil sector privatisation, it has been criticised as 
permitting the exploitation of the state’s oil wealth.61 The alternative contract currently used 
by the Federal Government is the Technical Services Contract. This oil contract model is 
described and compared to the Production Sharing Contracts model in the next section (see 
2.5.3). With all these disputes and outstanding issues, there is little potential that the law as it 
currently stands will be passed, or even voted on, in the near future.  
It is noted that the Draft Oil and Gas Law does not refer explicitly to corporate social 
responsibility obligations, but it contains some provisions to build local content and 
expertise.62 These provisions will be discussed and evaluated in chapter 6 at 6.3 along with 
similar requirements in the Technical Services Contract model presently in use.   
With the difficulties in passing the national oil and gas law, the remaining option for the Iraqi 
government to regulate foreign investment in the oil industry is though oil contracts. The 
issue whether oil contracts provide a suitable vehicle for incorporating CSR is considered at 
6.3. The following is an overview of key features of TSC model used in the oil licensing 
rounds (2.2.2 above).  
 
                                                             
59 Ibid; Behn, above n 57.  
60 Sakmar, above n 56.  
61 Behn, above n 57. 
62 Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007, art 15.  
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     2.5.3 Oil Contracts 
The Iraqi government through the Ministry of Oil has held five licensing rounds. The latest 
round was conducted in early 201863 with Iraq has signing many oil contracts with large 
IOCs (see Appendix 1). While, some of these oil contracts related to a further development 
and expansion of currently producing large oil fields, others related to the development of 
discovered but undeveloped oil fields.64 Oil contracts from the fifth licensing round held in 
2018, however, are for rehabilitation and development of 11 new exploration blocks. The 
contract model currently in use is Technical Services Contract.65 The duration of these 
contracts is 20-25 years. As such, they will shape the Iraqi oil industry for the next couple of 
decades. The Iraqi government has designed these contracts to combine elements from 
different categories of petroleum contracts to obtain the best benefits from each.66  
The Technical Services Contract (TSC) is a long term contract between the Iraqi government 
and an international oil company for the development, expansion or exploration of oil or gas 
in return for stipulated fees.67 The Iraqi government retains ownership of the field and 
production ownership rights. In contrast to the Production Sharing Contract, an IOC in a 
Technical Services Contract agrees to a pre-determined fee per-barrel rather than sharing 
profits from the sale of oil.68 The TSC oil contract is much more advantageous method for the 
Iraqi government than the originally proposed Production Sharing Contract in the Draft Oil 
                                                             
63 Ministry of Oil, The Ministry of Oil Declares for 11 Exploration Blocks to be Developed & Rehabilitated (1 
April 2018) <https://oil.gov.iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1055>. 
64 Anaz, above n 10, 224.  
65 There is no signed oil contract publicly available. The only available are Technical Services Contract model 
from the first bidding round (2010) <http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Clean_copy__BP_CNPC_comments__27_July__on_PCLD_draft_dated_01.pdf
> and Exploration, Development and Production Contract model from the fifth bidding round (2018) 
<https://oil.gov.iq/upload/upfile/ar/659.pdf>. Nevertheless, extracts from those contract models provide in 
Appendix 2.  
66 For example, the contract includes Joint Ventures elements in addition to normal service contract elements. 
See Technical Services Contract model, above n 65, art 13; Appendix 2. 
67 Abbas Ghandi and Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contract around the World: A Review’ (2014) 3 Energy 
Strategy Reviews 63, 71.  
68 Ibid.  
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and Gas Law.69 However, Iraq has to find a mechanism to share with IOCs the risks of oil 
price fluctuations to avoid paying a high fixed amount where the price of oil has fallen, see 
the discussion at 2.7.3 below.  
The main driving factors behind the adoption of the TSC in Iraq are sovereignty concerns 
over natural resources on one hand,70 and the need for international oil companies’ capital 
and knowledge for developing oil and natural gas fields on the other.71 Under TSCs, the IOCs 
bring new technology and industry expertise, and make upfront capital investment that is 
necessary to develop the oil fields and increase production. But IOCs do not acquire 
ownership of Iraqi oil and gas resources. Instead, the government reimburses IOCs for the 
cost of oil production (including investment expenses) plus a fixed fee per-barrel (around 
USD 1-6 depending on the contract)72 as a remuneration fee for each new barrel of oil 
produced by them.73  
Under the TSC, the parties are required to establish, shortly after the effective date, a Joint 
Management Committee for the purpose of general supervision and control of petroleum 
operations.74 The IOC and the state-owned oil company as a government partner are 
represented equally in this committee.75 The Joint Management Committee has a wide range 
                                                             
69 Anaz, above n 10, 225. 
70 Ghandi and Lin, above n 67. 
71 In addition to the need to IOCs capital, the participation of the IOCs allows the host government to benefit 
from their knowledge. The knowledge is sometimes more than just the technology. It also includes project 
management in terms of how the capital is invested. This is because IOCs have a better advantage on the 
process and structural system of managing large-scale investment (business management and industry experts), 
Ibid.  
72 This amount is differs among the various oilfields. For instance, BP receives USD 2.00 per barrel of oil 
produced from Rumaila field; ExxxonMobil receives USD 1.90 per barrel of oil produced from West Qurna-1, 
see Anaz, above n 10, 225.   
73 Technical Service Contract model, art 23(3); this is so because most Iraqi oil fields were producing before the 
IOCs awarded the contract to develop them.  
74 Technical Services Contract model, above n 65, art 13(1); Appendix 2. 
75 For example, under TSC for Rumaila field, the JMC consists of ten members, five of them including the 
chairman are representing the state-owned oil company, and the other five members including the deputy 
chairman and the secretary are representing the IOC(s).  
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of duties and authorities related to petroleum operations.76 It also has a power to control 
technical, financial, and legal performance. One of the functions of this committee is to 
approve training programs for developing Iraqi personnel and Iraqi employees’ plans as 
required by the terms of the contract, and supervising the implementation of approved 
programs.77 That is, the Joint Management Committee has an exclusive power to plan, carry 
out training and local content programs and supervise the implementation of such programs. 
The participation of the state-owned company in the Joint Management Committee creates an 
opportunity for the government to steer the joint committee towards providing benefits other 
than just participating in technical and financial decision-making. This may include 
monitoring environmental and labour protection programs implemented by the IOC, as well 
as proposing and monitoring training plans and employment of Iraqis.78  More specifically, 
the state-owned company can propose sustainable development projects for local 
communities to be implemented by the IOC as part of its CSR program. Given that the state-
owned company has, in theory, equal rights in decision-making, projects cannot be 
implemented without approval of both sides. Therefore, state-owned company can influence 
the selection of projects that are relevant to the needs of communities local to the oil or gas 
field. This advantage, if managed properly, can help to avoid implementing low-benefit 
projects or projects that are not related to the needs of host communities. This will be 
discussed further in chapter six at 6.3.4 in the discussion of the national oil company’s role in 
enhancing CSR programs of IOCs and at 6.4 in discussing the monitoring of these programs.  
Despite these opportunities to provide significant benefits to the Iraqi community, Chapter 
six demonstrates that overall these avenues for promotion of CSR have not been successful 
                                                             
76 Technical Services Contract model, above n 65, art 13(1); Appendix 2  
77 Ibid.  
78 The standard TSC includes provision for training and local content, see discussion in chapter 6 at 6.3. 
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despite the participation of the state-owned company. Chapter six provides detailed 
discussion of the reasons for this. 
2.6 Iraqi Oil Companies 
This section gives a brief description of petroleum companies in Iraq. It starts by discussing 
the types of companies in Iraq. Then it will explain the role of state-owned oil companies in 
the oil industry followed by a discussion of a possible future role for the proposed National 
Oil Company.  
2.6.1 Types of Companies in Iraq   
There are three categories of companies in Iraq: state-owned, mixed-sector and private-sector 
companies. The state-owned companies are wholly (100 per cent) owned by the state.79 These 
companies are regulated by a special law, the State Company Law No 22 of 1997 rather than 
the general company law. All national oil companies in Iraq are state-owned companies see 
discussion below and in chapter three at 3.5. The other two categories, private-sector 
companies and mixed-sector companies are regulated by the general company law, the 
Company Law No 21 of 1997. A private-sector company is a company formed by an 
agreement between two or more persons (or companies) with 100 per cent private capital or a 
company that the state owns a share of its capital but less than 25 per cent.80  
A company is a mixed-sector company where the state participates in a company jointly with 
the private sector. A mixed-sector company is a company formed by an agreement between 
one or more persons from the state sector (ie state-owned company) and one or more persons 
from outside the state sector. It may also be formed by two or more persons from the mixed-
                                                             
79 A state-owned company is defined as ‘the economic unit which is self-financed, fully owned by the state, 
enjoying a corporate status, independent financially and administratively and functioning on economic bases.’ 
See, State Company Law No 22 of 1997, art 1. 
80 Company Law, No 21 of 1997, art 8.  
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sector.81 The share of the state in the capital of a mixed company should initially be 25 per 
cent or more. If the share of the state falls below 25 per cent, then the company should be 
treated as a private-sector company.82  
The state is represented on the board of the mixed-sector company.83 In addition, the accounts 
of the mixed company are subject to control and audit by a state audit agency (official 
auditor) similar to state-owned companies,84 whilst the accounts of a company from the 
private-sector are subject to control and audit by auditors appointed by the company's general 
assembly (private auditor).85 The governance structure in companies from the private sector 
and state-owned companies is discussed in the next chapter at 3.4 and 3.5.   
2.6.2 State-owned Oil Companies 
The Federal Government through the Ministry of Oil manages the oil and gas sector in Iraq 
and is responsible for setting policies, regulation, exploration, production, marketing and 
information disclosure.86 Most national companies operating in the oil and gas sector are 
entirely (100 per cent) owned and managed by the Ministry of Oil, except for a few refining 
companies.87 The national oil companies are referred to generically in the thesis as state-
owned oil companies. Given that Iraq is estimated to have almost 10 per cent of the world’s 
                                                             
81 Ibid, art 7.  
82 Ibid.  
83 The board of directors in the mixed-sector company is limited to seven members. Two of them are 
representing the state sector See, Company Law, art 103(1).  
84 The auditing agency in Iraq is the Federal Board of Supreme Audit. 
85 Company Law, art 133(1).  
86 The Ministry of Oil has an exclusive right to publish data about monthly production and exports, and 
generated revenues. The majority of directors in a state-owned oil company are nominated by the Minister of 
Oil and they are all public officers. Moreover, some of the board’s key decisions cannot be implemented until 
they approved by the Minister of Oil. See the discussion on the corporate governance of state-owned oil 
companies in the next chapter at 3.5. See also, Muhammed Mazeel, ‘Restructuring and Reorganization of the 
Iraqi Oil Ministry and State-owned Oil Companies for Maximum Economic Growth and National Development’ 
(2012) 6(2) International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 133, 162.  
87 As mentioned above (see 2.4), the Law of Private Investment in Crude Oil Refining of 2007 allows foreign 
companies and Iraqi companies other than state-owned to participate in the activity of crude oil refining.  
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proven oil reserves,88 state-owned oil companies can play an important role not only in the 
local economy but in the international oil market as well.89 In oil producing countries, state-
owned companies are commonly used to manage national natural resources, and therefore 
have an essential role in many economies. With such value and economic capacity, the 
governance of state-owned oil companies is important not only to the economy but also, as 
will be indicated in chapter three, as a potential vehicle for the delivery of CSR. Table 2.1 
below lists these state-owned petroleum companies. It is divided into five categories: 
exploration and drilling, extraction, refining, transport and marketing, and gas companies.  
  Table 2.1: Iraqi State-Owned Petroleum Companies 
Exploration & 
Drilling Extraction Refining 
Marketing & 
Transport 
Gas 
Companies 
Oil Exploration 
Company  
North Oil 
Company 
North Refineries 
Company 
Oil Pipelines Company North Gas 
Company 
Iraqi Drilling 
Company 
Basra Oil 
Company* 
South Refineries 
Company 
Iraqi Oil Tankers 
Company 
South Gas 
Company 
Heavy 
Engineering 
Equipment State 
Company 
Midland Oil 
Company 
Midland 
Refineries 
Company 
State Organization for 
Marketing of Oil 
(SOMO) 
Gas Filling 
Company 
State Company 
for Oil Projects 
Missan Oil 
Company 
 Oil Products 
Distribution Company  
 
 Dhi Qar Oil 
Company 
   
  * Basra Oil Company was known as South Oil Company  
  Source: Author based on data from the Ministry of Oil90 
 
2.6.3 Iraqi National Oil Company  
Initially, the Iraqi National Oil Company was to be established under the Draft Oil and Gas 
Law proposed in 2007. But as noted above (see 2.5.2) the 2007 Bill never passed.91 In 2018, 
                                                             
88 World Bank, Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic, above n 1, 13; see also, Iraqi Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, 6th Report of the Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 2014 (April 2016) 
16 <https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/iraq-eiti-report-2014.pdf>. 
89 International Energy Agency, above n 2, 119.  
90 Ministry of Oil, Ministry Establishments (Accessed 20 August 2018) 
<https://oil.gov.iq/index.php?name=Pages&op=page&pid=95>. 
31 
 
the Parliament enacted a specific law to establish the Iraqi National Oil Company with the 
aim of ensuring the most efficient exploitation of oil and gas resources.92 The functions of the 
National Oil Company are to oversight and manage oil and gas exploration, rehabilitation and 
development of oil fields, as well as production and marketing93 based on the State oil 
policy.94  
If the National Oil Company is established, it will be owned by the government and linked to, 
overseen and monitored by the Council of Ministers (ie the Cabinet, explained above at 
2.3).95 The National Oil Company will acquire, without any payment, nine of the state-owned 
oil companies listed in the Table 2.1 above,96 and therefore all rights and obligations of these 
nine companies will come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Oil and are to be 
transferred to the National Oil Company.97 Given that some of those nine companies are 
bound by oil contracts with IOCs based on the licensing rounds, all rights and obligations 
related to these contracts are also to be transferred from the state-owned oil companies under 
the Ministry of Oil to the National Oil Company.98  
However, the process of transferring those nine companies to the National Oil Company has 
not commenced because the National Oil Company has not yet been officially established. 
The process has stalled because of serious legal and economic concerns and the appeal to the 
Federal Supreme Court claiming that the law is unconstitutional. In January 2019, the Federal 
Supreme Court decided that ten articles and sub-articles of the Iraqi National Oil Company 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
91 The legislative package proposed in 2007 also included legislation addressing revenue sharing and 
reorganisation of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. See, Sakmar above n 56.  
92 Iraqi National Oil Company Law, No 4 of 2018.  
93 Ibid, art 3.  
94 Ibid, art 11.  
95 Ibid, art 2.  
96 These nine state-owned oil companies are Iraqi Oil Exploration Company, Iraqi Drilling Company, Basra Oil 
Company, North Oil Company, Meesan Oil Company, Central Oil Company, Dhi Qar Oil Company, State 
Organization for Marketing of Oil, Iraqi Oil Tankers Company. The National Oil Company also can establish 
branches in the oil producing provinces if necessary. Ibid, art 8(2). 
97 Ibid, art 8(5). 
98 Ibid.   
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Law 2018 were unconstitutional.99 Consequently, the Iraqi National Oil Company cannot be 
established until the Iraqi National Oil Company Law is amended to avoid the constitutional 
difficulties. In light of this, the thesis will continue to refer to state-owned oil companies 
controlled by the Ministry of Oil.   
2.7 Potential Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil Industry  
The preliminary inquiry is why oil companies operating in Iraq should engage in corporate 
social responsibility. To answer this question, this section discusses multiple rationales for 
the implementation of CSR in the oil and gas industry. Understanding these reasons 
contributes to developing an appropriate strategy to implement CSR in this industry. By 
examining the issue from the Iraqi perspective, the following discussion refers to the long-
term negative impacts of oil operations, the significance of oil for the Iraqi economy and 
profitability of IOCs. The following chapter provides an exposition on the nature of CSR and 
the theories that underpin that concept. 
2.7.1 Long-term Negative Impacts 
An important rationale for CSR is the protection of the environment and other stakeholders 
including traditional communities from the negative impacts of oil and gas activities. 
Corporate social responsibility is a means of making companies responsible for the negative 
effects of their operations and preventing negative externalities, see 4.3.1. Typically, oil and 
                                                             
99 The Court decided that Article 8 of the Iraqi National Oil Company Law 2018 that regulates the duties of the 
Board of Directors is unconstitutional. This is because the majority of these duties are part of the authorities of 
the Federal Government, the Government of the Region and the Government oil producing provinces together 
according to Articles 78, 80 and 112 of the Constitution and thus, they cannot be part of the duties of the Board 
of Directors. Articles 3 and 11 of the law are also unconstitutional for the same reason. The Court also decided 
that Article 4(3)(5) and Article 7(2) (transfers the ownership of the State Organization for Marketing of Oil from 
the Ministry of Oil to the National Oil Company) of the law are unconstitutional. This is because marketing oil 
is an exclusive authority of the Ministry of Oil according to Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution. Federal 
Supreme Court, case No 66 unified with 71, 157 and 224/Federal/media/2018 (23/1/2019) (constitutional 
appeal). 
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gas activities create a wide range of negative impacts on the environment and communities 
during each phase of operation (exploration, production, refining, transportations, etc) as 
discussed at 4.3.2. In Iraq, oil and gas infrastructure (including oil fields, refineries, gas 
production plants, pipelines, pumping stations and tanker terminals) are spread across the 
country and through areas with high biological diversity, high population and areas of 
cultural heritage, see Figure 2.2 below. The Iraqi Ministry of Health and Environment 
reported that there were many oil pollution incidents in the Basrah province.100 These 
incidents included oil leakages from transport pipes and gas isolation plants, and the dumping 
of hazardous waste.101 A study measuring air pollution in the Basrah province showed that the 
pollutants in different areas surrounding oil fields are over the acceptable international 
levels.102 This air pollution is principally caused by gas flaring and burning.103 The local 
environmental problems of gas flaring may include, but are not limited to, greenhouse gases 
emissions, black carbon deposition, and possibly acid rain which may render the land 
unproductive.104 Many Iraqi giant oil fields are located on or close to the southern marshlands 
which are places of international cultural heritage. The negative impacts of oil operations on 
the southern marshlands are discussed at 4.3.2. Given that Iraq does not have an up-to-date 
technology to effectively deal with oil spills, any oil pollution, even small amounts, may 
cause serious harm.  
                                                             
100 12 of Iraqi currently productive oil fields are located in the Basrah province.  
101 Man Ali, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Oil Environmental Pollution, with Special Reference to Basra 
Governorate’ (Arabic version) (2015) 31(25) Gulf Economist 179, 213 [author’s trans]. 
102 Kadhim Al-Aasadi, Ali Alwaeli, and Hussein Kazem, ‘Assessment of Air Pollution Caused by Oil 
Investments in Basra Province-Iraq’ (2015) 4(1) Journal of Novel Applied Sciences 82, 86.  
103 Iraq has been reported as the second-largest source country of flared gas in the world behind Russia in 2017, 
See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Centers for Environmental Information 
<https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/viirs/download_global_flare.html>. 
104 Many possible reasons might lead to associated gas flares including legal reasons such as lack of gas 
regulatory framework, limited gas institutions and facilities; economic reasons such as lower gas price compared 
to the oil price and non-attractive gas quantities; safety reasons; and finally lack of government and public 
awareness. 
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Figure 2.2: Major Oil and Gas Infrastructure in Iraq
 
Source: International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook (2012) 
 
Significantly, the environmental governance framework and law enforcement in Iraq are still 
relatively weak, especially in relation to environmental protection. This makes a strong case 
for CSR which would require oil companies to protect the community against environmental 
risks arising out of their activities, and to undertake suitable measures to mitigate adverse 
negative consequences. How this would operate in Iraq is discussed in chapter six at 6.3.1. 
2.7.2 The Role of Oil and Gas in the Iraqi Economy 
The second rationale for implementing CSR in the oil industry is based on the fact that oil 
and gas resources are crucial to the country’s present and future prosperity; other industries, 
occupations and services depend on the success and profitability of the oil industry. As 
explained above (see 2.2.1), oil exports account for 99 per cent of total Iraqi exports, and 
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more than 90 per cent of central government revenue.105 The effective management of these 
natural resources can make a significant contribution to the development of the economy and 
maximise the general public good. A CSR policy can be used as a strategy in the 
management of those resources and to develop other related and non-related sectors through 
local content and building the capacity of individuals and communities through training and 
education. The following discussion illustrates and supports this argument. 
The Iraqi Government should exploit the significant economic advantages of massive oil and 
gas reserves, and the many willing bidders not only to increase revenues but also to achieve 
long-term growth and social benefits. These oil and gas reserves give Iraq an important place 
in the global oil supply106 and represent a significant contribution to the stability of global oil 
markets.107 As noted earlier, the Iraqi petroleum industry is very attractive for international 
oil companies because of reduced oil production costs, see 2.2.1. In practice, for instance, 
there are many IOCs investing in the Iraqi petroleum industry in 2018 (see the discussion at 
2.5.3 and Appendix 1). The number of IOCs is expected to increase because of new oil and 
gas discoveries, new pipeline projects and the potential for privatisation in the future. In 
contrast, non-oil investment remains subdued due to an unstable security and political 
situation, and a poor business environment.108 The point here is that, despite security 
problems and other technical and legal difficulties, there is an intense competition between 
IOCs to invest in the Iraqi petroleum sector109 whereas, sectors other than petroleum are less 
                                                             
105 World Bank, Iraq Systematic Country Diagnostic, above n 1, 13.  
106 Iraq has approximately 10 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves, ibid; see also, Iraqi Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, above n 88, 16.   
107 International Energy Agency, above n 2, 119. 
108 For example, in 2018 Doing Business Indicators publicised by the World Bank Group, measures business 
regulations and ranked Iraq at 168 on the ease of doing business out of 190 countries. Despite that Iraq has 
implemented in 2016 and 2017 substantive changes in the local regulatory framework in two main areas: 
starting a business and getting credit and more than 2,900 regulatory reforms making it easier to do business 
since 2004. See, World Bank Group, Doing Business Report 2018 Reforming to Create Jobs: Economy Profile 
Iraq (2018) 4, 65 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/wbg/doingbusiness/documents/profiles/country/irq.pdf>. 
109 For example, there were 16 IOCs participating in the conference hold by the Ministry of Oil in March 2018 
to announce for the fifth bidding round to develop and rehabilitate 11 exploration zones on the borderline 
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attractive for foreign investment. Therefore, Iraq must take advantage of this opportunity by 
implementing CSR policy targeting the long-term growth not only in the oil industry but also 
in other sectors such as mining, cement, bricks, drilling, transport and so on.  
From the Iraqi point of view, promoting local content in the oil industry through CSR 
mechanisms would contribute to the development and revitalisation of other related and non-
related industries. It would assist in developing and activating the Iraqi private sector (see the 
discussion and recommendations in chapter six at 6.3.3). To explain, the Iraqi economy for a 
long period was centralised and dominated by state-owned companies particularly for 
essential public utilities. Centralised economic policy, international economic sanctions 
(1991–2003) and a series of wars110 have undermined the domestic industry so that it is 
inactive and uncompetitive. The Iraqi economy is in process of transitioning from a 
centralized economy to an open market, but it is still dominated by state-owned companies.  
Cooperation between international oil companies and local businesses to supply goods and 
services may speed up the transition phase from a centrally-driven economy to a market 
economy. Local content requirements in the oil industry could extend to, supplying 
equipment, materials and pipelines, as well as providing services. This will enable local 
industries an opportunity for more investment, increasing capital, and the acquisition of 
industry experience, enhance reputation and becoming more competitive. Local services 
requirements could include services such as legal and accounting services, supplying food, 
transport and delivery. This could also create jobs and contribute to the Iraqi economy and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
between Iraq, Iran and Kuwait. See, Ministry of Oil, The Ministry of Oil Declares for 11 Exploration Blocks to 
be Developed & Rehabilitated (1 April 2018)  
<https://oil.gov.iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1055>. 
110 Iraq has had a significant security problem following the first Gulf War in1980-88, the second Gulf War in 
1991, the fall of the old regime in 2003 and the fight with ISIS in 2014-2017.  
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assist in reducing unemployment and poverty. Given that, according to latest available 
figures, unemployment is 15 per cent with higher levels for youth.111 
The inclusion of training and education requirements whether for employees or the local 
community can assist in participation in the labour market and the development of industrial 
and other sectors. CSR may be seen as a mechanism for developing local content 
requirements on the oil industry as a means of stimulating economic development. 
Discussion in 6.3.3 will explain how Iraq could achieve this.   
Furthermore, an active private sector could contribute to the diversification of imports and 
reduce reliance on oil revenues to finance the federal budget in the changing energy 
environment. As noted above (see 2.2.1) nearly 90 per cent of the central government 
revenue comes from the oil sector.112 Any decrease in oil revenue (eg, due to drop in the oil 
price or decrease in production rate) will have deep negative effects on the government 
revenue and the overall economy. This occurred during the financial crisis in Iraq in 2014 
when the oil price fell.113 
A further consideration is that, Iraq’s share in the oil market is governed by the regional 
agreement of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As a result of 
the 2016 Ministerial Conference of OPEC countries’ decision to reduce oil production by 
January 2017,114  Iraq’s share of oil production has been reduced by 210 thousand barrels per 
day (equalling around 4 per cent of Iraq’s production share in 2016).115 Private sector 
                                                             
111 World Bank, Iraq Economic Monitor from War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, above n 6, 10.  
112 Ibid, 5; see also, Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq for the Fiscal Year 2018 (Arabic version), No 9 
2018, art 1 [author’s trans].  
113 Oil price is usually governed by supply and demand rules, but sometimes it may influence by the alteration in 
the political and security situation in the Middle East region and in the global in general.  
114 The 171st Meeting of the Conference of OPEC was held in Vienna, Austria, in the 30th November 2016. The 
Conference agreed to reduce total oil production by 1.2 million barrels/day from 1 January 2017 in order to 
bring the oil market rebalancing. See, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Bulletin (11 
December 2016) 5  
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB11_12%202016.pdf>. 
115 Ibid, 35.  
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earnings have not replaced the consequent reduction in oil revenue. This is largely attributed 
to the private sector’s lack of experience and technical and financial capacity. This supports 
the argument that imposing local content requirements on IOCs can assist the development of 
sectors other than oil (like mining, drilling, construction, cement, bricks, transport etc) and 
therefore, reduce reliance on oil revenues and enhance the overall economic growth. Local 
content requirements under current oil contracts are discussed further in chapter six at 6.3.3.  
IOCs might be called upon to fund some basic infrastructure or development projects which 
will allow important services projects such as schools, hospitals, electricity or water, at least 
for local communities in the areas where IOCs operate.116 Providing development projects for 
local communities will further discussed as part of CSR framework at 6.3.4.  
2.7.3 International Oil Companies Profitability 
Another reason to implement CSR in the oil industry is that IOCs have made large profits but 
are not bearing the financial risk of reduced oil prices.117 Investment in the oil and gas 
industry is one of the most profitable economic activities and profitability of IOCs is 
expected to increase due to growing oil production. Under the Iraqi Technical Services 
Contracts (TSCs),118 the government reimburses IOCs for the cost of oil production 
(including investment expenses) plus a fixed fee per-barrel (USD1-6 depending on 
                                                             
116 See 4.5 (CSR and Community Welfare) and 5.5.2 (development projects in Nigeria). Funding some 
development projects might allow the government to reduce borrowings to fund necessary infrastructure 
projects. For example, The World Bank approved, in January 2018, a USD 210 million loan for Iraq to finance 
the Baghdad Water Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project. The development objective of this project is to 
improve the quality of drinking water supply and wastewater services in Baghdad. See, International Banks for 
Reconstruction and Development, ‘Baghdad Water Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project’ (Report No 
PAD2405, 9 January 2018)         
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/869811517626846051/pdf/BAGHDAD-NEWPAD-
01112018.pdf>.  
117 For example, Lukoil (Russian oil company) declared in its financial statements for the year of 2017 that net 
profit of West Qurna-2 oil field (one of the giant oil fields in Iraq) has increased by 17.8 per cent. See John Lee, 
Lukoil reports Less Compensation Oil from West Qurna-2 (23 March 2018) Iraq-businessnews 
<http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/03/23/lukoil-reports-less-compensation-oil-from-west-qurna-2/>. 
118 Full details about TSCs in Iraq are given at 2.5.3; extracts from a TSC model are in Appendix 2.  
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contracts)119 as a remuneration fee for each barrel produced above a threshold level.120 The 
terms of the contract mean that IOCs do not lose out if oil prices fall but will not receive any 
increase in payments if the oil price improves. Guaranteed fixed payment and quick cost 
recovery provide a stable profit margin for IOCs no matter how high or low the oil price is. 
At the time the contracts were originally negotiated, TSCs were lucrative for the government 
because oil prices were widely expected to average over USD100/barrel and the USD 2.00 
fee per barrel, for example, appeared to be reasonable.121 However, the fees became a burden 
on the government with falling oil prices in 2014 as revenues from oil exports sharply 
decreased122 with cost and profit levels of IOCs remaining unchanged.123  Iraq is seriously 
disadvantaged under these types of contracts.124 In such circumstances, when contract 
renegotiation is not possible (subject to what is said below), it makes sense for Iraq to 
rebalance the books by other measures.   
From Iraq’s perspective, IOCs should share the risks of oil price fluctuations to restore the 
economic balance between the parties. However, Iraq’s experience with IOCs indicates that 
these companies are reluctant to take any measures that may reduce their profits. Although 
IOCs agreed to renegotiate the contracts to allow adjustment for fluctuating oil prices,125 
IOCs saw this as an opportunity to gain additional benefits rather sharing the risks of lowered 
oil prices. This is illustrated by Iraq’s request in 2014 (in response to the oil crisis) for review 
                                                             
119 The fixed fee per-barrel differs among the various oilfields. For instance, BP receives USD2.00 per barrel of 
oil produced from Rumaila field; ExxonMobil receives USD1.90 per barrel of oil produced from West Qurna-1. 
See, Anaz, above n 10, 225. 
120 Ibid, 224.  
121 Ibid, 225. 
122 In the fourth quarter of 2014 Iraq was facing an economic crisis due to the slump in crude prices below 
USD60 a barrel from USD115 in June 2014. At the same time, IOCs were demanding payment in full without 
delay. 
123 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Iraq Looks to Renegotiate Oil Contracts’ The Economist (18 March 2015) 
<http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/442989028/iraq-looks-to-renegotiate-oil-contracts/2015-03-18>. 
124 Ibid, The Economist has reported that Iraq owes the IOCs around USD 9 billion for 2014 only. 
125 Since oil contracts are binding agreements between the two parties, the Iraqi government cannot unilaterally 
change its terms.   
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of contracts with international operating companies126 specifically those developing the major 
southern oil fields including Britain's BP, Russia's Lukoil, US’s ExxonMobil, Italy's Eni, 
Royal Dutch Shell, and PetroChina.127 Iraq first proposed to link the remuneration fee to oil 
prices rather than the current method of flat per barrel fees, but the companies refused this 
proposal.128 The only choice left for Iraq is cutting oil production to reduce production costs 
which has a negative impact on the state revenues. This occurred in the case of BP and 
PetroChina who agreed, under a revised contract signed in September 2014, to cut the 
planned output target for Rumaila oil field from 2.85 million barrels per day to 2.1 million 
barrels per day.  But in return, the stakes of both companies in the investment to develop the 
field were increased and the contract term was extended. The contract was extended by five 
years to run to 2034 and their stakes129 increased (by 9.5 per cent for each) to 47.5 per cent 
for BP and 46.5 per cent for PetroChina; the government’s share was reduced from 25 per 
cent to 6 per cent.130 Similarly, PetroChina, Malaysia’s Petronas and FrenchTotal131 agreed to 
reduce the final production target for the Halfaya oil field from 535 to 400 thousand barrels 
per day, but in return, their operations in this oil field were extended from 20 years to 30 
years.132 Later in 2015, the Ministry of Oil requested IOCs to reduce development plans and 
lower oil fields’ development budgets to reduce the burden of payments for oil development 
                                                             
126 There is an argument for including renegotiation clauses and trigger events in the Iraqi petroleum contracts to 
make the processes of requesting and reviewing those contracts easier, which in return will participate in the 
progress of restoring the economic balance between both sides (the Iraqi government and the IOC). 
Renegotiation clauses in the investment contracts are often used for unforeseen and unpredictable events (such 
as the sharp drop in oil price in 2014), and their objectives are restoring economic balance.  
127 Reuters, ‘BP, CNPC raise shares in Iraq's Rumaila oilfield -Iraqi official’, Reuters (7 September 2014) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/iraq-oil-rumaila/bp-cnpc-raise-shares-in-iraqs-rumaila-oilfield-iraqi-official-
idUKL5N0R80AZ20140907>. 
128 International Monetary Fund, Iraq Selected Issues (Country Report No 15/236, August 2015) 10 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15236.pdf>. 
129 Under the original contract signed in 2009, BP held a 38 percent stake in the Rumaila venture, PetroChina 
held a 37 percent share, while Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO) controlled the rest. 
130 Anthony McAuley, BP’s Long Game in Iraq is Paying Off (21 December2014) The National 
<https://www.thenational.ae/business/bp-s-long-game-in-iraq-is-paying-off-1.329910>. 
131 Under the terms of their contract, signed in 2010, PetroChina has a 37.5 percent stake in Halfaya oilfield, 
with 18.75 percent held by Petronas and another 18.75 by Total and 25 percent held by Missan Oil Company (an 
Iraqi state-owned company).    
132 Iraq-businessnews, Oil and Gas Fields: Halfaya <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/list-of-oil-and-gas-
fields-in-iraq/oil-and-gas-fields-halfaya/>. 
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(decreasing the cost by cutting of the investment expenses for construction, equipment and 
other enhancement).133 Those examples demonstrate the difficulties that Iraq has encountered 
in dealing with IOCs and ensuring a fair distribution of the wealth and profits from Iraqi oil. 
This also indicates that IOCs are not sharing the risks of oil price fluctuations; instead they 
appear to obtain extra economic benefits. Thus, Iraq has to find a mechanism by new bidding 
rules for oil contracts to share with IOCs the risks of oil price fluctuations to avoid paying a 
high fixed amount where the price of oil has fallen.   
IOCs, in addition, obtain preferential tax treatment. According to the technical service 
contract model, the sole tax liability of an IOC is the corporate income tax at a rate not to 
exceed 35 per cent levied on the remuneration fee (see above).134 In the event that the IOC is 
subject to any further tax (other than corporate income tax as stated in the contract), the 
government partner (a state-owned company) should bear such additional tax.135 The 
subsidiaries, branches or subcontractors of these companies operating in Iraq in the field of 
oil and gas extraction and production and the relevant industries are subject to same 
provisions.136 Concurrently, IOCs and their foreign subcontractors are enjoying preferential 
                                                             
133 For instance, the Ministry of Oil request to IOCs to postpone new projects and delay already committed 
projects as long as no additional costs were incurred. Ahmed Rasheed, ‘Exclusive: Oil companies offer to cut 
2015 spending in Iraq’ Reuters (13 March 2015) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil-
contracts/exclusive-oil-companies-offer-to-cut-2015-spending-in-iraq-idUSKBN0M820X20150312>. 
134 Technical Service Contract model, art 23(3), see Appendix 2.  
135 Ibid, art 23(4). For additional information regarding tax in the Iraqi oil industry see eg EY, Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide (2018) 697-701 <https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-2018-worldwide-
corporate-tax-guide/$FILE/EY-2018-worldwide-corporate-tax-guide.pdf>; EY, Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 
(2018) 285-296  
<file://ad.uws.edu.au/dfshare/HomesPTA$/90928758/My%20Documents/Chapter%204/Ey-global-oil-and-gas-
tax-guide.pdf>; see also, Deloitte, Oil and Gas Taxation in Iraq (2015) 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-iraq-oil-
gas.pdf>.  
136 The Law of Income Taxation on Foreign Oil Companies Working in Iraq, No 19 of 2010, art 1, 
<http://www.moo.oil.gov.iq/Legal-Dir-websitee/Legal-Dir-website/PDF/LAW_NO_19_2010_EN.pdf>; 
Facilitate Implementation of The Law of Income Taxation on Foreign Oil Companies Working in Iraq 
(Instruction) No 5 of 2011.   
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treatment at the expense of the Iraqi subcontractors. For instance, IOCs and their foreign 
subcontractors are exempt from fees, whereas the Iraqi subcontractors are not.137  
As noted above, Iraq has found it difficult to achieve fair terms in oil contracts, and CSR 
could be seen as one mechanism to achieve a more equitable outcome for Iraq.  But the issue 
is whether this is the appropriate strategy having regard to 2017 proposals to review oil 
contracts and amend their terms. The Parliament in the budget law for the fiscal year 2017138 
committed the Federal Government and the Ministry of Oil to reviewing oil contracts and 
amending their terms to preserve Iraq's economic interests.139 This may include an agreement 
to increase oil production, reduce production costs and finding a mechanism for cost recovery 
that responds to changes in the price of oil.140 The Parliament has reimposed this commitment 
on the government in the federal budget law for the year 2018,141 but this time the Parliament 
has also required all monitoring bodies to submit a report to the House of Representatives on 
the procedures for implementing this obligation during 2018.142 This suggests that the 
Parliament believes that current oil contracts are unfair for the Iraqi economy. If this 
unfairness results from the Iraqi government being unable to get fair terms in negotiating 
contracts, is it efficient to use CSR as a strategy to overcome this unfairness. If the Iraqi 
government cannot renegotiate fair terms, how can it persuade IOCs to adopt voluntary CSR? 
Its inability to pass the oil and gas law (see 2.5.2), suggests that legislative attempts to impose 
new obligations under new contracts or introducing legislation imposing CSR may have little 
prospect of success. This issue is taken up again in chapter 6 at 6.2. 
                                                             
137 Law of Exempting Foreign Companies and Foreign Subcontractors Contracted in Licensing Rounds from 
Fees (Arabic Version) No 46 of 2017 [author’s trans].  
138 The fiscal year of the Iraqi government commences 1 January of each calendar year. 
139 Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq for the Fiscal Year 2017 (Arabic version), No 44, art 48(1) 
[author’s trans].  
140 Ibid.  
141 Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq for the Fiscal Year 2018, above n 112, art 2(2)(21).  
142 The Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq for the Fiscal Year 2018 did not specify exactly which of 
the monitoring bodies are intended.  
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2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a contextual framework for the operation of CSR in the oil industry in 
Iraq. The oil and gas industry are central to the Iraqi economy. If proposals for the 
implementation of CSR in Iraq target IOCs this must be undertaken in the context of the 
existing regulatory framework, constitutional limitations and current legal arrangements 
relating to oil production contracts, TSCs. It must also take into account that the Iraqi 
government (through its state-owned corporations) operates not just as the regulator but as a 
joint venture in oil contracts. Later discussion will examine whether CSR should continue to 
operate as a voluntary mechanism by which corporations contribute to community welfare 
and the public good. The alternative, discussed in chapter five, is for Iraq to consider whether 
some form of mandatory regime such as exists in India, Nigeria and Tanzania might be a 
better approach (see 5.5). The chapter following examines the nature of CSR and its purposes 
and the tensions between shareholder primacy, the protection of stakeholder interests and 
community welfare. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The framework of corporate governance specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities of the company's shareholders, directors and managers, and the establishment 
of transparent processes for the accountability for the exercise of these powers and 
responsibilities. It also encourages the efficient use of resources and requires accountability 
for the stewardship of those resources. As noted in chapter one, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is defined in this thesis as involving voluntary activities by a corporation 
for the benefit of stakeholders, the environment and the community over and above legal 
requirements. Corporate social responsibility is concerned with balancing economic and 
social goals and requires directors to consider the impact of their decisions on stakeholders, 
community and the environment.  
This chapter explains the relationship between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility. Given that Iraq has a large amount of oil reserves, state-owned and 
international oil companies managing these resources have an essential role not only in the 
local economy but in the international oil market as well. With such value and economic 
capacity, the governance of state-owned oil companies and IOCs is important not only to the 
economy but also as a potential vehicle for the delivery of CSR. The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine whether the contemporary corporate governance framework and its 
implementation in Iraq can assist in promoting corporate social responsibility.  It begins by 
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outlining the overlap between corporate governance and CSR and then different corporate 
governance models dealing with corporate social responsibility. It discusses the evolution and 
elaboration of shareholder primacy and the push for recognition of stakeholder interests 
through enhanced shareholder value, enhanced shareholder welfare and the most recent US 
Bill, Responsible Capitalism. The chapter then looks more closely at who are stakeholders for 
these purposes. The chapter then gives a brief overview of corporate governance with 
observations concerning corporate governance in Iraq and governance of state-owned 
companies. This chapter provides the backdrop for discussion of CSR in the following 
chapter.  
3.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility  
In its narrow, and most usual, sense corporate governance is the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled,1 with the focus on the accountability of the company and its 
Board to the shareholders as owners of the company. In a broader sense, corporate 
governance involves a set of relationships among various participants including a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.2 The company’s relationships 
with stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers, and society as a whole have 
become important in the governance of corporations. Further discussion of who are 
stakeholders, and stakeholder theory, is set out below at 3.3.2.  
Advocates of CSR argue that corporate governance is no longer merely about maximising 
shareholder value but requires the corporation to take into account interests of stakeholders 
and the community. As will be seen in the chapter following, one argument is that CSR is 
concerned with addressing negative externalities, that is, those costs engendered by company 
                                                             
1 Sir Adrian Cadbury, ‘The Corporate Governance Agenda’ (2000) 8(1) Journal of Corporate Governance 7, 15.  
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2015) 9; see also, Mia Rahim, Legal Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Meta-Regulation 
Approach of Law for Raising CSR in a Weak Economy (Springer, 2014) 21.  
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operations for which the public, but not the corporation, pays (see 4.3). The following chapter 
will also examine the argument that CSR is not limited to negative externalities but extends 
also to maximising the creation of shared value for a wide range of stakeholders including the 
society at large (see 4.5).3 The discussion of CSR is integrally bound up with the nature of 
corporate governance and its purposes. If corporate governance is exclusively concerned with 
maximizing shareholder value, the shareholder primacy approach, then the Board of 
Directors can only take into account stakeholder interests or community welfare if this affects 
long term shareholder value. This necessarily limits the scope of CSR.  It may be in the long 
term interest of the company to take into account the interests of stakeholders and the 
community.4 In this context, CSR could be defined as an effective strategy in corporate 
governance to meet shareholder value maximisation.5 The next section will discuss modern 
elaborations of the shareholder primacy theory and stakeholder theory.  
3.3 Corporate Governance Models  
    3.3.1 Shareholders Primacy Approach 
The dominating principle in corporation law is ‘shareholder primacy’, the view that the 
corporation exists only to make money for its shareholders.6 According to this view, public 
corporations exist for one purpose only, to maximise shareholders’ wealth as the owners of 
the company.7 Accordingly, directors, as agents, have a fiduciary duty to make decisions that 
                                                             
3 Commission of the European Communities, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM/681/Final (25 October 2011) 6 
<http://www.accessibletourism.org/resources/csr_communication_ec_com2011681.pdf>. 
4 Lawrence Mitchell, ‘The Board as a Path toward Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Doreen McBarnet, 
Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (2007) 279.  
5 Dima Jamali, Asem Safieddine and Myriam Rabbath, ‘Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Synergies and Interrelationships’ (2008) 16(5) Corporate Governance 443, 459.  
6 Julian Velasco, ‘Shareholder Ownership and Primacy’ (2010) 3 University of Illinois law Review 897, 956.  
7 This is so because, according to shareholder value theory, everyone else (ie employees, creditors, suppliers and 
customers) are simply third parties who contract with the corporation for long-term benefits as much as they do 
with any sole proprietor. Therefore, they benefit from mutual benefit contracts, and society benefits from the 
opportunities that corporations create for its citizens. Ibid.  
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are in the best interests of the shareholders.8 Proponents of this principle view CSR as 
inconsistent with shareholder value creation.9 Milton Friedman argued that the only duty of 
business is to maximise profits for shareholders.10 According to this argument, expenditure 
protecting stakeholder or community interests amount to a violation of directors’ fiduciary 
duties.11  
Traditional corporate legal governance is modelled on the shareholder theory. However, 
critics of shareholder primacy argue that public corporations should serve the public interest, 
not shareholders’ alone:  
shareholder value ideology is just that –an ideology, not a legal requirement or a practical 
necessity of modern business life. United States corporate law does not, and never has, 
required directors of public corporations to maximize either share price or shareholder wealth. 
To the contrary, as long as boards do not use their power to enrich themselves, the law gives 
them a wide range of discretion to run public corporations with other goals in mind, including 
growing the firm, creating quality products, protecting employees, and serving the public 
interest. Chasing shareholder value is a managerial choice, not a legal requirement.12  
It seems now to be accepted that shareholder value may be maximised in the long-term by 
taking into account the interests of other stakeholders.13 This has become known as the 
enlightened shareholder approach which has been incorporated into corporation laws in many 
                                                             
8 For a discussion of Shareholder value theory see generally, D. Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy 
Norm’ (1998) 23(2) Journal of Corporation Law 277, 325; Lynn Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 Southern California Law Review 1189, 1210. 
9 Edwin Mujih, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Gower, 2012) 19.  
10 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962) 133.  
11 Jose Salazar and Bryan Husted, ‘Principals and Agents: Further Thoughts on the Friedmanite Critique of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams, Jeremy Moon, and 
Donald Siegel (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
137; Robert Reich, ‘The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility’, (Working Paper No GSPP08-003, 
University of California, 1 August 2008) 54 <https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/ssrn-
id1213129.pdf>. 
12 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, 
and the Public (Berrett-Koehler, 2012) 3-4.  
13 Mujih, above n 9, 19.  
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countries. For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Indian Companies Act 2013 
require the directors to take into account the interests of other stakeholders for the long-term 
benefit of the company. In the US there is a demand for more responsible capitalism. Senator 
Elizabeth Warren proposed on August 2018 a bill for Accountable Capitalism Act. The next 
sections will discuss Enlightened Shareholder Value, Enhanced Shareholder Welfare as 
modern elaborations of shareholder primacy. This is followed by discussion of the 
Accountable Capitalism proposal. 
A. Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Directors are required to promote the long-term success of the company. This may require the 
company and its board to take into account the concerns and interests of relevant stakeholders 
including the social and environmental impact of the company’s activities.14 In this context, 
taking into account stakeholder interests can be seen as a vital investment to enhance 
companies’ efficiency and benefit by increasing corporate profit and stimulate long-term 
sustainable development.15  
The UK Companies Act 2006 adopts ‘enlightened shareholder value’ model as an alternative 
to a narrow conception of shareholder primacy to capture this.16 Enlightened Shareholder 
Value is a management approach in which the corporations should pursue shareholder wealth 
with a long-run orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits having regard to the 
                                                             
14 Ibid; see also, Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide’ (2010) 36(1) Journal of Corporation Law 59, 112. 
15 Marshall Magaro, ‘Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the 
Shareholder-Primacy Norm’ (2010) 85 Indiana Law Journal 1149, 1167. 
16 David Millon, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition of Corporate 
Purpose Without Law’ in P.M. Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate Governance after the Financial 
Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 68, 69; see also Kent Greenfield, ‘The Third Way: Beyond Shareholder 
or Board Primacy’ (2014) 37 Seattle University Law Review 749, 773; Roman Tomasic, ‘Company Law 
Modernisation and Corporate Governance in the UK’ (2011) 1 Victoria Law School Journal 43, 61; Andrew 
Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: an Analysis of the United Kingdom's 'Enlightened 
Shareholder Value Approach'’ (2007) 29(4) Sydney Law Review 577, 612.  
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interests of all who contribute to and are affected by the corporate activity.17 Enlightened 
Shareholder Value still recognises the priority of shareholder value, however generating this 
value is qualified by taking into account the long-term external impacts of this value 
creation.18 Under the UK Companies Act attention to corporate stakeholders, including 
employees, the environment and local communities, is seen as critical to generating long-term 
shareholder wealth.19 Section 172 (1) of the Act makes it clear that a director’s duty is to  
act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst 
other matters) to 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,…20 
 
The duty is still primarily to promote the success of the company as a whole but taking into 
account stakeholder and community interests. It does not require directors to engage in 
community welfare independently of the interests of the corporation. This development in the 
UK corporation law has led to similar provisions in other jurisdictions.21 For instance, India 
has also adopted the Enlightened Shareholder Value model followed in the UK in the context 
of directors’ duties to act in the best interests of stakeholders not just shareholders. Section 
166 (2) of the Indian Companies Act 2013 reads: 
                                                             
17 Harper Ho, above n 14.  
18 Millon, above n 16, 70.  
19 Harper Ho, above n 14.  
20 UK Companies Act 2006 s. 172(1)(a)–(d); Andrew Keay, ‘The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: 
is it fit for Purpose in a Post-financial Crisis World?’ in Joan Loughrey (ed), Directors' Duties and Shareholder 
Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 2013) 50, 56.  
21 For example, in Australia s 181 of the Corporations Act 2001 permits directors to have regard for the interests 
of stakeholders other than shareholders and the broader community. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value    (June 
2006)  
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/corporate_responsibility/report/report.pdf>. 
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A director of a company shall act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, its 
employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of environment.22 
Section 166(2), however, requires directors to treat non-shareholder interests as an end in 
itself without necessarily constituting a means of enhancing shareholder value.23 On the face 
of it the Indian provision does not give primacy to shareholders’ interests in case of conflict, 
but ‘casts a positive duty on directors to cater to the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders in equal measure.’24 If directors do not fulfil the statutory duties set out in s 
166(2) they could be punishable by a fine.25 This section enables directors to discharge other 
duties set out in, eg s 135 of the Companies Act 2013 which mandates certain companies to 
spend, in every financial year, at least 2 per cent (2%) of their average net profits on socially 
responsible and development activities allowing directors to consider the interests of non-
shareholders, namely corporate social responsibility policy,26 see extended discussion in 
chapter five at 5.5.1. But despite the possible breadth of the provision, this cannot mean that a 
corporation can spend vast amounts on activities which do not promote shareholder value in 
the long term.  The dominating principle set out in the first part of the section, it is argued, is 
still that the corporation and its directors must act for the benefit of the company and its 
members as a whole. It does however require the company to consider stakeholder interests. 
The duty is one of good faith only.   
In the US, at the federal level, there is a demand for more accountability for large 
corporations. A Bill for Accountable Capitalism Act has been proposed to the Congress on 
                                                             
22 Indian Companies Act 2013, No 18, s 166(2).  
23 Mihir Naniwadekar and Umakanth Varottil, ‘The Stakeholder Approach Towards Directors’ Duties Under 
Indian Company Law: A Comparative Analysis’ in Mahendra Singh (ed), The Indian Yearbook of Comparative 
Law 2016 (Oxford University Press, 2017) 95, 97.  
24 Ibid, 107.  
25 Indian Companies Act 2013, s 166 (7). 
26 Ibid, s 135 (5). 
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August 2018. The next section gives a brief explanation of this Bill.  The discussion of the 
Accountable Capitalism Bill is not to illustrate how enlightened shareholder value would 
work but to give an example of the current thinking of forces for change. 
B. Accountable Capitalism   
In August 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed to the Congress a Bill called the 
Accountable Capitalism Act. Warren argues that, in the early 1980s, America's large 
corporations gave less than half of their profits to shareholders and reinvested the rest in the 
company. But focusing on 'shareholder value maximisation', in more recent times has 
allowed large American companies to pay 93 per cent of their earnings to shareholders, 
thereby redirecting trillions of dollars that could have gone to workers or long-term 
investments. This has led to booming corporations and shareholder profits based on rising 
worker productivity but at the cost of restraining wages growth.27 The Warren Bill may help 
solve this problem and help eliminate skewed market incentives.28   
The proposed Bill requires large corporations29 to balance the benefits to shareholders and 
other stakeholders including employees, customers and the communities in which the 
company operates.30 Directors of large corporations have to consider the interests of all major 
                                                             
27 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders’, Wall Street Journal (14 
August 2018) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders-
1534287687>. 
28 Ibid.  
29 The bill is proposed to apply to large corporations with more than USD 1 billion in annual revenue, estimated 
to be a few thousand companies. 
30 The Bill is derived from the ‘Benefit Corporation’ model that allows businesses to choose new legal structures 
to not only focus on profit maximisation but also on social and environmental goals. The Benefit Corporation is 
a new legal business entity that is obligated to pursue public benefit in addition to the responsibility to return 
profits to shareholders. Similar to other business corporations, a benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation, 
but the profit is made through conducting the business in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. 
More specifically, a benefit corporation is required to generate ‘public benefit’ when discharging their economic 
objective regardless of the sector in which they operate, and that should be specified in its certificate of 
formation. Some legislation defines 'public benefit' as 'a positive effect, or a reduction of a negative effect, on 
one or more categories of persons, entities, communities, or interests, other than shareholders.' See eg, Texas 
Benefit Corporation Legislation of 2017, § 21.952; Delaware General Corporation Law as amended in 2013, § 
362. Recently, legislations for Benefit Corporation exist in 34 states including Districts of Columbia, Delaware, 
New York, California and Florida. For more discussion on Benefit Corporation model see, J Haskell Murray, 
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corporate stakeholders in company decisions, not only shareholders. Following the successful 
approach in Germany (with two tier boards) and other developed economies that give 
employees a legal right to elect representatives to the Board (see 3.4.1 below), the proposed 
Bill would give workers a stronger voice in corporate decision-making by requiring large 
corporations to ensure that no fewer than 40 per cent of their directors are selected by the 
corporations’ employees.31   
Further, in the US, the top corporate executives are compensated mostly in company equity 
which provides financial incentives to focus exclusively on shareholder returns. To address 
self-serving financial incentives in corporate management, the Bill prohibits directors and 
officers from selling company shares within five years of receiving them or within three years 
of a company stock buyback.32 This is to ensure that directors and officers are focused on the 
long-term interests of all corporate stakeholders, not only shareholders.33 If the company has 
engaged in serious and repeated illegal conduct, the Bill permits the federal government to 
revoke the charter of the company.34 However, even there is little likelihood of the Warren 
Bill being passed, the Bill is important for the discussion because it shows the current 
thinking of forces for socially responsible conduct, especially because it proposed by a 
democratic candidate for the Presidential elections in the US.   
To summarise, under the dominating principle of shareholder primacy, directors’ duties are to 
maximise profits for shareholders. This has been moderated by recognising that the long-term 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
‘Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Law’ (2014) 4 Harvard Business Law 
Review 345, 371; Izi Pinho, ‘The Advent of Benefit Corporations in Florida’ (2018) 47 Stetson Law Review 333, 
364; Mark Loewenstein, ‘Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate Governance’ (2013) 68 The Business 
Lawyer 1007, 1038. 
31 Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act (15 August 2018) 
<https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountable-capitalism-act>. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Moreover, the bill prohibits US corporations from making any political expenditure without the approval of 
75 per cent of its directors and shareholders, to ensure any political expenditure benefit all corporate 
stakeholders. Ibid.  
34 Ibid, see also Warren above n 31.  
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viability and sustainability of the business may require the corporation to take into account 
stakeholder interests and the social and environmental impact of the corporation’s business 
activities. This shift towards recognizing the importance of stakeholder interests to company 
and shareholder value is reflected in modern statements of directors’ duties (eg UK and 
India). This allows the corporation and its directors to focus on the long-term success of the 
company rather than immediate shareholders profit. The shareholder primacy rule assumes 
that shareholders are exclusively interested in dividends and not on the corporation acting as 
a good corporate citizen. Recent commentary suggests that shareholder interest may extend 
beyond dividends to socially responsible conduct, the enhanced shareholder welfare view.35 
This notion of a corporation as having duties as would any other socially responsible citizen 
is also reflected in the US Warren draft Accountable Capitalism Act.  
While the shareholder value theory is based on a shareholder primacy model that has its 
principal focus on the economic functions of the corporation, the stakeholder theory 
embraces internal and external actors apart from shareholders who play a significant role in 
the corporation. The next section examines stakeholder theory.    
      3.3.2 Stakeholder Theory     
The emergence of CSR is largely based on the stakeholder theory in corporate governance.36 
Stakeholders are broadly defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organisation’s objective’37 or by the ‘actions, decisions, policies, or 
                                                             
35 Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, ‘Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value’ 
(2017) 2(2) Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 247, 275. 
36 Mujih, above n 9, 20. Regarding stakeholder theory, see generally Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: 
A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, 1984); Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implication’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 65, 91; 
Domenec  Mele, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories’ in Crane et al, above n 11, 47; Thomas Dunfee, 
‘Stakeholder Theory: Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a Multiple Actor Context’ in Crane et al, 
above n 11, 346. 
37 Freeman, above n 36, 46.  
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goals of the organization.’38 Although a company’s stakeholders can differ because of size, 
sector and sometimes the geographical location, the commonly identified stakeholder groups 
include shareholders, customers, investors, suppliers, employees, the environment and the 
society at large.39 However, as the thesis is concerned with CSR in the oil industry, the 
emphasis is on social stakeholders including suppliers, employees, local communities, the 
environment and civil society.40  
The core idea of stakeholder theory is that companies have relationships with many 
constituent groups (stakeholders) that affect and are affected by their actions. According to 
stakeholder theory, a corporation’s responsibilities extend beyond shareholders to 
stakeholders whose interests must be considered in making decisions. All corporations must 
obey the law.  In so far as stakeholders’ interests are protected by law, corporations must 
protect those interests. Where stakeholder interests have not been granted legal protection, 
there is no legal obligation to protect those interests. But it is here that stakeholder theory 
intersects with CSR. Where a corporation fails to mitigate the costs arising out of their 
activities such as industrial pollution and work injuries (negative externalities),41 stakeholder 
theory would require a corporation, as a good corporate citizen, to be responsible for that 
harm. As will be seen in the chapter following, CSR may be seen as primarily focused on 
negative externalities so that corporations, rather than the public, bear the costs of their 
activities. As noted in the previous section, the long term value, sustainability and financial 
                                                             
38 Archie Carroll and Ann Buchholtz, Business and Society: Ethics, Sustainability, and Stakeholder 
Management (Cengage Learning, 9th ed, 2015) 66.  
39 Michael Kerr, Richard Janda and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: a Legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 
2009) 13-14.  
40 David Chan and William Werth, Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility: Stakeholders, Globalization, and 
Sustainable Value Creation (Thousand Oaks, 3rd ed, 2013) 54; see also David Woodward, Pam Edwards and 
Frank Birkin, ‘Organizational Legitimacy and Stakeholder Information Provision’ (1996) 7 British Journal of 
Management 329, 347.  
41 The negative externalities are discussed in the next chapter at 4.3.   
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performance of the company may depend on positive relationships with stakeholders.42 
Although the primary concern of a company is to increase shareholder wealth, the success in 
doing so is likely to be affected by other stakeholders.43 In other words, shareholder’s 
interests cannot be met without satisfying to some degree the demands of other 
stakeholders.44  
The stakeholder theory initially challenged the traditional view that corporation should be 
managed for the benefit of its shareholders. As indicated in the previous section, the 
shareholder primacy theory has been elaborated so that stakeholder interests should be 
considered where this affects the long term sustainability of the corporation. The relevance of 
the shareholders primacy model or a stakeholder model is reflected in the corporate 
governance structure and monitoring mechanisms.45 For instance, under the German 
governance model employees have a legal right to elect representatives to the supervisory 
board. In contrast, Anglo-American model, with its emphasis on shareholder value, the board 
is constituted by executive and non-executive directors elected by shareholders.46 This is 
further explained in the following section (see 3.4.1 below) on corporate governance.  
3.4 The Structure of Corporate Governance  
     3.4.1 Board of Directors 
The board structure may be single or two-tier depending on the jurisdiction.47 The single 
board model, common practice in the US and the UK, is characterised by one single board 
                                                             
42 Dunfee, above n 36, 352; Rahim, above n 2, 66-69; Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel, ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (2001) 26(1) Academy of Management Review 117, 
127.  
43 David Foster and Jan Jonker, ‘Stakeholder Relationships: The Dialogue of Engagement’ (2005) 5(5) 
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 51, 57.   
44 Dima Jamali, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility: A Fresh Perspective into Theory 
and Practice’ (2008) 82(1) Journal of Business Ethics 213, 231.  
45 Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2016) 20.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid, 177.  
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comprising both executive and non-executive directors who are responsible for all aspects of 
the company’s activities.48 In contrast, the two-tier board model is a form of board structure 
found in Germany, Austria and Denmark. It consists of a supervisory board and an executive 
board of management. While the management board is responsible for the running of the 
business, the supervisory board oversees the direction of the business.49 In some countries, 
such as Germany, employees have representation on the supervisory board.50   
In Iraq the company’s board structure is in the form of single board. Prior to amendments of 
the Company Law in 2004, directors appointed by the General Federation of Trade Unions of 
Iraq represented employees’ interests. However, after the modification of the Company Law 
in 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority,51 there are no longer employees’ 
representatives on the Board, in contrast to State Owned Corporations (see below). It is 
unclear why the Coalition Provisional Authority made that change. The most likely reason is 
that the Coalition Provisional Authority was seeking to make the corporate governance model 
in Iraq closer to what is implemented to the single tier board in the US, which gives no 
representation to employees. By contrast, the presence of employees’ representatives on the 
board of directors in some countries, for instance in German and Japan, reflects the priority of 
stakeholders in the corporate governance system in those countries. There is a call to restore 
employee representation as employees represent an important segment of a company’s 
stakeholders who could be affected by the company’s operations. 
                                                             
48 Ibid, 178.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 The Coalition Provisional Authority work in Iraq is consistent with the UN Security Council Resolutions no 
1483 and 1511 (2003).  
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Sound governance practice recommends that companies have a majority of independent non-
executive directors.52 In Iraq, a unique feature is that all directors in a private sector company, 
the term used in Iraq to denote a public company that is not a state owned enterprise, are 
required to be shareholders according to the Company Law.53 They all have ‘skin in the 
game’ which is consistent with the expectations of all large corporations. The purpose of 
requiring the directors to be shareholders is to ensure commitment to the success of the 
company. To avoid possible conflict of interests, directors are required to act in the interests 
of the company and not to act to disadvantage minority shareholding interests.54 Accordingly, 
the chairman and board members are prevented from having direct or indirect interests in 
deals that are concluded with the company. They are also prohibited and from voting upon or 
participating in a matter in which they have direct or indirect interests.55   
    3.4.2 Board Committees 
Listed companies may be required to appoint various committees for specific purposes and 
delegate part of the board work to them. The aim of establishing such committees is to assist 
the board in dealing adequately with complex or specialised issues.56 Standing board 
committees usually include audit, appointments, risk management, and compensation 
committees. Some companies have also established a corporate social responsibility 
committee.57 Since companies should take into account stakeholder’s interests, the role of a 
board CSR committee is to assess and monitor stakeholder needs.58 The presence of a CSR 
                                                             
52 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (Oxford University Press, 2009) 62-
64.  
53 Company Law, art 106(1). According to the Company Law, each director should continuously own at least 
two thousand shares. Directors will lose board's membership if shareholdings drop below this level. 
54 Company Law, art 119(2). 
55 Ibid.  
56 For further explanation on board committees see, Tricker, above n 52, 67-72.  
57 Companies that have CSR committee include SAMSUNG, Coca-Cola European Partners and others.   
58 A CSR committee may alternatively be named as an ethics, sustainable development, environment, health and 
safety, or a public responsibility committee. For further discussion on CSR committees see, Edina Eberhardt-
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committee may also improve the quality and quantity of CSR reporting.59 Whereas 
establishing board committees is usually a listing requirement, in some countries the 
appointment of a CSR committees is a legal requirement whether the company is listed or 
not. In India companies (public or private) with specified profit thresholds must establish a 
CSR committee consisting of three or more directors, at least one of whom must be 
independent.60 According to the Indian Companies Act 2013, the CSR committee should 
formulate and recommend to the board a CSR policy. The policy must indicate the activities 
to be undertaken by the company and the amount of expenditure on these activities, as well as 
monitoring this policy regularly.61 CSR requirement in India according to this law is further 
discussed in chapter five at 5.5.1.  
In Iraq, the Company Law only requires companies to establish audit and remuneration 
committees.62 The law does not determine the number and qualifications of the members. The 
duties of those committees and the contents of reports that should be submitted to the board 
of directors have not been spelled out. 
    3.4.3 Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer  
The roles of chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) are frequently separated. The 
chairman has responsibility for running the board, whilst the CEO has the executive 
responsibility for the running of the company’s business.63 There is continuing debate 
whether the role of the chairman and the chief executive should be separated or combined in 
one person. The argument in favour of dividing the roles is that the separation increases 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Toth, ‘Who Should Be on a Board Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?’ (2017) 140 Journal of Cleaner 
Production 1926, 1935.  
59 Shayuti Adnan, David Hay and Chris Staden, ‘The Influence of Culture and Corporate Governance on 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: A Cross Country Analysis’ (2018)198 Journal of Cleaner 
Production 820, 832.  
60 Indian Companies Act 2013, no 18, s 135.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Company Law of 1997, art 117(2).  
63 Mallin, above n 45, 180.   
59 
 
accountability and avoids abuses resulting from concentration of power in one individual.64 
Separation of the roles allows the chief executive to focus on managing the business and the 
chairman having responsibility for running the board, and relations with shareholders, the 
government, the regulators, as well as the media.65 Separation of roles also provides a 
checking mechanism by making the managing director responsible to the board. Chairpersons 
exercise their authority on behalf of the board whereas managing directors have personal 
authority based on the terms of their appointment.66 The advocates for combining the roles 
argue that a dynamic enterprise needs just one leader and that separating leadership duties 
between two people leads to conflict.67 In the UK the roles of chairman and chief executive 
officer are separated, whereas the two functions are often combined in the US.68  
In Iraq, the role of chairman and CEO are separated in the public companies (known in Iraq 
as private sector companies), see Table 3.1 below, but not in the state-owned companies, 
below 3.5. In a public company (private sector company), the role of chairman and the CEO 
(Managing Director) cannot be exercised by the same person.69 The board of directors at the 
first meeting elects the chairman among its members. The board then appoints the CEO 
(Managing Director).70 The board of directors has authority to dismiss managing directors 
who do not fulfil their obligations.71 
Overall, examining the provisions of board structure in Iraq shows the weakness in separation 
between the executive and non-executive directors and their independence. In a company 
from the private-sector all directors should be shareholders, and in a state-owned company 
(eg state-owned oil company) all directors are government officers (see the next). There is a 
                                                             
64 Ibid.  
65 Tricker, above n 52, 58.  
66 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: a Personal View (Oxford University Press, 
2002) 99.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 See Company Law, art 121(2).  
70 Ibid.  
71 Company Law, art 122.  
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need for provisions to regulate some issues related to the board of directors, particularly those 
linked to structure and composition of the board, selecting members and essential tasks 
entrusted to board’s members, as well as board's role in overseeing executive directors. There 
is no comprehensive and specific description of the duties of the chairman and the board 
members, nor solutions for conflict between management, board members and shareholders 
as the result of misuse of assets and transactions. In addition, there is no independent 
evaluation of the performance of members of the board of directors nor oversight on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance.  
As the central focus of this thesis is how to implement corporate social responsibility in the 
oil industry, the next section discusses the corporate governance structure of state-owned oil 
companies. This is important because state owned oil companies are joint venturers with 
IOCs in the Iraqi oil industry. The examination will show how the governance structure of 
state-owned oil companies is entirely different to that of companies from the private sector. 
This is so because each is subject to different laws and therefore has a different governance 
structure. The next section discusses corporate governance in the state-owned oil companies 
and its importance to the implementation of CSR in the oil industry.   
3.5 Corporate Governance and State-owned Oil Companies 
State-owned oil companies have a governance structure that is quite different from companies 
in the private sector particularly in relation to nominating board members, their independence 
and employees representation. The board of directors in a state-owned oil company consists 
of a majority of appointed members all of whom are state officers and two elected members, 
see Table 3.1 below. The Board consists of general manager as a chairman and eight other 
members as executive directors.72 Six of them are nominated by the Ministry of Oil. They are 
                                                             
72 State Companies Law, No 22 of 1997, art 20. 
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chosen from the heads of the particular State-owned company’s various units and from the 
Ministry’s officers based on their experience and specific knowledge. Unlike the private 
sector, employees are directly represented by the appointment of two directors elected by the 
state-owned company's employees.73  
The General Manager is appointed in a dual role of chairman and chief executive officer. The 
general manager is responsible for running the company’s day to day business and directing 
the board.74 One of the issues is whether the CEO performing a dual role is disadvantageous 
to the effective operation of state-owned companies. While board members are appointed by 
the Ministry of Oil, the General Manager is appointed by the Council of Ministers (the 
Cabinet),75 the highest executive authority in the country.  
Table 3.1: Governance Structure in the Iraqi Company Laws 
Type of company  Ownership Board of 
Directors  
CEO Listed in 
ISE  
Applicable 
Law 
State-owned 
company  
-A single  
share 
-100% 
owned by 
the State 
-Fixed (9 
members) 
-All state officers 
-Dual role  
 
-State officer 
Cannot be 
listed 
State Company 
Law No 21 of 
1997 
Public (Private 
sector) company  
Shareholder 
ownership 
-Not fixed (5-9 
members)  
-All must be 
shareholders 
Separate role  Could be  listed 
Company Law 
No 22 of 1997 
Source: Author based on the provisions of Iraqi Company Law and State Company Law 
 
In a state-owned oil company, there is no separation between the roles and responsibilities of 
the government as an owner and the government as a manager. The Ministry of Oil deals 
with any state-owned oil company as part of a ministry’s department.76 As noted above, the 
                                                             
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid, art 27.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Muhammed Mazeel, ‘Restructuring and Reorganization of the Iraqi Oil Ministry and State-owned Oil 
Companies for Maximum Economic Growth and National Development’ (2012) 6(2) International Journal of 
Contemporary Iraqi Studies 133, 162.  
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majority of board directors are nominated by the government and are all public officers. As a 
result, the board of directors in state-owned oil company is not fully independent in making 
decisions. For example, some of the board’s key decisions cannot be implemented until they 
approved by the Minister of Oil.77 Disclosure on important financial and non-financial 
statements is not required. This is because the Ministry is the responsible authority so it can 
request such information at any time. The regulatory framework for the oil industry 
authorises the Ministry of Oil to develop and implement the oil policy for the whole sector. It 
effectively exercises dual functions as the Ministry responsible and as the national oil 
company.78 Therefore, the performance of state-owned oil companies is measured by 
reference to their ability to fulfil plans set forth by the Ministry of Oil, rather than on a 
competitive basis. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the background for discussion of CSR in the following chapter. It 
indicates that the issue of CSR is integrally connected with the theories of corporate 
governance. If the company’s, (and its board of directors), only duty is to enhance 
shareholder value, this leaves no room for the Board to engage in CSR where there are no 
advantages to be gained by the company. As discussed above more recent elaborations of 
shareholder primacy recognise that stakeholder interests should be taken into consideration as 
important for the long term sustainability and profitability of the company.79  It has also been 
argued that shareholders are not exclusively interested in dividends but that protection of the 
environment etc is also important to enhanced shareholder welfare.80 The chapter also 
pointed to the recent proposal, the Accountable Capitalism bill for large US corporations to 
                                                             
77 See eg, State Companies Law of 1997, art 26. 
78 Mazeel, above n 76.  
79 Magaro, above n 15.  
80 Hart and Zingales, above n 35.  
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act as good corporate citizens. The following chapter provides an exposition on the nature of 
CSR and its purposes. It will also discuss CSR reporting and the comply-or-explain regime.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROLE OF CORPORTE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the principal theories relating to corporate governance. It 
discussed the shareholder primacy theory with its more recent elaborations of enlightened 
shareholder value and shareholder welfare and recent calls for responsible capitalism. It also 
discussed stakeholder theory. This discussion underpins the examination of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in this chapter.  If the duty of a company is not only to its shareholders 
but to stakeholders, this provides the essence of the argument that, at a minimum, CSR is 
concerned with the duty of a company to avoid negative externalities and avoid harm to its 
stakeholders, employees, suppliers, consumers and the community. Whether CSR also 
involves positive duties to contribute to community welfare is also discussed.   
The concept of corporate social responsibility remains controversial despite the vast literature 
attempting to identify its scope and objectives. In this chapter the distinction between 
negative externalities and benevolence is important to the understanding of the concept of 
CSR. This chapter commences by discussing the concept of corporate social responsibility 
and the key debates, specifically the argument that CSR is essentially concerned with 
voluntary rather than legal responsibilities. It also discusses why corporate social 
responsibility is needed and the common arguments against CSR.  
The chapter then discusses whether the corporation (and its Board of Directors) have duties 
beyond increasing shareholder value to stakeholders including the community. If the 
corporation’s primary duty is to increase shareholder value, this means that the harm it may 
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cause to the community by its operations (negative externalities) are borne by the community 
rather than its shareholders. The problem of, and the solutions to dealing with, negative 
externalities are examined in the context of the Oil and Gas industry. As the oil industry is the 
backbone of the Iraqi economy, (see chapter 2) the two selected examples of approaches to 
CSR are set in the context of the oil industry. It then discusses the role of corporate social 
responsibility in maximising social welfare and strategies for implementing positive CSR.  
The chapter also discussed CSR reporting is a new accountability practice that allows the 
public and other monitoring agencies to oversight corporations’ social and environmental 
performance. A number of jurisdictions have introduced regulatory requirements governing 
CSR (non-financial information) reporting on a comply-or-explain basis, specifically in EU. 
It investigates if Iraq can use CSR reporting on a comply-or-explain basis to increase 
accountability in the oil industry. This is followed by the conclusion.  
4.2 The Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility  
     4.2.1 What is Corporate Social Responsibility? 
A particular challenge of studying corporate social responsibility is that there is no accepted 
definition of CSR despite numerous efforts to define its concept.1 In 2008, for instance, a 
study found 37 separate definitions of CSR2 confirming that CSR is understood and 
                                                             
1 Max Clarkson observed that a ‘fundamental problem in the field of business and society has been that there are 
no definitions of corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social responsibility (CSR1), or corporate social 
responsiveness (CSR2) that provide a framework or model for the systematic collection, organization, and 
analysis of corporate data relating to these important concepts. No theory has yet been developed that can 
provide such a framework or model, nor is there any general agreement about the meaning of these terms from 
an operational or a managerial viewpoint’. Max Clarkson, ‘A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and 
Evaluating Corporate Social Performance’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 92, 117; see also, 
Edwin Mujih, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Gower, 2012) 11; Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon, ‘Implicit and Explicit CSR: 
A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2008) 33(2) 
Academy of Management Review 404, 424; William Werther and David Chandler, Strategic Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Stakeholders in a Global Environment (SAGE Publications, 2010) 6.  
2 See Alexander Dahlsrud, ‘How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: an Analysis of 37 Definitions’ 
(2008) 15 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 1, 13 (for the convenience of the 
reader, Dahlsrud listed all the 37 CSR definitions In the Appendix); see also, Irene Buhanita, ‘Dimensions in 
66 
 
interpreted differently by companies, scholars, governments, non-government organisations 
and other interested groups.3 This is because corporate social responsibility in not the only 
term used in describing ‘business-society relations’, but in some cases it used interchangeably 
with related terms and ideas.4 Another reason for lack of definition is that CSR is in a 
constant state of evolution associated with social expectations and concerns. Thus, the norms 
of CSR change with each generation and its criteria may change according to the societal 
values.5 In practice, the absence of an accepted definition allows flexibility for CSR across all 
sectors of an economy and international borders,6 and may foster evolution and development 
of the concept.7   
Whatever the reason, or maybe the benefit, behind the absence of an accepted definition for 
CSR, giving some examples of proposed definitions will provide useful clarification of the 
elements of CSR and provide focus for the discussion. The section begins with definitions 
offered by international bodies. For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development considers CSR as a means to achieve sustainable development by defining it as 
‘the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working 
with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
CSR: an Evaluation of Current Definitions’ (2015) 10(4) Romanian Journal of Journalism & Communication 
64, 72; However, focusing on the academic literature, Carroll has reviewed and discussed over 25 different ways 
that CSR is defined. See, Archie Carroll, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct’ (1999) 38(3) Business and Society 268, 295.  
3 For example, CSR could mean something different to corporation than to civil society groups (NGOs). It can 
also mean different thing to researchers trying to establish it as a discipline and to decision-makers seeking to 
perform CSR inside companies. Thus, all have been free to define and interpret CSR as best fits their purpose. 
See, Michael Blowfield and Jedrzej Frynas, ‘Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Developing World’ (2005) 81(3) International Affairs 499, 513. 
4 Matten and Moon, above n 1; See also, Carroll, above n 2.  In some cases, CSR is linked to related terms such 
as sustainability, corporate citizenship, socially responsible investment, non-financial risk management, 
business sustainability, the triple bottom line and corporate governance.  
5 Mia Rahim, Legal Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Meta-Regulation Approach of Law for 
Raising CSR in a Weak Economy (Springer, 2014) 15.  
6 Samuel Idowu, ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ in Samuel Idowu and Walter 
Filho (eds), Global Practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (Springer, 2009) 11, 32. 
7 For a review of the history of CSR and definitions see Archie Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Concepts and Practices’ in Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams, Jeremy Moon, 
and Donald Siegel (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 
2008) 19.   
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quality of life.’8 The European Commission has previously, in 2001, defined CSR as ‘a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.’9 In this 
definition, the European Commission’s emphasis is on the protection of stakeholders, the 
society and the environment. The European Commission, based on its new strategy for CSR 
adopted in 2011, puts forward a new simpler definition of CSR as ‘the responsibility of 
enterprises for their impacts on society.’10 In turn this requires companies’ directors to act 
responsibly and take into account the impact of their decisions on society.11 
The dominating principle in the corporate social responsibility literature is the principle of 
voluntarism which implies that the responsible business activities are discretionary and reach 
beyond legal requirements.12 There is evident, for example in the following description of 
CSR as  
an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize the following: 
(a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the natural 
environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals; (b) that 
companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with whom they do business (e.g. 
                                                             
8 Richard Holme and Phil Watts, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Making Good Business Sense’ (Report, 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2000) 10 
<http://www.ceads.org.ar/downloads/Making%20good%20business%20sense.pdf>. 
9 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibilities, COM/366 final (18 July 2001) 6 
<http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/LW/Data%20reports%20and%20studies/Reports%20and%20%20communicati
on%20from%20EU%20Commission/20110830-103712_com_2001_366enpdf.pdf>. 
10 Commission of the European Communities, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM/681/Final (25 October 2011) 6 
<http://www.accessibletourism.org/resources/csr_communication_ec_com2011681.pdf>. 
11 Rado Bohinc, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: (A European Legal Perspective)’ (2014) 20 Canterbury Law 
Review 21, 37.  
12 Doreen McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: the New Corporate 
Accountability’, in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 9, 11; Bryan 
Husted and David Allen, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Multinational Enterprise: Strategic and 
Institutional Approaches’ (2006) 37(6) Journal of International Business Studies 838, 849; Abagail McWilliams 
and Donald Siegel, ‘Corporate Social Responsibilities: A Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (2001) 26(1) 
Academy of Management Review 117, 127. 
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within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its relationship with wider 
society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value to society.13 
The above recognises that CSR extends beyond the obligation to obey legal and regulatory 
minimum standards and the duty to maximise profit for the shareholders.14 The most widely 
held view is that corporate social responsibility requires corporations to prevent negative 
externalities (the costs to society of company’s activities which the corporation does not pay), 
to protect the stakeholders and the public from the negative impacts of their operations.15 
Further explanation on negative externalities and solutions is given in the following at 4.3 and 
4.4 respectively. It has also been argued that CSR should extend beyond mitigating negative 
externalities to require a company to contribute positively to the welfare of society.16 This can 
be in the form of education and health care programs for a local community, investments in 
local infrastructure like roads, electricity, sanitation and housing etc. Maximising social 
welfare is discussed later in this chapter at 4.5 below.   
Indeed, CSR is a multidimensional concept that covers a wide range of issues. Based on 
international standards that set CSR norms and promote policies such as the UN Global 
Compact,17 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,18 ISO 26000 Guidance 
                                                             
13 Blowfield and Frynas, above n 3, 503.  
14 Mujih, above n 1, 10; McWilliams and Siegel, above n 12. However, Carroll argued that obeying the law 
constitutes a part of CSR as he breaks down the concept into four components: the economic responsibilities, 
the legal responsibilities, the ethical responsibilities, and the philanthropic responsibilities of the company. This 
is because laws reflect society's view of fair practices, so complying with these laws is part of a business's 
responsibilities toward society. Archie Carroll, ‘The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the 
Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders’ (1991) 34 Business Horizons 39, 48.  
15 Mujih, above n 1, 36; see also Commission of the European Communities, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 
for Corporate Social Responsibility, above n 10, 6.  
16 Ibid, Keith Davis and Robert Blomstrom, Business and Society: Environment and Responsibility (McGraw-
Hill, 3rd ed, 1975) 39; Archie Carroll and Ann Buchholtz, Business and Society: Ethics, Sustainability, and 
Stakeholder Management (Cengage Learning, 9th ed, 2015) 31. 
17 UN Global Compact, United Nation Global Compact Progress Report (2017) 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/UN%20Impact%20Brochure_Concept-FINAL.pdf>. 
18 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(2011) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>. 
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Standard on Social Responsibility19 and many others,20 CSR may include efforts to mitigate 
the impact of companies’ activities on matters related to the environment, society and 
employees, respect for human rights,21 anti-corruption and anti-bribery measures22 (see 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4).23   
    4.2.2 The Rationale for Corporate Social Responsibility 
The fundamental question in the corporate social responsibility debate is why corporations 
should engage in positive CSR activities in addition to avoiding negative externalities. 
Corporate social responsibility justifications are related to models of governance discussed in 
the preceding chapter.24 In a stakeholder value model, companies must address and balance 
the need of their stakeholders.25 CSR is seen as a means to protect the stakeholders from the 
adverse impacts of companies’ operations. Stakeholders consist of individuals or groups of 
people who are affected by the company’s activities.26 According to stakeholder theory 
(previously discussed at 3.3.2), companies should balance their economic, social and 
environmental activities. In relation to negative externalities (see below), it is justified 
because these are the costs of the company’s operations for which it does not pay but which 
are imposed on the community. Although the primary concern of a company is to maximise 
profit, however, this profit should be made in such a way that minimises adverse impacts on 
                                                             
19 International Organization for Standardisation, ISO 26000 Guidance on social responsibility (2010) 
<https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/discovering_iso_26000.pdf>.  
20 For detailed information on many others corporate responsibility initiatives see Deborah Leipziger, The 
Corporate Responsibility Code Book (Routledge, revised 3rd ed, 2017).  
21 See generally Olufemi Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law: Multinational 
Corporations in Developing Countries (Routledge, 2011). 
22 See generally Adefolake Adeyeye, Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations in 
Developing Countries: Perspectives on Anti-corruption (Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
23 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L 330/1, para 6.   
24 Patricia Crifo and Antoine Reberioux, ‘Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: a 
Typology of OECD Countries’ (2016) 5(2) Journal of Governance and Regulation 14, 27.   
25 Michael Kerr, Richard Janda and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: a Legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 
2009) 13.  
26 Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, 1984) 46. 
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the society and the environment. The stakeholder centred model holds directors responsible 
for running the company to ultimately benefit all relevant stakeholders.27  
In relation to the shareholder model of corporate governance (previously discussed at 3.3.1), 
the sole duty of corporate directors is to maximise shareholder wealth. Under this model CSR 
can be legitimate if it is proved to be associated with higher (short-term or long-term) profit 
or increases shareholder value.28 However, modern company law, even in shareholder 
primacy jurisdictions, has moved towards a stakeholder model of governance.29 This is 
because the company success in maximising shareholder wealth is likely to be affected by the 
concerns of other stakeholders,30 and that the shareholder’s interests cannot be met without 
satisfying to some degree the demands of other stakeholders.31 Consequently, directors are 
required to promote the long-term success of the company, but they have to take into account 
the concerns and interests of relevant stakeholders and consider the social and environmental 
impact of the company’s activities. From this perspective, CSR is seen as a vital investment 
to enhance companies’ efficiency and benefit by increasing corporate profit and stimulating 
long-term sustainable development.32 This is called a ‘business case for CSR.’33 That is, the 
use of social initiatives to achieve corporate objectives (maximise profit).34 Strategic reasons 
relating to long term sustainability of the corporation appear to be the predominant motive of 
                                                             
27 Crifo and Reberioux, above n 24.  
28 Ibid; Robert Reich, ‘The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility’, (Working Paper No GSPP08-003, 
University of California, 1 August 2008) 54 <https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/ssrn-
id1213129.pdf>. 
29 Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder Divide’ (2010) 36(1) Journal of Corporation Law 59, 112. 
30 David Foster and Jan Jonker, ‘Stakeholder Relationships: The Dialogue of Engagement’ (2005) 5(5) 
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 51, 57.   
31 Dima Jamali, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility: A Fresh Perspective into Theory 
and Practice’ (2008) 82(1) Journal of Business Ethics 213, 231.  
32 Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of The Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and 
Implication’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Management Review 65, 91.  
33 For more details on the business case for CSR see eg, Elizabeth Kurucz, Barry Colbert and David Wheeler, 
‘The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Crane et al, above n 7, 83; Paul Argenti, Corporate 
Responsibility (SAGE Publications, 2015) 41-61. 
34 Carroll and Buchholtz, above n 16, 41-42.  
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CSR.35 Companies may invest in CSR activities to achieve higher economic benefits, 
generate competitive advantage,36 attract new business, strengthen employees’ loyalty and 
enhance relationships with customers and suppliers.37 In general, multiple strategic 
motivations for CSR activities may be at work at once.  
In addition to these strategic reasons for CSR, oil companies’ engagement in CSR activities 
may be motivated by concerns over long-term reputational risk38 which are perhaps more 
visible in the oil industry than some other sectors of the economy.39 The negative impacts of 
oil operations are detailed in the following section (see 4.3.2 below). Prominent examples of 
catastrophes in the oil industry include oil spills such as those involving the Exxon Valdez 
and the Deepwater Horizon explosion; the involvement of oil companies in human rights 
abuses such as Chevron in Nigeria and BP in Colombia; and protests by indigenous groups 
such as occurred in the anti-Shell protests in Nigeria. Such events (widely reported by the 
media) with increased awareness of the local communities and civil society institutions 
towards corporate behaviour (what it does and what corporations should do), have put 
particular pressure on IOCs to act in ways conforming to responsible conduct expected by 
society.40 Social activists (eg politicians, labour unions, indigenous people and NGOs 
campaigns) have made direct demands that IOCs internalise negative externalities that affect 
                                                             
35 Forest Reinhadt, Robert Stavins and Richard Vietor, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic 
Lens’ (2008) 2(2) Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 219, 239; Som Bhattacharyya, ‘Exploring the 
Concept of Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility for an Integrated Perspective’ (2010) 22(1) European 
Business Review 82, 101.  
36 Michael Porter and Mark Krame, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy’ (2002) 80(12) 
Harvard Business Review 56, 68; Philippe Gugler and Jacylyn Shi, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility for 
Developing Country Multinational Corporation: Lost War in Pertaining Global Competitiveness’ (2009) 87 
Journal of Business Ethics 3, 24.    
37 Jedrzej Frynas identified four motives for oil companies to engage in community development projects as a 
business case including: obtaining competitive advantage, maintaining a social licence to operate, managing 
external perceptions and keeping employees happy. See, Jedrzej Frynas, Beyond Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Oil Multinational and Social Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 116-121.  
38 See eg, Prakash Sethi, Terrence Martell and Mert Demir, ‘Building Corporate Reputation Through Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports: The Case of Extractive Industries’ (2016) 19(3) Corporate Reputation 
Review 219, 243; C Maden et al, ‘Linking Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Reputation: a Study on 
Understanding Behavioral Consequences’ (2012) 58 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 655, 664.  
39 Frynas, above n 37, 6; David Spence, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Shale Patch’ (2017) 21(2) Lewis 
and Clark Law Review 387, 425.  
40 Frynas, above n 37, 6.  
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particular environmental and social aspects41 (see the case of Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline 
explained at 4.4.2 below). If there are adverse impacts of a company's operations on the 
environment and society, then there is a possibility of unrest in local communities towards 
the company. This could lead to the stalling of a company’s operational activities (for 
example day to day running of facilities or delaying in the commissioning of new projects) 
which might cause financial loss.42 Protest by social institutions against the company might 
also lead to a wide spread loss of company reputation. This might result in further economic 
risks as when a company suffers reputational loss this may negatively affect its relationships 
with financial institutions and investors.43 Thus, it is important for corporations to act in more 
socially desirable manner and manage their relationship with wider society. In this case, CSR 
investment by IOCs is a response to external pressure from civil society, but at the same time 
it provides legitimacy and social approval for corporations, and contributes to maintaining a 
stable working environment.44 Finally, oil companies might adopt CSR programs because 
basically it is ‘the right thing to do’ to be a good corporate citizen.45  
Overall, motives for companies’ responsible behaviours can be justified on different grounds 
according to the model of governance. It is difficult to disentangle the multiple, usually 
concurrent, motivations for CSR activities which can range from avoiding external pressure 
from civil society and concerns over long-term reputational risk to companies’ self-interest. 
Critics see many CSR efforts as ‘greenwashing’ particularly if the company also benefits 
from CSR spending in some way. The following discussion highlights the main arguments 
against CSR.   
 
                                                             
41 Ibid.  
42 Bhattacharyya, above n 35.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Frynas, above n 37, 117; Crifo and Reberioux, above n 24. 
45 Spence, above n 39. 
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     4.2.3 Arguments Against Corporate Social Responsibility 
The debates about whether the business should be socially and environmentally responsible 
first appear in the early 1950s and continue.46 Corporate social responsibility advocates claim 
that CSR is a necessary part of contemporary business’ operations to prevent the 
externalising of corporate costs and enhancing long-term success (as discussed in the 
previous section).47 CSR opponents argue that the role of the corporation is to maximise 
shareholders wealth, and not engage in social welfare. Milton Friedman argues that the 
company’s only duty is to maximise shareholder profits.48 They exist only to serve consumers 
and thereby make money for investors, and this is how they serve the public.49 This line of 
argument sees corporate social responsibility as sacrificing profits in the social interest.50 
However, this view limits CSR to benevolence and fails to consider CSR as critical to 
minimising negative externalities.51 In addition, the most available evidence demonstrates 
that most corporations view socially responsible actions in the same way that they view more 
traditional business activities.52 Corporations are not sacrificing profits for the social good, 
rather they engage in a more profitable set of socially beneficial activities that contribute to 
their financial bottom line (reducing costs and increasing profits).53 Thus, CSR should not be 
                                                             
46 For a review of the history of CSR see Carroll, ‘A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and 
Practices’, above n 7, 19-46.  
47 McWilliams and Siegel, above n 12; Bhattacharyya, above n 35.  
48 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962) 133.  
49 Reich, above n 28, 55.  
50 Einer Elhauge, ‘Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest’ in Bruce Hay, Robert Stavins, and Richard Vietor (eds), Environmental Protection and the Social 
Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, Economics, and Business (Resources for the Future, 2005) 13. 
51 Mujih, above n 1, 39.  
52 Reinhadt et al, above n 35; McWilliams and Siegel, above n 12. 
53 For example, Dow Chemical reduces its carbon emissions to reduce its energy costs. Walmart has applied 
'green' packaging for its fresh produce (transparent plastics from corn sugars) because it is cheaper than 
petroleum-based packaging. These steps may be worthwhile in terms of environmental protection; however, 
they are not undertaken because they are socially responsible but to reduce costs. Although such initiatives 
might have some beneficent impact on the rest of society, yet the main focus of corporation is profit. See Reich, 
above n 28, 6 –7.  
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seen as in conflict with shareholders’ interests but rather as protecting their long-term 
interests.54   
Corporate social responsibility issues are also viewed as having a public character so that it is 
the role of state, not companies, to address these issues.55 Consequently, it is inappropriate for 
corporations to be engaged in social welfare which can impair efficiency by distracting 
management from the company’s legitimate business activities.56 It is argued that, 
corporations being socially responsible mislead the public into believing that more is being 
done by the private sector to meet certain public goals and that diverts public attention from 
the task of establishing such laws and rules defining responsible behaviour in the first place.57 
As discussed in chapter two, since oil and gas are central to the Iraqi economy, this sector is 
the obvious focus for any CSR measures. This is because oil and gas activities can pose 
severe threats to the environment, workers and the community at large. As CSR, at a 
minimum, requires corporations to reduce or eliminate negative externalities, the following 
section examines the negative externalities arising out of oil and gas operations and how oil 
companies should deal with these impacts and what CSR would require them to do?  
4.3. Negative Externalities in the Oil Industry 
     4.3.1 Negative Externalities   
Negative externalities are the negative consequences of a corporation’s economic activity that 
affect the public, environment and third parties who are not directly involved in those 
activities and for which the corporation does not pay.58 Negative externalities arise when a 
                                                             
54 McBarnet, above n 12, 9.  
55 Mujih, above n 1, 86.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Reich, above n 28, 51.  
58 Externalities in general are defined as activities that generate costs or benefits to people not directly involved 
in those activities. These effects are generally unplanned or unintended, therefore, they was not included in the 
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corporation’s activities injure surrounding communities and the environment but the 
corporation does not pay for these costs, rather the costs are borne by the community. In 
economics, the analysis of negative externalities assumes that market failures59 arise because 
corporations ignore the external effects of their actions.60 There is evidence that oil activities 
create certain negative externalities both global (greenhouse gas emissions that cause global 
climate change) and local (eg oil spills or property damages, see 4.3.2 below). However, 
when a corporation pays the external costs of its activities, it internalises the costs of that 
externality. The issue is what corporations are expected to do about negative externalities and 
what is the potential role of corporate social responsibility in solving this problem.  
The most widely held view is that corporate social responsibility requires corporations to 
protect the stakeholders and the public from negative externalities by identifying, preventing 
and mitigating the possible adverse impacts of their operations.61 This involves both 
preventive and responsive aspects.  Under the preventive aspect, the company takes proactive 
steps to avoid causing harm to society by anticipating the externalities that may arise from its 
activities and takes pre-emptive measures to address them.62 For example, the company 
expects that potential harm may result from discharging its hazardous waste, and develops a 
hazard-free method for disposing the waste.63 Another example is an oil company anticipates 
the risks that could result from drilling a new oil well or transporting oil by pipelines and, 
therefore, designs a good risk management policy (due diligence initiatives) using modern 
technology to prevent any possible harm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
original market price for the transaction. See, Terry Hillman, Economics (Mike Sanders, 2014) 45; see also, 
Robert Frank and Ben Bernanke, Principles of Economics (McGraw-Hill, 5th ed, 2013) 279. 
59 Market failure is an economic situation where the allocation of goods and resources in a free market is not 
efficient. It occurs when the price mechanism fails to account for all of the costs and benefits necessary to 
provide and consume a good. 
60 William McEachern, Economics: a Contemporary Introduction (Thomson South-Western, 7th ed, 2006) 365.  
61 Commission of the European Communities, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, above n 10, 6; Mujih, above n 1, 36.   
62 Mujih, above n 1, 45.  
63 Ibid.  
76 
 
In contrast, the responsive aspect is concerned with the way the company reacts to negative 
externalities after they have occurred.64 It assumes that the company has acted in a way that 
causes negative externalities such as injuring employees because of an incident during the 
operations or an oil spill causing pollution and property damage. In this situation, the oil 
company should mitigate damage caused by their operations and provide fair compensation 
to the victims. The way the company reacts to the problem can determine whether the 
company is a socially responsible entity or not. It has been argued that, action taken to 
remedy a fundamental breach of the law or in response to enormous pressure from activists, 
stakeholders and the government does not amount to social responsibility, but only action 
based on principle qualifies as CSR.65 Thus, the responsive aspect is a crucial matter for the 
company because its response to the problems might have a significant effect on its image 
and, therefore, its future in the community.66 
     4.3.2 Potential Negative Impacts of Oil and Gas Operations  
Oil and gas activities, both onshore and offshore, pose serious threats to the environment and 
society during each stage of industrial process including exploration, production, refining and 
transport.67 The negative environmental impacts include land clearance, oil spills, hazardous 
waste, noise, road congestion, natural gas emissions and contribution to global warming.68 
                                                             
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 See eg, Javier Estrada, Kristian Tengen, and Helge Bergesen, Environmental Challenges Confronting the Oil 
Industry (Wiley, 1997); Yusaf Samiullah, ‘Biological Effects of Marine Oil Pollution’ (1985) 2(4) Oil and 
Petrochemical Pollution 235, 264.  
68 Global warming is an increase of Earth's average surface temperature due to effect of greenhouse gasses 
(GHG) such as carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. Given scientific evidence like the results 
presented in the Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, such emissions impact the world climate negatively. 
An increase in the concentration of GHG can led to increase the mean atmospheric temperature implying a 
higher frequency of disasters and natural catastrophes (such as droughts, floods, and heat waves), higher 
mortality rates, and a significant loss of biodiversity. For further explanation on global warming and climate 
change see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report’ (Report, 1 
November 2014) 
<ftp://atitlan.ethz.ch/docs/afischli/for-srinivasan/TS-01978822-
Can't%20suppress%20pdf%20indexing%20during%20imports/Attached%20PDFs/Ip096.pdf>. 
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Given that oil and gas companies usually operate in locations of high biodiversity and 
environmentally sensitive areas, any oil or chemical pollution, even small amounts, may 
cause huge ecological damage and harm to local communities. In addition, oil spills not only 
harm the soil immediately surrounding the spill but can also pollute ground and surface 
water, threatening drinking water sources and agricultural land. These environmental effects 
can cause adverse health impacts and significant economic loss (see the case of Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, 4.3.2 below). Other social effects include threats to the safety of the 
workplace and the community; preventing the use of property rights or exclusion of 
indigenous people; human rights abuse (see the case of Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline below at 
4.4.2); increase in local population levels (immigration) leading to many social problems (eg 
pressure on social amenities such as schools and health, a prevalence of diseases like HIV 
Aids, high prices of goods and services and inflation); and impact on other sectors of the 
economy (eg abandonment of farming for the oil and gas industry which affect agriculture).69 
The BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is the most recent example of 
damage caused by the operations of international oil companies. The Deepwater Horizon oil 
drilling rig, leased and operated by BP, exploded and sank on the 20th of April 2010, causing 
the death of 11 workers on the rig and the largest offshore oil release in US history.70 The 
Macondo well was damaged in the explosion and start leaking a torrent of oil and gas into the 
Gulf for around three months. It was estimated that more than 4.9 million barrels of oil had 
been released into the Gulf before the well was successfully closed on the 15th of July 2010.71 
The spill resulted in substantial negative economic, social and ecological consequences. In 
addition to the loss of workers’ lives and injuries to others, different groups of people were 
                                                             
69 For a brief explanation on how business might impact the internationally recognised human rights see, UN 
Guiding Principles, ‘The Relationship Between Business and Human Rights’ 
<https://www.ungpreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/UNGPRF_businesshumanrightsimpacts.pdf>. 
70 US Department of the Interior, U.S. Scientific Teams Refine Estimates of Oil Flow from BP's Well Prior to 
Capping (1 August 2010) <https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Scientific-Teams-Refine-Estimates-of-
Oil-Flow-from-BP-Well-Prior-to-Capping>. 
71 Ibid.  
78 
 
directly exposed to the oil spill (ie clean-up workers and Gulf Coast residents). Those 
exposed continue to suffer multiple chronic diseases72 and mental illness.73 The incident also 
damaged natural resources, destroyed the habitats of marine animals and organisms, and 
contaminated many coasts and marshes along the Gulf. This impacted on the livelihoods of 
thousands of fishermen as well as the tourism sector.74 The Deepwater Horizon explosion is 
an example of corporate failure to protect the environment and to secure the safety of 
workers.  
Another illustration of negative environmental impacts arising out of oil industry operations 
is in relation to the Iraqi southern marshlands. The Iraqi southern marshlands, also known as 
the ‘Ahwar of Southern Iraq’, comprise the lower floodplains of the Euphrates and the Tigris 
which are the largest wetlands in the Middle East. The main marshes are Al-Hammar, Qurnah 
and Al-Hawizeh which together cover an area about 15-20 thousand sq. km, Figure 4.1 
below.75 The area supports a diverse range of flora and fauna, and is considered as a major 
stopping point for migratory birds, and is inhabited by more than 500 thousand persons.76 In 
July 2016, the Iraqi southern marshlands were named a UNESCO World Heritage Site for 
their mixed biodiversity and archaeological values of global significance.77 Being part of the 
World Heritage Site means that these marshlands become legally protected areas from any 
                                                             
72 Mark D’Andrea and G. Kesava Reddy, ‘Health Consequences among Subjects Involved in Gulf Oil Spill 
Clean-up Activities’ (2013) 126(11) The American Journal of Medicine 966, 974; Lauren Peres et al, 'The 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Physical Health among Adult Women in Southern Louisiana: The Women and 
Their Children’s Health (WaTCH) Study’ (2016) 124(8) Environmental Health Perspectives 1208, 1213.  
73 Tonya Hansel et al, ‘Longer-Term Mental and Behavioral Health Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil 
Spill’ (2015)3 Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 1260, 1271; Richard Kwok et al, ‘Mental Health 
Indicators Associated with Oil Spill Response and Clean-up: Cross-sectional Analysis of the GuLF STUDY 
Cohort’ (2017) 2 Lancet Public Health 560, 567.  
74 Natural Resources Defense Council, ‘Summary of Information Concerning the Ecological and Economic 
Impacts of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster’ (June 2015) 6-7  
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75 For more information on the Ahwar of Southern Iraq and its history see Nadhir Al-Ansari, Sven Knutsson and 
Ammar Ali, ‘Restoring the Garden of Eden, Iraq’ (2012) 2(1) Journal of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical 
Engineering 53, 88.  
76 Ibid.  
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activities that can potentially impact their integrity. These marshlands face fundamental 
conservation challenges because of the overlap between marshlands' zones and potential and 
actual areas for oil exploration or production. In practice, there are numerous contracted areas 
for oil exploration inside and immediately close to the Marshes as shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
This includes north Rumaila oil field in the east Al-Hammar area (contracted to BP/CNPC), 
West Qurnah oil field in the central Marshes (contracted to Lukoil/Statoil), Majnoon oil field 
in the south Al-Hawizeh (contracted to Shell/Petronas), and Halfaya oil field, in the north Al-
Hawizeh (contracted to CNPC/Petronas/Total).78 Oil development in these areas is 
recognised as an emerging threat to the integrity of the Marshes.79 Table 4.1 below 
summarises these threats. 
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 Figure 4.1: Contract Areas for Oil Exploration in the Marsh Area 
                 
 
 Source: IUCN 201180 
Table 4.1: Direct and Indirect Threats from Oil Exploration/Extraction to the Integrity of the 
Ecosystem of the Marshes  
• Habitat destruction and fragmentation for oil infrastructure (access roads, oil 
installations, pipelines) 
• Freshwater consumption during oil extraction, 4-15 per cent of the oil volume (scarce 
water resources available in the Marshes)  
• Accidental pollution with crude oil or chemicals used in the extraction process, 
• Disturbance and potentially increased hunting pressure because of easier access to marsh 
areas via oil transport infrastructure, and 
• Deterioration of the aesthetic values of the area, decrease of attractiveness to future 
tourists (once security situation has improved), and loss of tourism income, and hence 
incentives for local resource users to switch from non-sustainable to sustainable ways of 
natural resource use. 
Source: IUCN 201181 
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The most important threats from oil exploration and extraction to the integrity of the 
ecosystem of the marshes are draining the marshlands, possible oil pollution and freshwater 
availability. Because of oil exploration, a large area of the marshes (1000 km2) was drained 
for the major oil fields in southern of Iraq (mentioned above).82 As a result, the size of the 
marshes would depend on the size and the existence of the oil installations. Any oil pollution 
into the water will cause harmful impacts on biological species like fish and birds. The rapid 
spread of oil pollution in the water and the absence of appropriate technology for treating 
such pollution in Iraq increase the dangers of any oil incident. Furthermore, oil extraction 
from fields close to marshes might create demands on the scarce freshwater resources 
available in the marshes and thus threaten the aquatic ecosystem.83 This is because oil 
production, in particular from the Iraqi southern fields, requires on average 1.5 thousand 
barrels of water injected replacing the space in the reservoir created by producing one 
thousand barrels of oil.84 This method is in use to maintain the reservoir pressure and increase 
the percentage of oil extraction. Obviously, oil exploration and extraction in these areas poses 
a threat not only to the general ecological integrity, but also specifically influencing the life 
of indigenous people heavily dependent on the marshes for their livelihoods.85  
In order to protect the Iraqi marshes, as a world heritage site, and the other environmental 
issues mentioned above, oil companies both national and international must integrate social 
and environmental protection policy into their existing corporate strategies. This is because, 
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83 United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, ‘United Nations World Water Development Report 
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84 International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report (9 October 2012) 
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as argued in the previous section (see 4.3.1), CSR requires oil companies to take 
responsibility for the harm caused to the environment and the community by their activities 
(negative externalities). They have to undertake due diligence initiatives to mitigate any 
possible risks on the environment and the negative consequences on the local communities 
and cultural heritage in the areas of their operations (internalising the externality). In this 
context, CSR should be viewed as a complement to, rather than, a substitute for, increasing 
government regulation.86 The role of corporate governance and CSR in protecting the 
environment and other stakeholder in Iraq is discussed further in chapter six at 6.3.1.  
However, evidence shows that many oil companies have failed to prevent the negative 
impacts of their operations on the environment and society, especially those operating in 
developing countries.87 In some cases oil companies were not forced by legislation to fully 
internalise the harm caused to the environment and society. For example the supertanker 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 leaked 11 million gallons of crude oil in Alaska, resulting in 
severe economic, cultural and social impacts that continued for years after the accident.88 At 
the time of Exxon Valdez oil spill, the liability for oil pollution was limited under the US 
law.89 This accident encouraged the US government to make significant legal changes by 
enacting a comprehensive oil pollution statute, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, to prevent 
future oil spills, impose penalties and help victims of future oil spills if an oil spill occurs.90  
Even when there are environmental, health and safety laws, oil companies do not always 
                                                             
86 Reinhadt et al, above n 35.   
87 See generally, Charles Woolfson and Matthias Beck (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility Failures in the Oil 
Industry (Baywood Pub, 2005); Jedrzej Frynas, ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies’ (2005) 81(3) International Affairs 581, 598. 
88 See, eg, Steven Picou and Cecelia Martin, ‘Long-Term Community Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 
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comply with those laws. For example, in the case of Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP 
breached the Clean Water Act 1972 (US) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 1918 (US) in 
addition to 11 felony counts of misconduct or neglect by ships officers relating to the loss of 
11 lives.91  
This problem is most visible in developing countries where high levels of corruption often 
impede meaningful enforcement of existing legislation and where adequate compensation 
measures for adversely affected groups rarely exist.92 For example, in April 2013, the Rana 
Plaza factory in Bangladesh collapsed. It caused the death of over 1,100 garment workers and 
injured more than 2,500 garment workers.93 In this incident, companies had breached existing 
building and labour protection laws in Bangladesh.  
Another example is the Bhopal tragedy, where the victims have not been fairly compensated 
after more than three decades of litigation in the US and India.94 The international company 
that caused the catastrophe, Union Carbide, neither remedied the human and environmental 
damage nor paid compensation.95 Similarly, Chevron’s oil exploration and production activity 
in Ecuador damaged the environment and threatened the livelihood of people from at least six 
indigenous groups. After more than twenty years of litigation, the impacted area has still not 
been cleaned up and the victims have still not been compensated.96  
                                                             
91 Guilty Plea Agreement, United States v BP Exploration and Production Inc, No 12-292 (ED La, 15 
November 2012) Rec Doc 2-1. 
92 European Parliament, ‘New Options for Strengthening Standards on Social and Environmental 
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International Journal of Advanced Research and Development 1162, 1169.  
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These incidents show that even if there exists legal regulation, enforcement is a serious 
problem not only for developing countries such as Bangladesh but also in relation to large 
companies operating in developed countries like BP in the US (see the case of Deepwater 
Horizon explosion explained above). The problem is particularly acute in developing 
countries because of political influence of large industries and corruption risks. So, the issue 
is whether where there is a failure of law enforcement, CSR has any role to play in improving 
working conditions or minimum environmental standards. In addition to providing a sound 
basis for voluntary CSR, it also points to the need for more comprehensive and effective 
enforcement of existing regulations. The potential role for CSR in Iraq in protecting 
stakeholders from the negative impacts of oil activity is discussed in chapter six at 6.3.1.  
4.4 Solutions for Negative Externalities  
As explained above, negative externalities arise because corporations do not pay for the 
external effects of their actions, creating a market failure.97 Economists (eg Ronald Coase) 
argue that externalities can sometimes be internalised through a private negotiation between 
the affected party and the company causing the damage. As long as the bargaining costs are 
low, the parties would achieve an efficient solution to the problem of externalities by 
assigning property rights to one party or the other.98 Consequently, a private deal would 
negate the inefficiency of the market because the cost not originally included could be paid to 
the injured party.99 However, solving the problem of negative externalities through a private 
negotiation is more likely to be effective for small and local externalities than for larger or 
global ones. This is because global externalities, like global warming, involve a large number 
                                                             
97 McEachern, above n 60, 365.  
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of people and corporations. When the number of parties involved in the transaction is large, 
assigning property rights is not a useful solution for efficient outcomes.100   
It is argued that with large-scale or global externalities only government action can 
successfully aggregate the interests of all individuals suffering from the externality. 
Legislation is seen as the necessary solution to remedy the externality.101 As a result, 
governments have developed policies and enacted laws in several areas to protect the 
environment and society from the externality of corporates’ actions. One policy that has been 
tried is requiring a corporation to pay a tax that is equal to the marginal social cost of 
pollution, usually 100 dollars per ton of emissions. This tax internalises the externality and 
removes the inefficiency of the negative externalities.102 Another solution is for governments 
to enact legislation to force corporations to bear the costs in particular areas, for example, 
human rights, labour rights, and environmental protection etc. In areas such as those, CSR is 
not seen as an appropriate response; it is not left to corporations as good corporate citizens to 
do the right thing. The next section will give illustrations of legislation in these areas.  
     4.4.1 Hard Law Solution 
Many countries, specifically industrialised countries, have enacted strong environmental and 
labour protection laws to require companies to obey labour standards and protect the 
environment. These laws are continually updated to respond to current issues. For example, 
Canada has issued much stronger environmental legislation to ensure the safety of pipeline 
projects. The Canadian Pipeline Safety Act 2015 incorporates the ‘polluter pays’ principle 
into Canadian law by imposing additional financial requirements on companies that construct 
                                                             
100 This is because shared ownership of property rights gives each owner power over all the others, so joint 
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101 Andrews Doku and Benjamin Appiah-Kubi, ‘Internalizing the Negative Externalities of Mining in Ghana: 
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or operate pipelines.103 According to this Act, in the case of oil or gas release, the financial 
liability of a pipeline company is unlimited,104 and there is liability for the costs and damages 
it causes without proof of fault or negligence.105 In Europe there are numerous specific 
measures to increase labour protection in supply chains, such as Modern Slavery Act 2015 in 
the UK106 and Duty of Vigilance Law 2017 in France.107 The following chapter gives 
illustrations of where legislation, rather than CSR, was seen as the necessary solution to 
protect workers in developing countries, who produced goods for sale in developed 
economies, see the discussion in chapter five at 5.4.  
For example, the US adopted legislative solutions to force oil companies to internalise the 
negative externalities of their operations. In the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (see 4.3.2 above), 
the environment, coastal communities and wild life were protected by legislation with BP 
subject to criminal and civil penalties and civil liability for the harm caused. BP agreed to 
plead guilty to the criminal charges related to the accident.108 This led BP to enter into 
criminal and civil settlements109 with the US government in addition to other payments such 
as clean-up costs. These settlements included penalties for breach of laws, compensation for 
victims, procedures to improve BP's code of conduct and social welfare programs. Under the 
Guilty Plea Agreement,110 approved by the court in early 2013,111 BP was required to pay 
                                                             
103 Pipeline Safety Act, SC 2015, c 21, s 48(11).  
104 Ibid, s 48(12)(1).  
105 Ibid, s 48(12)(4).  
106 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK) c 30, s 54. 
107 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 [Law No 2017-399 of 23 March 2017] (France) JO, 28 March 2017. 
108 BP pleaded guilty to 14 counts of criminal conduct; 11 felony counts of misconduct or neglect of ships 
officers relating to the loss of 11 lives; one misdemeanour count under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; one 
misdemeanour count under the Clean Water Act; and one felony count of obstruction of Congress. See, Guilty 
Plea Agreement, United States v BP Exploration and Production Inc, No 12-292 (ED La, 15 November 2012) 
Rec Doc 2-1. 
109 These settlements include the Guilty Plea Agreement, Economic and Property Damages Settlement 
Agreement, Medical Settlement Agreement and Administrative Agreement.  
110 The Guilty Plea Agreement resolves all federal criminal charges but it does not cover civil claims.  
111 United States v BP Exploration and Production Inc, No 12-292 (ED La, 15 November 2012) Rec Doc.  
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billions of dollars as fines.112 Under other settlements, BP agreed to pay billions of dollars to 
resolve civil claims113 and substantial compensation to the affected people, businesses and 
local governments.114   
For the purpose of preventing future accidents, the Guilty Plea Agreement further included 
specific requirements enforced by the court to enhance BP’s ethics, safety and risk 
management practices (corporate’ internal environment). The Agreement imposed a five-year 
term of probation, whereby BP’s performance would be overseen for the next four years. To 
meet the terms of its probation, BP is specifically required, for example, to conduct Safety 
and Environmental Management Systems audits; comply with operational oversight 
provisions; develop ethical conduct in dealings with the authorities; adopt specific oil spill 
response training and drill measures and programs; revise its oil spill response plan and 
develop new safety technologies.115 It was also required to hire a third-party auditor to 
oversee compliance with these conditions and publicly disclose compliance information.116 
These provisions required BP to internalise the adverse effects of its activities, as well as 
setting in place measures to prevent future harm to persons, property, and the environment. 
The US Department of Justice declared that such safety provisions combined with the 
                                                             
112 Under this agreement, BP had to pay, over a five-year period, USD 4.0 billion as criminal penalties. This 
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financial requirements (criminal and civil) have made this settlement 'the strongest of its kind 
in history.'117  
At the same time, BP agreed under several settlements with the US government to finance 
programs for the benefit of various stakeholders including the environment, local 
communities, and federal and state governments (corporate’s external environment).118 These 
settlements provided an opportunity to turn Deepwater Horizon crisis into long-term 
investment to support Gulf Coast communities. In addition to providing compensation for 
damages resulting from the accident, many of those settlements have established sustainable 
programs to support research, education, health, and environmental restoration and 
protection, to mitigate the adverse effects of this oil spill and prevent similar future 
incidents.119  
Overall, the preceding discussion demonstrates that the US has taken a hard law legislative 
approach to ensure that IOCs, in this case BP, were held responsible for the negative 
externalities created by its activities. Environmental protection and the safety of workplace 
are not left to voluntary CSR. The government has imposed tough requirements in the 
settlements with BP to protect the internal (ie employees) and external stakeholders (ie the 
environment, affected communities and the government). These operated to deter BP and 
other deep-water drillers from causing a similar catastrophic loss in the future. BP had to 
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agree to review its code of conduct, improve process safety and risk management plan and 
conduct specified training exercises for drills and oil spill response.120  
The Deepwater Horizon case also demonstrates that the US is able through both its legislative 
regime and jurisdiction to control IOCs and provide support for stakeholders from the 
negative consequences of an oil spill. As of May 2015, claims related to Deepwater Horizon 
have been mostly resolved and BP has paid billions of dollars in criminal fines and 
compensation, and been responsible for the costs of clean-up. By contrast, victims of 
catastrophes caused by IOCs in developing countries as India, Ecuador, Nigeria, Ghana and 
others, have not received fair compensation nor clean-up of the pollution caused by the oil 
company.121  
The lessons learned from these cases is that developing countries should enact hard laws for 
environmental protection and workplace safety to require IOCs to protect stakeholders and 
impose liability for harm that arises from their activities. In this regard, developing countries 
should also learn from the Canadian experience which incorporates the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle into oil and gas pipeline law that make the liability of a pipeline company unlimited 
for the costs and damages the company may cause (see above). It follows, therefore, that in 
developing countries CSR should, at best, complement, rather than be a substitute for, 
environmental and labour protection laws.122 Legislative protection in developing countries 
should be combined with strong enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. The position in 
relation to Iraq is discussed in chapter six at 6.3.1.     
Nevertheless, legislation is not the only possible avenue for forcing IOCs to compensate. The 
Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, discussed next, is illustrative. 
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    4.4.2 Community and Pressure from International Institutions  
The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project is an oil development project which includes 
construction of a 1,070 km underground pipeline designed to carry crude oil from the Doba 
region of southern Chad to the Atlantic coast of Cameroon for transportation to the world 
market. The project was approved by World Bank in 2000.123 The project was executed and 
operated by a consortium of three international oil companies; the project leader ExxonMobil 
owns 40 per cent, Chevron 25 per cent and Petronas of Malaysia 35 per cent.124 The 
consortium of three IOCs provided approximately 97 per cent of the project capital needed 
whilst Cameroon and Chad were to provide the remaining 3 per cent.125 Both countries 
applied for loans from the World Bank to fund the project.  
According to the World Bank, the project was expected to generate significant economic 
benefits to both countries during its 25-year life span.126 Building the pipeline was necessary 
for Chad because it is landlocked and its quickest access to the ocean from the oil fields is 
through Cameroon. At the same time, Cameroon benefits from transit fees and taxes on 90 
percent of the pipeline that had to go through its territory.  It was expected that both countries 
would benefit from substantial improvements to their infrastructure, increased employment, 
capacity-building and poverty reduction.127  
Despite the estimated benefits from the project for both countries, the project was heavily 
criticised by civil society, institutions and foreign governments.128 The concern was the 
negative impacts on the host communities in terms of environmental degradation, adverse 
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health impacts, and human rights abuses. Criticism centred on the possible adverse effects of 
the project on the environment and community that were not adequately addressed in the first 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study submitted by the project sponsor in 1998. The 
pipeline route was expected to cross 17 main rivers and pass through or close to important 
areas that are home to indigenous peoples in Cameroon, as well as through rainforest 
inhabited by endangered species of plants and animals.129 The offshore terminal on the 
Cameroon coast posed a threat to the ecologically diverse coastal region whose inhabitants 
largely depend on fishery and tourism. As a result, any pipeline leakages could cause 
groundwater contamination and freshwater or marine pollution. This could seriously affect 
communities that rely on these water systems for their daily needs. There were also concerns 
about forced resettlements of householders around oil wells and significant loss of fertile land 
for local farmers and cattle ranchers because of oil exploitation and production.130 In 
addition, massive migration into the project area during construction may pose threats to food 
security and increase the risk of transmitting diseases. There was also a risk of ethnic conflict 
in the region.131 The EIA study was intended to mitigate the project’s social and ecological 
risks. However, the EIA study prepared by the consortium did not provide a plan to respond 
to an oil spill nor did it clearly define the responsibility for spills and other disasters. It also 
lacked adequate participation and consultation with the affected people.132   
Following the numerous concerns that were raised by critics of the project, NGOs and other 
concerned groups pressured the World Bank to force IOCs to mitigate negative externalities. 
The World Bank was the target because without its involvement, the oil pipeline could not be 
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built, as the project sponsors ExxonMobil admitted.133 The World Bank, in turn, influenced 
oil companies by incorporating community demands into the project’s lending conditions. 
The World Bank made its involvement in the project conditional on the consortium holding 
active consultations with local people and requiring a detailed study to address the negative 
impact of the project.134 It required the consortium of oil companies to provide a new EIA 
study that addressed social and ecological concerns raised about the project and elaborate the 
measures that would be taken to reduce or eliminate any adverse impact of the project on the 
environment and the community.135 
Due to the direct and indirect pressure by the community and the World Bank, the IOCs 
undertook numerous improvements to address the criticisms made in relation to the first 
version in the second EIA study that became public in 1999. These changes included 
redesigning the pipeline route in response to concerns about the effects of a possible oil spill, 
and plans to mitigate the adverse impacts. Table 4.2 below details these changes.    
The discussion on the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project shows that absent pressure from 
the community and the World Bank (funder of the project), IOCs would have not internalised 
negative externalities. The external pressures have influenced oil companies’ decisions 
significantly and led to better project management including significant adjustments to the 
project design to protect the environment and society and suitable consultation with local 
communities.136 IOCs report that they continue with CSR initiatives over the project’s life.137 
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Such pressure by NGOs forces IOCs to take CSR seriously, principally in developing 
countries where environmental and social protect legislation is not as stringent as that of 
developed countries or not enforced.138 However, it must be noted that NGO pressure may 
have worked in this instance because the NGO was able to exert influence on the World Bank 
as the project funder.  
Table 4.2: Changes in the Second EIA Study of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project 
1  Re-routing the pipeline away from sensitive habitats, 
2 Developing an Oil Spill Response Plan, 
3 Presenting an Environmental Monitoring Plan, 
4  Developing an Operations Integrity Management System, 
5  Introducing an Indigenous Peoples’ Plan, 
6 Presenting a Compensation Plan to those whose land and property would be affected 
by the project and 
7 Introducing a health outreach programme to local communities and workers  
Source: Author based on information provided by Edwin Mujih (2012)139 
NGOs and international institutions may be able to influence various CSR initiatives, but 
their legitimacy and capacity are often limited,140 because of their lack of accountability.141 
Moreover, the majority of oil projects do not involve international financial institutions and 
civil society pressure is rarely strong enough to force socially responsible conduct by IOCs. 
This confirms the need for statutory regulations, specifically in developing countries, to 
ensure at the very least, environmental protection. This is practically important for Iraq, as is 
explained in chapter 2 (see 2.7.1) discussing how oil projects pose serious threats to 
                                                             
138 Thomas Lyon and John Maxwell, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical 
Perspective’ (2008) 2(2) Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 240, 260.  
139 Mujih, above n 1, 89-99.  
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indigenous communities and places of cultural heritage. Legislation for protecting the 
environment and other stakeholders in Iraq is discussed in chapter 6 at 6.3.1.  
4.5. Corporate Social Responsibility and Community Welfare 
     4.5.1 Maximizing Social Welfare 
As previously explained, CSR can be seen not only as a means by which IOCs can be held 
responsible for negative externalities arising from their operations but also as means to 
contribute to sustainable development in host countries. In some developing countries, IOCs 
are not merely expected to act appropriately in terms of negative externalities requiring 
responsible environmental practice and health and safety, but also to increase social 
welfare.142 Whilst the primary objective of host countries is to obtain fiscal revenues from oil 
and petroleum as a means to build infrastructure that will benefit the community,143 some 
countries look to IOCs to provide benefits and infrastructure for local communities. This can 
be short term while operations are on-going, like supplying goods and services, and longer 
term such as training and skills development, as well as local community infrastructure such 
as roads, electricity etc.144 Many host countries have regulated local content and training 
requirements in the extractive industries (mining, oil and gas) (see 5.5 and 6.3).  
Companies’ positive contributions to community welfare are particularly relevant in 
developing countries, where the state has been unable to provide necessary infrastructure, 
health, and education facilities.145 Local communities in developing countries expect oil 
companies to play an essential role in providing public goods. Moreover, in developing 
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countries where existing regulations require a level of environmental and social protection 
below social expectations, additional corporate investment to improve living standards can 
increase social welfare. However, companies’ contributions to increase social welfare are not 
limited to developing countries. At present in the US, for example, many shale producers 
have made large contributions to local governments (eg local fire departments and road 
repairs) and other social programs (eg healthcare, education, training and local content) 
aimed at alleviating the social impacts resulting from the boom in producing shale placed on 
the local infrastructure and the community.146 This may be seen by shale producers as 
essential for their long term interests and necessary to maintain public support for this 
industry in what had become a hostile environment. 
As part of the growing global expectation that the oil industry should contribute positively to 
long-term local development, international oil companies are called on to play a role in 
international development goals such as poverty alleviation and promoting education and 
health.147 IOCs have responded to these challenges by accepting social responsibilities and 
demonstrating their commitment by increasing community development spending. Oil 
companies are now spending millions of dollars on CSR initiatives.148 As part of their ‘social 
licence’ to engage in the oil industry, IOCs have initiated, funded and implemented 
community development projects (eg hospitals, schools, roads, water and electricity, sports’ 
facilities, assist youth employment programmes) in developing countries and participated in 
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partnerships with established development agencies (eg US Agency for International 
Development and the United Nations Development Program).149 
The rationale is that providing social development programs may mitigate the negative 
perceptions of the oil industry and its negative effects. CSR engagement by IOCs offers an 
opportunity for companies to generate competitive advantage, improve the company’s 
reputation, and provide legitimacy and positive approval (see the full discussion on the 
rationale of CSR engagement above at 4.2.2). 
However, the effectiveness of CSR initiatives in this sector has been increasingly 
questioned.150 Expenditure is likely to be a very small in comparison to the huge profits made 
by IOCs. Corporate social engagement has relatively little potential for tackling the 
developmental challenges of local communities.151 Oil companies’ initiatives for local 
communities are limited because of companies’ motives for community development work 
and problems of implementation.152 From the companies perspective, the main motive for 
positive engagement is the ‘business case for CSR’ that is, the use of social initiatives to 
achieve corporate objectives (see discussion at 4.2.2 above).153 As a consequence, social 
projects are usually driven by short-term expediency rather than the long-term development 
needs of a community.154 This motive combined with an absence of proper consultation with 
the affected community means that CSR projects may reflect the company’s priorities rather 
than those of local communities. The other reason for limited development potential of CSR 
initiatives is that oil companies ordinarily implement social projects without integrating these 
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153 Frynas identified four motives for oil companies to engage in community development project that all 
considered as a business case including: obtaining competitive advantages, maintaining a licence to operate, 
managing external perceptions and keeping employees happy; Ibid.   
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projects into a larger regional development plan or coordinating with government agencies.155 
The consequence is that projects may bring little benefit to the community. For example, an 
oil company in Nigeria built a road which ran parallel to another road built by a government 
agency (the Niger Delta Development Commission).156  
Nigeria provides an illustration of the problems. Putting aside the fact that IOCs in Nigeria 
are required by legislation to contribute to development (see 5.5.2), IOCs claim that they 
have contributed to development in the Niger Delta via programmes in education, health, 
agriculture, transport and construction as part of their corporate social responsibility. These 
initiatives did not satisfy community demands with antipathy by host communities against oil 
companies.157 IOCs have been criticised for not achieving tangible benefits from 
development projects for local stakeholders.158 This is largely because oil companies failed to 
consult with the broader host communities, so that projects may not be relevant to their 
needs.159 The next section discusses community consultation as necessary for the success of 
development projects and is a key strategy for Corporations making positive contributions to 
social welfare. This is sometimes referred to as positive CSR although ‘positive CSR’ may 
more properly describe those beneficial community outcomes which derive from the 
corporations’ operations, such as conducting research which benefits not only the corporation 
itself but also the broader industry and the economy. In the section following ‘positive CSR’ 
is used in the broader sense.  
                                                             
155 Ibid, Similar finding of Jedrzej Frynas’s study have been demonstrated by other study on the multinational 
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157 See footnote n 166 below.  
158 O Alabi and S Ntukekpo, ‘Oil Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility in Nigeria: An Empirical 
Assessment of Chevron’s Community Development Projects in the Niger Delta’ (2012) 4(2) British Journal of 
Arts and Social Sciences 361, 374.    
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     4.5.2 Strategies for Implementing Corporations Contributions to Social Welfare 
      A. Community Consultation  
Many large oil projects implement CSR programmes, sometimes referred to as ‘positive 
CSR’ (see above) which often include benefits for nearby communities. As noted above 
community consultation is essential to maximise community benefits. One approach is to 
enter into Community Development Agreements (CDAs). CDAs can be a useful approach 
that provides both the oil company and the community with a mutually agreed means to 
define and manage development expectations from the oil project.160 The core objectives of 
the CDAs are, first, improving relationships between companies, communities, governments 
and other stakeholders; and second, promoting sustainable and mutually rewarding benefits 
from oil projects, including poverty alleviation and other initiatives which may be beyond the 
immediate scope of impacts for the project.161 The World Bank encourages government and 
companies to use CDAs   
as a tool to enhance community participation and consultation, manage expectations of 
involved parties, and ultimately maximize pro-poor benefits to impacted communities while 
helping to establish “social license to operate” for governments and industry.162  
CDAs are increasingly being used in the mining industry, either in response to CSR 
principles or under legal requirements.163 CDAs can also be used in the oil and gas sectors.164 
They have been used extensively by Chevron in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.  
                                                             
160 Otto, above n 143. 
161 Word Bank, Mining Community Development Agreements: Source Book (March 2012) 5 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/mining_community.pdf>. 
162 Ibid, 1.  
163 Governments are increasingly mandating in legislation (Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, Guinea, Indonesia, 
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Chevron’s Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) in Nigeria is a successful 
example of implementing consultation approach for community development. Prior to 
launching the GMOU in 2005, Chevron’s model for engagement with local communities 
included individual agreements with communities near the company’s operations and 
infrastructure development projects selected by the company. This model was problematic165 
and did not result in a stable operational environment.166 Nor did it contribute to community 
development of the sort that the company intended, or that most community members 
wanted.167 Chevron realised that a more reliable governance model that relies on using a new 
community engagement approach was needed.  
As a result, Chevron dramatically reshaped its community engagement strategy in 2005168 
and established the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) as a public-private 
model to promote economic and social stability.169 The GMOUs were signed between 
Chevron, clusters of communities impacted by the company’s operations and state 
                                                             
165 Individual agreements take the form of funding for small-scale development projects, homage payments to 
traditional leaders and sometimes contracts for work. As a result, there were few development results to show 
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range of disturbances including the theft of crude oil, kidnapping expatriate staff, sabotage of oil pipeline and 
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Oil Industries and their Host Communities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region’ (2017) 4(1) International Journal 
of Public Administration and Management Research 42, 52.   
167 Hoben et al, above n 165, 4.  
168 Ibid, 2.  
169 Chevron, ‘Roots of Change: Chevron’s Model Community Empowerment Program in the Niger Delta’ 
(2017) <https://www.chevron.com/-/media/chevron/stories/documents/nigeria-case-study-GMoU.pdf>. 
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governments.170 The GMOUs are essentially CSR initiatives in the form of agreements by the 
oil companies (with groups of communities instead of with single communities) to provide 
communities with benefits like employment, businesses and scholarships.171 Under GMOUs 
host communities participate in decision-making regarding development projects, and assume 
responsibility and accountability for how to use funding provided by the company and for 
implementing the projects selected.172 The World Economic Forum in 2016 stated that, 
implementing GMOU model ‘has established [Chevron] as industry leader in social 
performance in Nigeria and has been adopted by other companies in Nigeria’173 like Shell. It 
has led to achieve tangible outcomes including 
[A] measurable improvement in the security of the operating environment, a substantial 
improvement in the health, education and economic well-being of local communities and a 
remarkable improvement in the cordial relationship between the local communities and the 
company.174  
Based on this successful experience, in 2007 the government of Nigeria requires mining companies to 
reach community development agreements with their prospective host communities towards the 
provision of social and economic benefits that would enhance the sustainability of host 
communities.175 However, this assumes an authorised spokesperson(s) body, which in turn assumes a 
stable society, accountability, and transparency which features Iraq struggles to achieve. 
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(Report, World Economic Forum, May 2016) 22 
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           B.  Public-Private Models   
In addition to effective community consultation, public-private collaboration is another 
successful approach for using CSR for community development. As part of their commitment 
to corporate social responsibility, most IOCs initially engaged in direct community 
development projects. But recently the emphasis has shifted to the use of a partnership 
strategy to address social and environmental issues. While the primary task of the public 
sector is to map societal and environmental needs, private sector companies engage primarily 
through CSR initiatives in financing and executing projects to meet those needs. This 
approach can maximise the benefits from development projects and enhance the relationship 
between the government, companies and stakeholders. In some cases the social and 
environmental issues are more complex, and cannot be solved by the government alone or by 
individual private initiatives (see the case of India below). For this, corporations may enter 
into a public-private partnership, whereby the government provides the necessary 
infrastructure (ie legal framework, planning and design) with the remaining responsibilities to 
be borne by the private sector (ie capacities, experience and execution). Following are two 
example of using public-private partnerships to implement CSR for social welfare.  
Brazil has successfully implemented the public-private partnership approach in the oil 
industry to increase social benefits from investment in this sector. Since 2005, Brazil required 
(under the petroleum law and contractual clauses)176 that oil and gas companies invest in 
research and development to the value equal to 1 per cent (1 %) of gross revenues from large 
oil fields. Half of these resources (50 per cent) must be invested in scientific and 
technological institutions (ie in non-profit public or private universities or research institute 
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located in Brazil) accredited by the government (the National Petroleum Agency).177 This 
interaction between oil companies and research institutions allows the fostering of 
technological development and training of qualified workers related to the oil industry.178 In 
practice, this collaboration has strengthened oil companies’ contribution to technological 
development and boosted scientific research, technological capabilities, and innovation.179 It 
is again noted that these are legislative requirements but the implementation does suggest 
suitable approaches to dealing with non-mandatory voluntary CSR. 
India has also used CSR as a means of achieving national social and environmental goals.180 
One massive environmental problem in India is that about 60 per cent of the Indian 
population have no access to clean sanitation and practice open defecation.181 This impacts 
the health and well-being of the society, reduces gross domestic product and results in 
economic loss.182 In response, the Government of India launched in October 2014 a nation-
wide cleanliness campaign183 named Swachh Bharat Abhiyan.184 The objectives of this five-
                                                             
177 The R&D clause in Brazil is currently regulated by the National Petroleum Agency resolutions 47/2012 and 
50/2015, as well as by the National Petroleum Agency technical regulations 7/2012 and 3/2015.  
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year cleanliness campaign185 are to provide sanitation and water supply facilities in the 
country, improve solid waste disposal systems, and generate awareness about sanitation and 
its linkage with public health.186 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan has been included as CSR activities 
under Schedule VII of the Companies Act 2013 that requires certain companies to spend at 
least 2 per cent of their average net profits of the last three financial years on CSR programs 
(further discussed at 5.5.1).187 As such, the Government has called upon companies to invest 
part of their CSR expenditure on this campaign. For instance, oil and gas enterprises and their 
joint ventures were advised to spend 33 per cent of CSR funds on Swachh Bharat 
activities.188 Along with companies from other sectors, oil companies are notably supporting 
Swachh Bharat, by undertaking clean up initiatives, constructing sanitation facilities and 
increasing awareness.189 Some oil companies have focused on large projects. For example, as 
a method of managing solid waste, Indian Oil is in the process of installing 10 waste-to-
energy plants of 5 tonnes per day capacity in Varanasi city. The first plant under this project 
was installed in 2017 and the electricity generated from organic waste at this plant is being 
used to illuminate street lights in the vicinity.190 In doing so, the Government of India had 
established an effective partnership with companies to require large corporations to contribute 
to community welfare.191 Although the Indian legislation refers to these contributions as 
‘CSR’ and the funds as ‘CSR funds’, consistently with the thesis definition of CSR (see 4.2.1 
above), these contributions do not qualify as CSR. But what it does indicate is that 
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government and the community expect large corporations to positively contribute to social 
welfare and legislation is seen as the appropriate mechanism to achieve this. This also 
demonstrates that these legal obligations in India provide an opportunity to build a productive 
relationship between the public and the private sector to implement public policy agenda, and 
it allows the government to invest resources in projects that actually support social welfare.  
As noted in chapter three and in this chapter, modern legislative responses acknowledge that 
Corporations have duties to take into account the impact of their operations on stakeholders. 
Concurrently with this development are increased reporting requirements for Corporations on 
CSR activities. This is discussed in the next section.  
4.6 Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
     4.6.1 The Benefits of CSR Reporting  
Corporate social responsibility reporting refers to a corporation’s reporting of social and 
environmental performance information or ‘non-financial information’ to investors as well as 
to the broader public. CSR reporting requirements have developed due to increasing 
stakeholder demands for companies to be more transparent about their social and 
environmental policies.192 Stock exchanges and securities regulators have also acknowledged 
that information on companies’ environmental and social performance may be material to 
investors and to the stability of modern capital markets.193 This is because reporting financial 
performance alone is not adequate to judge the success of a company or its overall 
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performance; integrated reporting practice must combine financial and non-financial 
information (social and environmental) into a single annual report.194  
Corporate social responsibility reporting is one of the most important widely applied 
governance practices reflecting the evolution of companies’ governance systems from a 
shareholder interest focus to a broader stakeholder’s perspective.195 Sharing qualitative and 
verifiable non-financial information can build and enhance trust between the company and 
key stakeholders.196 This is because such information provides stakeholders with an 
understanding of how the company has taken into account or responded to major 
environmental and social risks. Presenting this information to stakeholders and integrating 
their feedback into the company's policy leads to greater stakeholder engagement, and may 
help firms better manage their stakeholder expectations.197 Hence, CSR reporting seems to be 
a new accountability practice that allows the public and other monitoring agencies (eg the 
government, stock markets, NGOs, and the media) to gauge companies’ social and 
environmental performance, and increase pressure on them to act in a more responsible 
way.198  
Moreover, non-financial disclosure can be seen as an opportunity to integrate sustainability 
into business practices and support companies to achieve benefits and efficiencies. 
Companies can generate continuous improvements in business impact by learning from 
interactions with their stakeholders and past experiences, and implementing this learning in 
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their future strategy. For these reasons, performance assessments, risks' management and 
stakeholder’s engagement, which are all part of the reporting process, serve as necessary 
elements for companies to generate more positive impact on society.199 Thus, CSR reporting 
is an opportunity for companies to enhance their societal value and for stakeholders to 
monitor companies’ social and environmental performance.   
Although reporting on CSR policy is important for both companies and key stakeholders, 
reporting on CSR practice until recently has been voluntary. This voluntary reporting 
approach (self-regulation) has allowed companies not to fully disclose their efforts, if any, to 
integrate CSR initiatives in their core policies; some may focus on positive rather than 
negative indicators and, therefore, neglect substantial risks or, in some cases, publish 
deceptive information.200 Moreover, in contrast to more regulated financial reporting, a 
voluntary CSR disclosure regime does not meet investors' concerns who require information 
that is timely, reliable, consistent, and comparable among firms and over time.201 It is argued 
that mandatory regulation is the best way of improving the quantity and quality of non-
financial information.202 A study confirmed that the quality of non-financial disclosures is 
lower in countries without regulative mandate, compared to countries with regulations.203 A 
study of effects of national regulations on CSR activities in 24 OECD countries found that 
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companies in countries with mandatory non-financial disclosure engage in significantly more 
CSR activities.204  
Many CSR disclosure measures in corporate laws, securities and capital markets regulation 
are moving increasingly toward mandatory CSR reporting using a 'comply-or-explain' model, 
discussed next.  
     4.6.2 Comply or Explain 
The widely applied approach for enforcing CSR reporting or non-financial information 
disclosures is the ‘comply-or-explain’ regime that is described as flexible corporate 
governance practice.205 Under the comply-or-explain model, a stock exchange, securities 
regulator or other authority adopts a code incorporating corporate social responsibility best 
practice. Companies then can choose between complying with these principles or explaining 
why they do not.206 Accordingly, a company that fails to implement the code’s best practice 
and fails to provide an adequate explanation would be noncompliant.207 Companies, however, 
are not sanctioned if they do not establish and implement adequate social responsibility 
policies but rather they have to give a reasonable explanation for non-compliance. There is a 
divergence of views on whether comply-or-explain is a mandatory or voluntary approach.208 
On the one hand, it is mandatory because all subject companies should either comply or 
explain under the same code provisions, 'the codes themselves represent a form of soft law or 
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self-regulation' because complete conformity to the code is not required.209 In fact, comply-
or-explain, therefore, represents an intermediate approach to regulation, as it neither fully 
mandatory nor fully voluntary.210 Further, the comply-or-explain approach is more likely to 
be effective where discipline is exercised by the financial market, where there is strong 
shareholder activism and a critical financial press which create a market sanction rather than 
a legal one.211 It is also relies on the level of relevant stakeholders' awareness so as to exert 
effective community control over the performance of markets and the way companies work.  
Although reporting on a comply-or-explain basis is mostly used to disclose corporate 
governance practice, using this regime has expanded existing corporate governance 
disclosures to include a wide range of CSR issues in many jurisdictions. For instance, 
comply-or-explain regime implemented by regulations that focus on stakeholder protection 
and require corporations to report on environmental protection, human rights, anti-corruption, 
anti-bribery matters (eg EU countries and Australia)212 as well as regulations that focus on 
increasing social welfare (eg India and Tanzania).213  
There is international recognition of the importance of strengthening market mechanisms to 
monitor the social and environmental performance of corporations. A number of jurisdictions 
have introduced regulatory requirements governing CSR disclosure on a comply-or-explain 
basis.214 In the EU, for example, a series of decisions have been taken to enhance reporting 
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Empirical Evidence from Germany’ (2011) 5(2-3) Review of Managerial Science 233, 262; Sridhar Arcot, 
Valentina Bruno and Antoine Grimaud, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach 
Working?’ (2010) 30 International Review of Law and Economics 193, 201.  
212 Australian companies are obliged to disclose sustainability-related information under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) and also under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth).   
213 See, Indian Companies Act 2013, s 135; Tanzanian Petroleum Act 2015, ss 220, 222; see also the discussion 
at 5.5.1 and 5.5.3 respectively.   
214 In 2016, there were over 400 sustainability reporting regulations and other instruments across 64 countries, 
the majority of them were mandatory, in contrast to 180 instruments across 44 countries in 2013. See UNEP, 
GRI, KPMG & Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, ‘Carrots and Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability 
109 
 
requirements on social, environmental and governance issues, effectively making reporting of 
non-financial information compulsory across the EU.215 In 2014, the European Parliament 
issued Directive 2014/95/EU that set greater business transparency and accountability on 
social and environmental issues.216 The directive requires all member states to enact laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive.217 By 
requiring companies to disclose accurate, clear and verifiable details, the directive seeks to 
enhance the consistency and comparability of non-financial information throughout the 
Union.218 The directive requires companies with an average of 500 employees to disclose 
information on their performance and measures undertaken relating to the impact of their 
activities on the environment, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery matters.219 By 2017, all 28 EU member states enacted regulations to 
implement the provisions of Directive 2014/95/EU into their national law.220 Implementing 
this directive in all EU countries represents a significant development in regulating CSR 
reporting.  
In order to comply with Directive 2014/95/EU, some EU countries (eg UK221, France222 and 
Germany223) have amended their company laws. In some jurisdictions specific laws have 
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<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/non-financial-reporting-directive-transposition-status_en>. 
221 UK amended the Companies Act 2006 by inserting two new sections: section 414CA sets out the requirement 
for large public interest entities with over 500 employees to prepare a non-financial information statement and 
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been enacted, like the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015,224 thereby expanding the scope of the 
law to include listed and unlisted companies, compared to countries that mandate CSR 
reporting through stock market regulation that applies to listed companies only such as Dodd-
Frank Act 2010 in the US.225 As such, the reporting obligation will not only impact specific 
categories of companies but corporations generally. Some EU countries have accompanied 
the reporting obligations with additional enforcement mechanisms by imposing penalties and 
sanctions226 for breaching reporting requirements.227   
Mandatory CSR reporting in EU not only impacts on companies operating in Europe, but it 
will have a worldwide influence because many large EU companies operate overseas. This 
applies to international oil companies from the EU who operate overseas such as British BP 
(until the UK exits the EU), Dutch Shell, and French Total etc. As a result, oil companies 
with headquarters in the EU are now obligated to report on their CSR practice in host 
countries. They are required to disclose non-financial information related to the environment, 
employee-related matters, human rights, anti-corruption and bribery. This CSR reporting 
requirements will increase companies’ accountability and, in theory, may encourage IOCs to 
take on more CSR activities.228 Overall, the comply-or-explain approach to CSR disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
section 414CB sets out the content of the non-financial information statement, see Companies, Partnerships and 
Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 2016 (UK) No 1245.  
222 The France Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law has inserted Articles L. 225-102-4 and L. 225-102-5 into the 
French Commercial Code, Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 [Law No 2017-399 of 23 March 2017] (France) 
JO, 28 March 2017.  
223 Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in ihren Lage- und 
Konzernlageberichten [Law on strengthening the non-financial reporting of companies in their situation and 
group management reports] (Germeny) No 20, (11 April 2017).  
224 UK Modern Slavery Act 2015, c 30, s 54. 
225 US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 
1376, s 1502.   
226 See eg, the UK Companies Act 2006, s 414D.  
227 This is because the previous Directive 2013/34/EU (amended by Directive 2014/95/EU) required member 
states to do so. Article 51 of Directive 2013/34/EU states that ‘member States shall provide for penalties 
applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive and shall take 
all the measures necessary to ensure that those penalties are enforced. The penalties provided for shall be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’ Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2013] OJ L 182/19, art 51.        
228 Jackson et al, above n 204.  
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may offer a useful tool for improving corporate governance practice and stakeholder access 
to corporate social responsibility information. 
However, such an approach might not be effective in the very different financial climate in 
Iraq. The next section will explain why the comply-or-explain approach may not be effective 
for reporting on CSR in Iraq.  
    4.6.3 Can Comply or Explain Work in Iraq 
Considering the current status of the capital market in Iraq, the comply-or-explain regime is 
less likely to be the appropriate choice for implementing CSR in the oil industry. The current 
legislative and regulatory framework of the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) limits the possibility 
of enforcing CSR reporting in Iraq through corporate governance or listing rules. This is 
because; the ISX is small and under-developed.229 As at January 2019 there were only 120 
companies listed on ISX, the majority of them are financial companies (banks, insurance and 
money transfer).230 International oil companies and state-owned oil companies are not listed. 
Second, the ISX, since it was incorporated and began operations in June 2004, is subject to an 
interim law issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority.231 The Securities Law has not yet 
been enacted, though drafted in 2008. This has made ISX less attractive for companies and 
investors both domestic and foreign. Third, there are no specific corporate governance 
guidelines, but the ISX has issued instructions in disclosure regulations and can suspend 
                                                             
229 Sahar Nasr, ‘Republic of Iraq: Financial Sector Review’ (Report, The World Bank, 25 September 2011) 45. 
For example, in 2011 the total market capitalisation was approximately USD 3 million which, in comparison for 
example the Amman Stock Exchange has a market capitalisation of USD 27 million and Kuwait Stock 
Exchange has approximately USD 101 million. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
The Role of MENA Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance (2012), 22.  
230 See Iraq Stock Exchange,  
<http://www.isx-iq.net/isxportal/portal/companyGuideList.html?currLanguage=en>. 
231 The Iraq Stock Exchange was incorporated under the Interim Law on Securities Markets (Coalition 
Provisional Authority’s Order No 74, 18 April 2004). This CPA’s Order also stopped the operations of Baghdad 
Stock Exchange and liquidated it.   
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trading by non-compliant companies.232 However, according to the ISX rules, companies are 
only required to disclose their financial statements but not their social or environmental 
performance.233 In contrast, under a comply-or-explain regime for corporate governance and 
CSR requires companies to disclose both financial and non-financial information (see above). 
Thus, the accountability mechanisms which might have been implemented through listing 
rules are not an option.  
Listing international oil companies in the ISX is not expected to occur in the near future. In 
relation to state-owned oil companies if they are partially or fully privatised in the future, 
they could be listed in the ISX.234 However, even if state-owned oil companies have been 
listed in the ISX, which is unlikely to occur soon, the comply-or-explain regime is not 
expected to be effective to impose corporate accountability and corporate social responsibility 
without amending the current regulatory framework of ISX to mandate strong CSR reporting 
requirements and improve monitoring efficiency.   
Overall, the current position of ISX is inadequate for disclosure of non-financial information 
particularly CSR in the oil industry based on a comply-or-explain regime because IOCs are 
not listed in the first place and because of the absence of CSR reporting. IOCs accountability 
outside the ISX is also weak. IOCs are not required to disclose their social and environmental 
performance to any official authority. The role of civil society organizations particularly 
activist NGOs and Unions is almost non-existent. The civil society has no regulatory impact 
on companies. Moreover, the financial press and the public in general are not active in 
                                                             
232 Conditions and Requirements of the Companies Listing at ISX (Instruction No 6, 2008); Disclosure 
Instructions of the Listed Companies at ISX (Instruction No 8, 2010). All are available at Iraq Stock Exchange 
<http://www.isx-iq.net/isxportal/portal/companyGuideList.html?currLanguage=en>. 
233 Ibid; Interim Law on Securities Markets, 2004, s. 3(6).  
234 For example, at the time of writing, Saudi Arabia is planning to sell 5 per cent of the state owned Saudi 
Aramco. But, there is still no timeline for an actual date for any selling or listing of Aramco's shares. See eg, 
John Kemp, ‘Saudi Aramco International Share Sale Might Never Happen’ Reuters (10 March 2018) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-privatisation-kemp/saudi-aramco-international-share-sale-might-
never-happen-kemp-idUSKCN1GL2F0>. 
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providing oversight of the work of oil companies due to the lack of public awareness on the 
negative impacts of oil companies' operations on the environment and society (labour and 
local community), which makes comply-or-explain regime less effective. Thus, alternative 
approaches need to be considered. This will be discussed further in chapter six at 6.2 and 6.3. 
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the concept of corporate social responsibility. Corporate social 
responsibility has been defined as involving voluntary activities by a corporation beyond 
legal responsibilities. Viewed from the perspective of corporate governance, there is an 
important linkage between CSR and a corporation’s stakeholders. Despite the difference in 
the corporate governance model, CSR is now a systematic element of companies’ strategy 
and a routine aspect of their spending whether for the purpose of increasing stakeholders’ 
welfare or for achieving the company self-interest.  
Corporate social responsibility is primarily concerned with the recognition that corporations 
should pay for negative externalities caused by their operations. Corporate responsibility 
principles at a minimum require companies to internalise negative externalities. But this is 
often in the absence of legislative requirements or enforcement of laws relating to 
environmental protection, health and safety legislation and the like. The chapter discussed 
two quite different approaches to managing externalities in the oil industry.  In the Deepwater 
Horizon case legislation imposed huge penalties on BP for breach of environmental 
protection legislation. In the case of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, the World Bank in its 
role as private lender was able to insist on protection of the environment, community 
consultation etc. But there has been considerable debate whether loan conditions were 
actually effective in protecting the community. Both were examples of where the IOC had 
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legal obligations to protect the community and the environment. Other methods have 
included community consultation and public-private partnership approach. 
This chapter goes further to argue that a corporation should in addition operate in a way that 
protects and improves the welfare of society as a whole. Stakeholders, including the 
community, bear the brunt and costs of negative externalities. But this does not account for 
the argument that a corporation has positive duties to act for the welfare of the community. 
This chapter points to community expectations that corporations should positively contribute 
to community welfare not just be responsible for negative externalities. The chapter discussed 
how developing countries, such as India and Nigeria, have translated what might have been 
considered CSR in the past into formal legal obligations. Chapter five discusses jurisdictions 
where Corporations are statutorily required to contribute to development or community 
welfare. This provides possible models for Iraq. 
The chapter also discussed the benefits of reporting non-financial information in building 
trust between the company and key stakeholders, and may lead to better management of 
stakeholder expectations. CSR reporting is a new accountability practice that allows the 
public and other monitoring agencies to oversight corporations’ social and environmental 
performance. A number of jurisdictions have introduced regulatory requirements governing 
CSR (or non-financial information) reporting on a comply-or-explain basis, specifically in 
EU. However, the current status of the Iraq Stock Exchange is inadequate for disclosure of 
non-financial information particularly in the oil industry based on a comply-or-explain 
regime because IOCs are not listed in the first place. Chapter five will discuss alternative 
approaches for implementing CSR that might be possible models for Iraq. This includes 
promoting CSR through government policies and statutory requirements for protection of 
stakeholder interests and contributions to community welfare and development.
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CHAPTER FIVE  
LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
 
5.1 Introduction  
The dominating principle in corporate social responsibility literature is that such actions are 
done because it is ‘the right thing to do’ over and above any legal requirements requiring 
compliance (discussed in chapter four). This approach underpins the thesis, see chapter one at 
1.1. Corporations, along with other associations and individuals, are required to obey the law 
and are subject to sanctions and penalties for non-compliance. It is sometimes suggested that 
in developing economies with weak institutional and legal structures and high levels of 
corruption, obedience to the law might be regarded as a matter of choice rather than 
obligation1 and therefore obeying the law should qualify as CSR. There are also some who 
argue that CSR should not be just a matter of voluntary benevolence but should be a normal 
part of company operations and integrated into the corporate governance framework,2 see 
discussion at 3.3. This chapter includes discussion of what can be generally termed CSR 
statutes which impose statutory obligations on corporations to contribute to community 
development and welfare. The rationale for this inclusion is that it opens up alternative 
approaches to CSR which could be considered by Iraq. This chapter examines the approaches 
to CSR at both the international and domestic level for the purpose of assessing an approach 
to CSR in the oil industry that is a good fit for Iraq.  
                                                             
1 Peter Dobers and Minna Halme, ‘Editorial Corporate Social Responsibility and Developing Countries’ (2009) 
16 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 237, 249.  
2 Jingchen Zhao, ‘Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations Through a Corporate Law Regulatory 
Framework’ (2017) 37(1) Legal Studies 103, 136.  
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The chapter begins by exploring how international instruments set standards for CSR and the 
importance of bilateral trade and investment agreements on this issue. It then investigates the 
various approaches to CSR at the national level. An important aspect of this discussion is the 
role of government policies as a primary tool for promoting CSR. The chapter proceeds to 
discuss the different approaches to CSR that have been used in selected jurisdictions. With a 
particular focus on oil and gas contracts, these approaches are contrasted with examples of 
where CSR is mandated through oil and gas contracts. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
summary and overview. 
5.2. Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility in International Legal Instruments 
     5.2.1 Norm Setting  
There are a wide range of international standards and policies dealing with CSR. Many of 
them focus on the activities of multinational enterprises. These instruments seek to achieve 
efficient and safe functioning of global commerce by ensuring that financial profit is not 
generated at the expense of people, society and the environment (negative externalities). They 
also aim to promote positive contributions by multinational enterprises to economic, 
environmental and social welfare worldwide. They include, for example, the UN Global 
Compact,3 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,4 the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises,5 the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
                                                             
3 The United Nations Global Compact, to date, is the largest international CSR and sustainability initiative 
launched in 2000.  It is defined as a ‘call to companies everywhere to align their operations and strategies with 
ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption’. See 
United Nations Global Compact, United Nation Global Compact Progress Report (2017) 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/UN%20Impact%20Brochure_Concept-FINAL.pdf>. 
4 United Nations, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>. 
5 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, first adopted in 1976 and last updated in 2011, is one of 
the most important CSR initiatives for responsible business conduct in a global context. It provides 
recommendations for multinational enterprises on a wide range of issues such as taxation, bribery, labour 
relations, human rights, and environment. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>. 
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Work,6 the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility,7 the EU Oil and Gas 
Sector Guide,8 and others.9  
These international instruments set standards and policies for CSR. They do not have the 
status of international treaties that are ratified by states, nevertheless, they set norms, create 
standards of behaviour and promote policies in the areas of social, labour, and environmental 
protection, health and safety, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery. These 
CSR standards are increasingly shaping investment policy at the national and international 
levels.10 As will be seen in the following discussion, many Trade Investment Agreements 
refer to these international CSR standards. Some matters covered by existing CSR 
international instruments are the subject of national polices, domestic legislation, and 
contractual agreements such as petroleum contracts. This reflects the movement of CSR 
obligations from purely voluntary activities to legislative and contractual solutions at least in 
relation to negative externalities and in some instances through mandatory contributions to 
development and community welfare, (see 5.4 and 5.5 below). 
  
                                                             
6 International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 
in 1998 and revised in 2010 <https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--
en/index.htm>. 
7 The ISO 26000 guidance standard on social responsibility was launched in 2010. It provides guidance on how 
businesses and organizations can operate in a socially responsible manner by acting in an ethical and transparent 
way that contributes to the welfare of society. Unlike some other ISO standards, ISO 26000 cannot be certified 
because it provides guidance rather than requirements. International Organization for Standardisation, ISO 
26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility (2010)  
<https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/discovering_iso_26000.pdf>.  
8 In 2013, the European Commission issued the Oil and Gas Sector Guide. It focuses on both national and 
international oil and gas companies whether exploration companies, production companies, or pipeline 
companies and etc. It is also applicable to all sizes of oil and gas companies regardless of the type of ownership 
and structure. The Oil and Gas Sector Guide is designed to be applied to EU oil and gas companies operating 
inside and outside the EU on their activities and to their business relationships with third parties including 
companies’ direct relationships and supply chain. Nevertheless, it is possible to be adopted globally. See 
European Commission, Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (2013) <https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/eu-sector-guidance/EC-Guides/O&G/EC-Guide_O&G.pdf>. 
9 For detailed information on other corporate responsibility initiatives see Deborah Leipziger, The Corporate 
Responsibility Code Book (Routledge, revised 3rd ed, 2017).  
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development (2015) 35 <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf>. 
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     5.2.2 Trade and Investment Agreements  
Although international investment agreements are mostly geared towards the protection of 
investors and investment, many recent agreements call for businesses to meet standards of 
corporate social responsibility. Incorporating CSR provisions into investment treaties helps to 
solve the tension between investor’s rights and guarantees under international investment law 
and the rights of host states to regulate in the fields of social and environmental protection.11 
On the one hand, International Investment Agreements mostly regulate the behaviour of host 
governments towards foreign investors, generally committing states to provide foreign 
investors compensation for expropriation, unfair, inequitable or discriminatory treatment. On 
the other hand, states have sovereign rights to enact regulations and to take measures to 
protect society and the environment from harm by foreign investors.12 The host state’s 
regulation of foreign companies requiring foreign companies to satisfy social and 
environmental responsibilities may conflict with the State’s substantive obligations under 
investment agreements.13 This may expose the state to claims by foreign investors.14 To 
overcome this, a new approach has been taken by many countries including Canada, Brazil 
and the EU that incorporate CSR provisions into investment treaties,15 leading to the 
development of what so called a 'new generation’ of International Investment Agreements.16 
As a result, in the last few years, there are increasing numbers of International Investment 
                                                             
11 Mary Footer, ‘Bits and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of Foreign Investment’ 
(2009) 18(1) Michigan State Journal of International Law 33, 64. 
12 Suzanne Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements’ 
(2010) 13(4) Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1075.  
13 For instance, the host state may violate the non-discrimination principle by distinguishing between foreign 
companies having different social and environmental impacts or it may violate the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(FET) standard if the regulation on CSR issues is frustrating the legitimate expectations of foreign corporations. 
See Ying Zhu, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Investment Law: Tension and Reconciliation’ 
(2017) 1 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 91, 119.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Rafael Peels, Elizabeth Echeverria, Jonas Aissi and Anselm Schneider, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Trade and Investment Agreements: Implications for States, Business and Workers’ (Research 
Paper No 13, International Labour Office, April 2016) 5 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_476193.pdf>. 
16 Spears, above n 12; Footer, above n 11.  
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Agreements which include obligations to promote CSR. In practice, this approach is 
necessary to achieve a balance between the social and ecological impacts of foreign 
investor’s activities and the many guarantees and rights they receive under these agreements. 
In other words, the inclusion of CSR provisions in International Investment Agreements 
confirms the rights of host states to regulate for the protection of society and the environment 
as well as investment promotion and protection.  
For example, Canada has incorporated CSR norms into a series of its bilateral treaties based 
on an enhanced CSR strategy. Article 16 of the 2013 Canada-Benin bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT), for example, has provisions explicitly entitled ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. 
It states  
Each Contracting Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject 
to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate 
social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as statements of principle 
that have been endorsed or are supported by the Contracting Parties. These principles address 
issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-
corruption.17  
This Article requires the Parties to encourage enterprises to commit to CSR in their ‘practices 
and internal policies.’18 Article 16 of the 2014 Canada-Senegal BIT takes a further step. It not 
only obliges states to encourage CSR commitments by the enterprises, but also to encourage 
such enterprises ‘to make investments whose impacts contribute to the resolution of social 
problems and preserve the environment.’19 Most Canadian agreements that adopt CSR 
                                                             
17 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Benin for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 9 January 2013 (entered into force 12 May 2014) 
art 16. 
18 Canada has also included similar CSR provisions in its Foreign Trade Agreement with Honduras in 2013, BIT 
with Mali in 2014, and BIT with Burkina Faso in 2015.   
19 Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 27 November 2014 (entered into force 5 August 2016) art 16.  
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provisions do not explicitly refer to specific CSR instruments, but rather make general 
references towards ‘internationally recognised standards of corporate social responsibility.’ In 
contrast to this, some international investment agreements make explicit reference to 
particular CSR international instruments. For example, the 2009 Norwegian BIT model 
explicitly encourages investors to comply with the OECD Guidelines and the UN Global 
Compact. Overall, the Canadian BIT model marks a start by incorporating CSR terms into 
international investment treaties.20 
References to CSR are made in the Brazilian series of Agreements on Cooperation and 
Facilitation of Investments (ACFIs). In contrast to BITs that are intended for investment 
protection, the ACFIs focus on investment facilitation and risk mitigation.21 Unlike the 
Canadian BITs, the Brazilian ACFIs use a different approach to CSR. The Brazilian 
agreements speak directly to investors rather than State Parties. For instance, Article 9 of the 
2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI under the title ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ provides  
Investors and their investment shall strive to achieve the highest possible level of contribution 
to the sustainable development of the Host Party and the local community, through the 
adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices, based on the voluntary principles 
and standards set out in this Article.22   
The second paragraph of this Article clearly identifies CSR concepts by setting out a best-
efforts obligation on investors and their investments to protect the environment, respect 
human rights and achieve sustainable development. 23 It also strengthens responsible internal 
                                                             
20 Zhu, above n 13.   
21 Fabio Morosini and Michelle Badin, ‘The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of 
Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?’ 3(6) Investment Treaty News 
(August 2015) 4 <https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-itn-august-2015-english.pdf>. 
22 Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the 
Republic of Malawi, signed 25 June 2015(not yet in force) art 9(1).  
23 For example, the investors are required to (I) strengthen the relationship with the local community; (II) 
encourage the development of human capital especially by creating employment opportunities and facilitating 
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policies.24 In contrast to the Canadian and Norwegian BIT model, the Brazilian ACFI 
explains in detail in the text of the agreement what it meant by CSR (see Appendix 4). In 
doing so, Brazil provides an advanced model of the new generation of BIT. Other recent 
BITs refer, in general language, to internationally recognised CSR standards or existing CSR 
instruments, but in many cases in the annexes only. The Brazilian ACFIs model makes no 
provision for mechanisms to enforce these CSR obligations but is innovative by explicitly 
identifying CSR and ‘best efforts’ to protect the environment, human rights and sustainable 
development.25 
The European Union has also made significant progress towards the inclusion of CSR in 
trade and investment agreements by publishing a resolution in 2012 on future European 
international investment policy. The policy calls for a corporate social responsibility clause to 
be included in every free trade agreement the EU signs.26 Following this policy, the EU has 
included CSR provisions in a number of its recently concluded Association Agreements and 
Free Trade Agreements.27 The obligation to promote CSR in these agreements is imposed on 
State Parties rather than directly on investors. For example, the 2014 EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, Article 293 provides that the Parties shall strive to facilitate and promote trade 
and foreign direct investment in environmentally friendly goods, services, technologies and 
energies, and ‘shall strive to facilitate trade in products that contribute to sustainable 
development’, including products ‘respecting corporate social responsibility and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
professional training; (III) and promote the knowledge and professional training of the workers. Ibid art 9(2). 
For more details see Appendix 4, full text of this Article.  
24 For instance, investors must make best-efforts to (I) absorb host state regulations and not to seek illegal 
exemptions relating to environment, health, security, work or financial incentives; (II) develop and apply 
effective self-regulatory practices and management systems; (III) develop and apply good practices of corporate 
governance. Ibid. The same provisions were included in the Brazilian ACFIs signed in 2015 with Mozambique, 
Angola and Mexico. See Morosini and Badin, above n 21.    
25 Ibid.  
26 European International Investment Policy [2012] OJ C 296 E/34, art 28. 
27 The Association Agreements are a better platform for reconciling investment promotion and protecting the 
social interests than other investment agreements because they cover a much wider variety of topics, including 
political, economic and social cooperation between the Parties. Zhu, above n 13.  
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accountability principles.’28 Similarly, Article 154 of the 2016 EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provides that the Parties agree to promote ‘trade and 
investment in environmental goods and services and in climate-friendly products and 
technologies’, and to promote ‘corporate social responsibility practices.’29 Significantly, the 
recently signed Economic Partnership Agreement between EU and Japan not only requires 
the Parties to promote corporate social responsibility considering the relevant internationally 
recognised principles and guidelines,30 but also includes a specific chapter on corporate 
governance for the first time in an EU trade agreement.31  
Likewise, the 2012 EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement recognises the social 
and the environmental dimensions of economic development, and contains several clauses 
laying down the protection of the environment and the human rights as well as achieving 
sustainable development.32 Including CSR provisions in the trade and investment agreements 
is an option for Iraq in promoting CSR. But at best the only ‘obligations’ imposed are to 
encourage, promote or strive to implement CSR.  
Overall, the number of countries including CSR requirements in the trade and investment 
agreements is increasing. The inclusion of CSR clauses in the international trade and 
investment agreements provides a new avenue to encourage corporate social and 
environmental behaviour beyond the current reliance on voluntary initiatives and national 
legislation. By supporting CSR initiatives in trade and investment agreements, states could 
play an important role in shaping the conditions for responsible business behaviour of 
                                                             
28 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part, signed 21 March 2014(entered into force 1 September 2017) art 293(2)(3). 
29 Enhanced Partnership and cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part, signed 12 December 2015 (applied provisionally 
1 May 2016) art 154(1). 
30 Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, signed 17 July 2018, art 
16(1).  
31 Ibid, arts 15(1)-15(7).  
32 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Iraq, of the other part, signed 11 May 2012. See eg, Articles 84, 86 and 93.  
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enterprises that are in their territories, subject to their jurisdiction, or even overseas.33 
Accordingly, CSR clauses in international instruments may contribute to increased 
harmonization and indirectly influence companies’ CSR commitments. Even though the 
direct implications of CSR clauses are situated at the level of states, in some international 
investment agreements (the case of Brazil) CSR clauses address investors and enterprises. 
Despite the relatively soft character of states' commitments (eg ‘shall strive to’, ‘shall 
promote’), they are included in binding agreements. This means that states, in principle, can 
be called to account although in practice these provisions operate as aspirational statements.34 
It is, however, doubtful whether there is an expectation that these types of provisions could 
actually be enforced. 
5.3 Government Policies Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility 
Over the last two decades, CSR has increasingly been the subject of public policies. As a 
consequence, governments have become the major CSR driver35 by encouraging companies 
to behave in a responsible and sustainable manner.36 In EU, for example, governments have 
assumed an increasingly active role in shaping and promoting CSR by developing policies 
and programs (see below).37 Incorporating CSR into the national development policy could 
assist government to achieve policy objectives in a more strategic way, and provide an 
                                                             
33 Rafael Peels and Elizabeth Echeverria, ‘CSR in International Trade and Investment Agreements’ (2017) 5(6) 
GREAT Insights 29, 31.  
34 Peels et al, above n 15. 
35 Jeremy Moon, ‘Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative 
Perspective’ (Research Paper No 20-2004, International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, 2004) 17; 
Josep Lozano, Laura Albareda,Tamyko Ysa, Heike Roscher and Manila Marcuccio, Governments and 
Corporate Social Responsibility : Public Policies Beyond Regulation and Voluntary Compliance (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 42.  
36 Anna Peters and Daniela Röß, The Role of Governments in Promoting Corporate Responsibility and Private 
Sector Engagement in Development (United Nations Global Compact, 2010) 12; Reinhard Steurer, ‘Soft 
Instruments, Few Networks: How ‘New Governance’ Materializes in Public Policies on Corporate Social 
Responsibility Across Europe’, (2011) 21 Environmental Policy and Governance 270, 290.  
37 Reinhard Steurer, ‘The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public 
Policies on CSR in Europe’ (2010) 43(1) Policy Sciences 49, 72.  
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attractive complement for hard-law regulations in particular where new laws are controversial 
or not politically feasible.38  
The most relevant comparative analyses of CSR policies framework distinguishes four types 
of policy to promote CSR based on their regulatory strength: endorsement, facilitation, 
partnering, and mandate (see Table 5.1). This framework has been used for studies of 
government CSR policies in both developing countries,39 and European countries.40  
As indicated in the chart, the regulatory strength of government’s policies varies according to 
promotion, facilitating, partnership and mandatory approaches. At its lowest is an 
endorsement policy, which aims at raising awareness of CSR, and promotes good social 
practices.41 CSR is promoted through providing political support for, and affirming 
companies recognised for good social and environmental CSR programmes.42  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Including CSR in the public policy might have low political costs compared to hard-law regulations because 
the government can easily issue an administrative order to enforce that policy without engaging in conflicts with 
political partners or advocates on special issues, Steurer, ‘The Role of Governments in Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, above n 37.  
39 Tom Fox, Halina Ward, and Bruce Howard, Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Baseline Study (The World Bank, 2002); Uwafiokun Idemudia ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Rentier Nigerian State: Rethinking the Role of Government and the Possibility of 
Corporate Social Development in the Niger Delta’ (2010) 30(1-2) Canadian Journal of Development Studies 
131, 151.  
40 Jette Knudsen, Jeremy Moon and Rieneke Slager, ‘Government Policies for Corporate Social Responsibility 
in Europe: a Comparative Analysis of Institutionalisation’ (2015) 43(1) Policy Press 81, 99; Jean-Pascal Gond, 
Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, ‘The Government of Self-regulation: On the Comparative Dynamics of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) 40(4) Economy and Society 640, 671.  
41 Knudsen et al, above n 40. 
42 Fox et al, above n 39, 6. For example, the Australian Federal Ministry for Social Security competition rewards 
for the enterprise with the best equal opportunity and family friendly policy, Australian Prime Minister’s 
Awards for Excellence in Community Business Partnerships, and Green Business Award in Taiwan.  
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Table 5.1: CSR Policies and Their Regulatory Strength  
Type of policy Description Regulatory strength entailed 
in policies 
Endorse Political support for CSR through 
general information campaigns and 
websites, political rhetoric, award and 
labelling schemes 
Low regulatory strength 
Facilitate Incentives for companies to adopt 
CSR through subsidies or tax 
incentives; public procurement 
Medium regulatory strength 
Partner Collaboration of government 
organisations with business 
organisations to disseminate 
knowledge or develop/maintain 
standards, guidelines and so on 
Medium regulatory strength 
Mandate Regulation of minimum standards for 
business performance 
High regulatory strength 
Source: Adapted from Knudsen et al, 201543  
 
The medium regulatory strength includes facilitating and partnering policies which involve 
governments playing more active roles in promoting CSR.44 Such policies enable or 
incentivise companies to engage with the CSR agenda or to lead social and environmental 
improvements.45 Governments can also promote CSR through partnerships between 
government and CSR actors.46 Partnership policies can create multi-stakeholder initiatives 
and involve mixed complementary resources. To illustrate, governments often provide fiscal 
and regulatory capacity while companies bring their networks, employees and knowledge to 
                                                             
43 Knudsen et al, above n 40.  
44 Fox et al, above n 39, 5.  
45 Ibid.  
46 For example, in UK and Denmark, the governments have entered partnering agreements (Ethical Trading 
Initiative) with some companies, trade unions and NGOs and committed to improving working conditions in 
global supply chains. See, Knudsen et al, above n 40.  
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bear in addressing problems.47 Indeed, partnerships provide governments with more 
opportunities to frame and carry out CSR policy than simple facilitation.48 
The most robust policies mandate ‘CSR’ within the regulatory framework. As noted in 
chapter four, according to the standard definition adopted in this thesis, CSR refers to 
voluntary activities over and above legal requirements. Where regulations require 
corporations to recognise and protect interests of stakeholders, the environment and the 
public, and, in some cases, positively contribute to community welfare, this is no longer CSR 
according to the standard definition. Negative externalities (cost of  operations imposed on 
the public) are now internalised into the cost  of the corporation’s operations. The discussion 
which follows gives some illustrations of where countries demand through legislation that 
corporations do more than promote shareholder interests. It is based on the premise that 
corporations cannot, and do not, voluntarily act for the benefit of stakeholders and the 
community. The legislation could take the form of  imposing minimum standards for business 
performance which take into account stakeholder interests, or legislation imposing 
development levies or mandate minimum ‘CSR’ spending on designated community welfare 
projects. The minimalist approach is to impose obligations on corporations in relation to non-
financial reporting. Non-financial reporting aims at encouraging companies to establish the 
tools to measure their social and environmental impacts, discussed at 4.6. At the other end of 
the scale is India, where companies that meet a financial threshold are required by legislation 
to spend 2 per cent (2%) of the company’s average net profits (based on the previous three 
financial years) on socially responsible and development activities (see section 5.5.1 below). 
The following section looks in greater detail at the legislative initiatives requiring 
corporations to promote stakeholder and community welfare. 
                                                             
47 Gond et al, above n 40.   
48 Ibid.  
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The following discussion is important as it will be seen from the discussion in chapter six,  
that in the context of Iraq, there is little evidence that IOCs will voluntarily act to undertake 
activities to promote community welfare. The consequence is that Iraq may see benefit in 
legislation requiring IOCs to contribute to the community and public welfare beyond the duty 
to pay for the costs of harm caused to the public. These initiatives are options that Iraq may 
consider in relation to IOCs. 
5.4 Legislative Alternatives to Corporate Social Responsibility  
The selected examples in this section illustrate the different approaches that have been used 
to provide alternatives to CSR in each jurisdiction. Examples are drawn from developed 
countries including the US, the UK, France, and the EU. These countries impose legislative 
obligations related to corporations’ negative externalities. This section will examine 
legislative alternatives to CSR in the areas of human rights, labour rights and accountability 
in supply chains.    
     5.4.1 Human Rights Protection  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act)49 includes 
provisions dealing with the involvement of US companies in conflict minerals and resource 
extraction payments. Section 1502 requires companies, who deal in certain ‘conflict 
minerals’50 originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo) or an adjoining 
country, to demonstrate that their products are not fuelling conflict in Congo. Companies are 
required to carry out supply chain due diligence and to report to the US Securities and 
                                                             
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376.  
50 ‘Conflict minerals’ are defined as ‘(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their 
derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country. Ibid, s 1502(e)(4). These minerals are 
widely used in industries including mining, automotive, aerospace, and jewellery, so that s 1502 has a wide 
impact on the global trade.  
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Exchange Commission.51 The reason for enacting this requirement is the problem that the 
trade in conflict minerals has fuelled human rights abuses in eastern Congo for over a 
decade.52 By enhancing supply-chain transparency, the goal is to stop national armed groups 
in Congo from illegally using profits from the minerals trade to fund conflict. Section 1502 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to ensure that conflict minerals used in their products 
and their suppliers do not directly or indirectly finance armed conflict or result in labour or 
human rights violations. If companies comply with these requirements, this can minimise 
possible harmful impacts, and promote peace and stability.  
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires resource extraction issuers53 to disclose to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission payments made to a foreign government54 or the US 
Federal Government for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. This is 
defined as including ‘exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other significant actions 
relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity.’55 
The resource extraction issuer or an entity under its control must disclose in an annual report 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission information about the type and full 
                                                             
51 Dodd-Frank Act, s 1502(b); Celia Taylor, ‘Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation’ (2012) 2 
Harvard Business Law Review 105, 120.      
52 According to The Congress the ‘exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence… particularly 
sexual- and gender-based violence and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein...’. Dodd-
Frank Act, s 1502(a). This attitude was built on a report prepared by United Nations Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo published by Security Council in 2008, that address the link between the trad 
in certain minerals from conflict-affected areas and the finance of internal armed conflicts. The report shows 
that the principal method used by armed groups in Congo to raise funds is through the illegal trade of mineral 
resources. They were reaping profits estimated to worth millions of dollars a year from this trade. It also 
demonstrates that some companies, domestic and foreign, were complicit in a systematically trad with the armed 
groups and knowingly purchasing minerals from them. The report suggests that promoting due diligence within 
the international minerals supply chain would represent effective ways for cutting off the financial support to 
those armed groups. See especially United Nations Security Council, S/2008/773, 12 December 2008 [72-73] 
(Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the 
Security Council).    
53 The ‘term “resource extraction issuer” means an issuer that— (i) is required to file an annual report with the 
Commission; and (ii) engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.’ Dodd-Frank Act, 
s 1504. 
54 Foreign government means a foreign government, a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign 
government, or a company owned by a foreign government; Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
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amount of the payments made for each project and to each government concerning the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.56 The purpose of these commercial 
disclosure requirements is to support international transparency efforts relating to the 
commercial development of natural resources.57 This would in turn promote corporate 
accountability and mitigate corruption specifically for supply chains in developing countries. 
For example, financial disclosure of payments to foreign governments for natural resources 
development may help to ensure that international oil companies are not involved in 
supporting armed groups in the host country.  
As an additional measure to enforce these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the President of 
US issued an Executive Order blocking the property and interests in property of certain 
persons, including companies, who contribute to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo through, for example among other activities, the illicit trade in natural resources of 
Congo.58 Any breach of this order could lead to imposing civil monetary penalties and 
criminal penalties.59 Companies are also required to submit a description of any products 
manufactured by the company to determine whether the product is ‘Democratic Republic of 
the Congo conflict free’ or not.60 Labelling products as ‘not Democratic Republic of the 
Congo conflict free’ can create significant reputational risks for companies that can be 
avoided if the company does not use such minerals in its products.61 These requirements 
                                                             
56 Michael Seitzinger and Kathleen Ruane, ‘Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction: Dodd-Frank, SEC 
Regulations, and Legal Challenges’ (Congressional Research Service, 2 April 2015)  
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43639.pdf>. 
57 For this purpose, the law suggests applying guidelines of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as 
commonly recognised standard in this area.  
58 President of the United States, Executive Order 13671 79, 132 (8 July 2014) s 1(a)(C)(7).  
59 The civil monetary penalties would be up to the greater of USD 284,582 as of 1 August 2016 for violations 
occurring after 2 November 2015. The criminal penalties would be up to USD 1,000,000, imprisonment for up 
to 20 years, or both. See for more details Office of Foreign Assets Control, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Sanction Program (5 October 2016).     
60 Products are Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict free if they do not contain minerals that directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in Congo or an adjoining country. 
61 Andreas Manhart and Tobias Schleicher, ‘Conflict minerals – An evaluation of the Dodd-Frank Act and other 
resource-related measures’ (Oeko Institute for Applied Ecology, August 2013) 26 
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demonstrate that legislative measures by the US government have replaced voluntary socially 
responsible conduct by Corporations.   
The Dodd-Frank Act was the first domestic legislation that required US-listed companies to 
report the use of conflict minerals in their products. This approach has been adopted in other 
countries, particularly the EU. The European Parliament issued a regulation in May 2017 ‘to 
provide transparency and certainty as regards the supply practices of Union importers, and of 
smelters and refiners sourcing from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.’62 Similarly to the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the EU regulation establishes a framework for supply chain due diligence in 
order to curtail opportunities for armed groups and security forces to trade in conflict 
minerals.63 However, the EU regulations have a broader scope and geographic coverage than 
US law.64  
The due diligence framework required by the Dodd-Frank Act is similar to the OECD due 
diligence guidance on conflict minerals published in 2011. The OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict Affected and High-Risk 
Areas65 provides a five-step due diligence framework66 developed by a UN Group of Experts 
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although the general due diligence approach in 
the OECD guidance is voluntary in nature, it recommends that the concept be incorporated 
into national legislation. In addition, the commercial disclosure requirements in those two 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/daf3/18602187aac0a9e82e1bf2bd33f4b5b7413c.pdf?_ga=2.120241615.67715
4703.1527675221-1813851469.1527675221>. 
62 Regulation 2017/821/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [2017] JO L 130/1, art 1 (laying 
down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and 
gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas). 
63 Ibid.  
64 The EU regulations are not limited to tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold (collectively known as 3TG), but covers 
other metals. It is also not limited to conflict minerals originating in Congo, but covers minerals originating 
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Ibid, Annex 1.   
65 OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas (2nd ed, 2013) <https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf>. 
66 Based on the five-step due diligence framework companies are required to strengthen their management 
systems; Identify and assess risks in supply chains; design and implement a strategy to respond to identified 
risks; ensure independent third-party audits; and publicly disclosing supply-chain due diligence and findings. 
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sections of the Dodd-Frank Act were imposed for reasons other than the prevention of 
consumer deception.67 Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank Act seeks to prevent companies from 
engaging in human rights abuses. This is in line with the UN Global Compact Principles 
mentioned earlier (5.2.1), that required companies to ensure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses; and develop policies and concrete programmes to avoid any forms of 
corruption internally and within their supply chains. It is also consistent with both UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises as updated in 2011. Those two guidelines emphasise that 
companies operating in the conflict-affected areas should respect human rights, and avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts. As noted above, these initiatives 
demonstrate state preference for legislating to protect against human rights abuses in supply 
chains rather than relying on voluntary initiatives by corporations. 
     5.4.2 Labour Practices  
Another area where states have preferred legislative solutions rather than rely on CSR is in 
relation to what has been termed ‘modern slavery’. The term modern slavery refers to a range 
of exploitative practices which includes, human trafficking, slavery, debt bondage, forced 
labour, wage exploitation, and similar practices.68 It includes forced labour of adults and 
children. Companies are required to take affirmative steps to protect against modern slavery 
in the conduct of their business both domestically and in their global supply chains.  
                                                             
67 Seitzinger and Ruane, above n 56.  
68 Forced labour can be in the form of threats or actual physical harm to the worker; restriction of movement of 
the worker (to the workplace or to a limited area); debt bondage, where workers work partly or exclusively to 
pay off debts or loans and are not paid for their services; withholding wages or refusing to pay the worker at all; 
retention of passports and identity documents so that the workers cannot leave or prove their identity and status; 
threat of denunciation to the authorities, where the worker has an irregular immigration status. See International 
Labour Office, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law 
Enforcement (2005) 20-21  
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081999.pdf>. 
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For example, the United Kingdom and California have taken measures to protect labour 
rights in supply chains through the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010.69 
The Californian Act requires retail sellers and manufacturers that do business in California 
and have over USD 100 million in gross annual receipts70 to publicly disclose their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains. According to this Act, 
companies are required to disclose what actions they are taking, if any, to evaluate, and 
address the risks of human trafficking and slavery in their product supply chains. Companies 
must also be transparent about their efforts to audit their suppliers’ compliance with company 
standards in this regard. Companies must provide their employees and management, who 
have direct responsibility for supply chain management, training on mitigating human 
trafficking and slavery and develop and maintain accountability mechanisms for employees 
or contractors who fail to meet company standards regarding this issue. These disclosures 
must be publicly available on the company's website or, if a company does not have a 
website, through written disclosures.71  
The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 s 54 is modelled on a similar provision in the Californian 
Act, but it has a broader reach.72 Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act applies to 
‘commercial organisations’ which are defined as being, first, either bodies corporate 
(wherever incorporated) or partnerships (wherever formed) that, second, carrying  on a 
business, or part of a business in the United Kingdom.73 In this way, the Act uses the 
                                                             
69 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, ch 556 Cal Stat s 2641 (West 2012). The California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 enacted section 1714.43 of the Civil Code of the State of California. 
Australia has also enacted modern slavery laws at the federal level, Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth), and at the 
state level, Modern Slavery Act 2018 (NSW). 
70 Cal Civ Code s 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012).   
71 Sarah Altschuller, Amy Lehr and Andrew Orsmond, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) 45(1) The 
International Lawyer 179, 189.  
72 Modern Slavery Act 2015, c 30, s 54(1). 
73 Ibid s 54(12). 
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activities of business entities as a basis for regulation rather than their domicile. This has 
expanded the reach of the legislation to business entities incorporated in foreign jurisdictions 
but which carry on business in the UK.74 Third, the entity must supply goods or services 
whether the goods and services are supplied in the UK or offshore.75 In this respect, the UK 
Modern Slavery Act is broader than the Californian Act which imposes a disclosure 
obligation only on retail sellers and manufacturers. Fourth, the entity must have a ‘total 
turnover’ greater than the threshold amount prescribed by the Secretary of State.76 This 
threshold is a much lower threshold than under the Californian Act.77 Importantly, according 
to the Secretary of State's regulations the ‘total turnover’ includes the turnover of the 
disclosing entity and ‘any of its subsidiary undertakings.’78 The inclusion of a subsidiary 
undertaking in the calculation of the turnover threshold extends the reach of the legislation, 
compared with a calculation on an entity-by-entity basis.79  
Section 54 of the UK Modern Slavery Act requires companies to disclose the steps they have 
taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in any part of their 
business and supply chains or to disclose that they have taken no such steps.80 ‘Slavery and 
human trafficking’ is defined under the Act as conduct that ‘constitutes an offence’ or ‘would 
constitute an offence’ under certain anti-slavery legislation if it were to have occurred in the 
United Kingdom.81 This involves the offences of slavery, forced or compulsory labour, 
human trafficking and third party involvement in such acts.82 If the disclosing company has a 
                                                             
74 Ryan Turner, ‘Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as Corporate Law’s New 
Frontier’ (2016) 17(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 22.  
75 Modern Slavery Act 2015 s 54(2)(a).  
76 As at September 2018, this is £36 million (roughly USD 43.5 million);  Modern Slavery Act 2015 
(Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015 (UK) SI 2015/1833 reg 2.   
77 This is USD 100 million in ‘annual worldwide gross receipts.’ See, Cal Civ Code s 1714.43(a)(1) (West 
2012).   
78 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015 (UK) SI 2015/1833 reg 3(1).   
79 Turner, above n 74.  
80 Modern Slavery Act, s 54(4).   
81 Ibid, s 54(12).  
82 Ibid.  
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website, it must then publish the slavery and human trafficking statement on its website and 
include a link to the Statement on its home page.83 The disclosing statement may include 
information about the company's due diligence processes to assess and manage any possible 
risk of slavery and human trafficking in its business and supply chains; its effective measures 
against such performance; and training about slavery and human trafficking available to its 
staff.84 The disclosure obligations imposed on companies by s 54 are enforceable by the 
Secretary of State bringing civil proceedings in the High Court for an injunction.85 In 
addition, non-compliance would create a reputational risk and market consequences.  
     5.4.3 Accountability in Supply Chains  
The French law Corporate Duty of Vigilance 2017 is a significant step forward for corporate 
accountability in supply chains.86 This law was motivated by the devastating collapse of the 
Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh 2013 that killed more than 1,000 garment workers and 
injured many thousands more.87 French clothing brands were manufactured in this factory. 
Most victims and their families did not receive adequate compensation because neither 
French companies, nor their suppliers, were liable under French law at that time.88 The 
French law, Corporate Duty of Vigilance 2017, established a legally binding obligation for 
parent companies to prevent serious violations of human rights of workers within supply 
chains and environmental protection. Secondly, the law makes the parent company 
responsible for the conduct of its subsidiaries whether located in France or abroad. The parent 
company is exposed to civil liability for the wrongful conduct of its subsidiaries (see below). 
Finally, French courts have jurisdiction over corporate violations of human rights committed 
                                                             
83 Ibid, s 54(7).  
84 Ibid, s 54(5).  
85 Ibid, s 54(11).   
86 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 [Law No 2017-399 of 23 March 2017] (France) JO, 28 March 2017.  
87 BBC NEWS, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Toll Passes 1,000 (10 May 2013) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22476774>. 
88 Vivian Curran, ‘Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company Liability for Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights 
Violations’ (2016) 17(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 403, 446.  
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by a subsidiary of a French corporation anywhere in the world.89 This assists victim of human 
rights abuse overcome some of the barriers they face in achieving justice.  
The French statute, the Corporate Duty of Vigilance 2017 applies to large companies90 from 
all business sectors incorporated or registered in France subject to the French Commercial 
Code.91 It requires parent companies to identify and prevent abuses of human rights, protect 
the health and safety of individuals, and be responsible for environmental impacts resulting 
from their activities, and their subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers, with whom they 
have an established commercial relationship. According to Article 1 of the law (includes 
Article L. 225-102-4 added to the French Commercial Code), the parent company is required 
to establish, publish and effectively implement a vigilance plan.92 The vigilance plan must 
include: (1) a mapping that identifies, analyses and ranks risks; (2) procedures to regularly 
assess, in accordance with the risk mapping, the situation of subsidiaries, subcontractors or 
suppliers with whom the company maintains an established commercial relationship; (3) 
appropriate actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious violations; (4) an alert mechanism for 
potential or actual risks; and (5) a monitoring scheme to follow up on the measures 
implemented and assess their efficiency.93 
                                                             
89 Ibid.  
90 The law will apply to companies established in France which, at the end of two consecutive financial periods, 
employ at least 5,000 people within the company itself and in its direct or indirect subsidiaries, whose head 
office is located in France, or employ at least 10,000 people within the company itself and in its direct or 
indirect subsidiaries, whose head office is located in France or abroad.  
91 The law adds two new articles, L. 225-102-4 and L. 225-102-5, to the French Commercial Code. The law will 
only apply to companies subject to the obligation provided for in Article L.225-102 of the French Commercial 
Code, namely, public limited companies listed or unlisted. Thus, it does not apply to parent companies governed 
by foreign law, since they are not subject to the French law.  
92 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 [Law No 2017-399 of 23 March 2017] (France) JO, 28 March 2017, art 1. 
The vigilance plans, as well as the report concerning its effective implementation must be published and 
included in the company's annual management report.  
93 Ibid; See also European Coalition of Corporate Justice, The French Duty of Vigilance Law - Frequently Asked 
Questions (23 February 2017) European Coalition of Corporate Justice <http://corporatejustice.org/news/405-
french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law-frequently-asked-questions>; this website also provides an English 
translation for the law.  
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In the event of any breach of the obligations under the duty of vigilance, the company may be 
issued with a formal notice and given a three-month period to meet its obligations.94 If the 
company still fails to meet the obligations after the three-month period is over, a court order 
may require compliance and publication of a vigilance plan. The court order can be issued at 
the request of any person who has a legitimate interest (including affected people and 
communities) in bringing proceedings before a competent court.95 Article 2 of the law 
(includes Article L. 225-102-5 added to the French Commercial Code) which states that in 
the event of a breach of the obligations laid down in Article 1 if the misconduct has caused 
loss, the company or any of its direct or indirect subsidiaries could be held liable, and will 
have to compensate for the harm it caused. This Article provides that the liability of the 
company will be determined according to the conditions provided for under Articles 1240 
and 1241 of the Civil Code, confirming the application of the general rules of the tort law.96 
Finally, in such a case, the judgment (or relevant excerpt) on liability may be made public.97 
This would negatively impact the company’s reputation. It should be mentioned that the law 
initially provided a civil fine (maximum of 10 million Euros) for breaching the vigilance 
obligations, but the civil fine was declared unconstitutional by the French Constitutional 
Council during its review of the Law.98 This law is relevant to oil industry in Iraq because it 
applies to French IOCs operating in Iraq such as Total.  
                                                             
94 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 [Law No 2017-399 of 23 March 2017] (France) JO, 28 March 2017, art 1.   
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid, art 2.  
97 Ibid, see also Stéphane Brabant and Elsa Savourey, ‘France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A Closer 
Look at the Penalties Faced by Companies’ Revue International de la Compliance et de Lethique des Affairs (14 
December 2017)  
<https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/French%20Corporate%20Duty%20of%20Vigilance%20Law%20
-%20Penalties%20-%20Int%2527l%20Rev.Compl_.%20%26%20Bus.%20Ethics_.pdf>.  
98 Conseil Constitutionnel [French Constitutional Court], decision n° 2017-750 DC, 23 March 2017 reported in 
JO, 23 March 2017, 14. Nevertheless, it may be possible to reimpose the civil fine in the future if the 
constitutional conditions are fulfilled. This is because the law was prepared during a four-year process that 
involved considerable joint efforts from civil society organizations, trade unions and Members of Parliament; 
and passing the law's bill through by the French National Assembly voting demonstrates that the civil fine was 
acceptable by all of these actors. See, Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau De Lomenie, ‘The 
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The statutory provisions outlined above are instances where States have legislated to require 
corporations to act as good corporate citizens rather than rely on voluntary CSR.  The next 
section provides some illustrations where States likewise have preferred to legislate to require 
corporations to contribute to community welfare. 
5.4 Mandatory Contributions to Community Welfare and Development 
This section provides three illustrations where corporations have been required to contribute 
to community welfare or regional development.  Examples are drawn from India, Nigeria 
and Tanzania. The Indian legislation explicitly defines CSR activities and requires certain 
companies to spend a percentage of their profits on developmental activities and community 
welfare. Nigeria and Tanzania are particularly interesting as they specifically deal with the 
oil and gas industry and offer a comprehensive legal framework for local content and value 
adding by oil and gas corporations. These examples provide possible models for Iraq. Their 
suitability will be discussed in chapter six at 6.3. 
   5.5.1 India 
The Indian Companies Act 2013 provides an example of legislation requiring large 
corporations to contribute to community welfare and development.99 Rather than relying on 
voluntary corporate benevolence, this Act requires certain companies (see below) to spend a 
percentage of their profits on socially responsible and developmental activities based on the 
‘comply-or-explain’ approach, discussed in the previous chapter at 4.6.2. These provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017)2 Business 
and Human Rights Journal 317, 323.    
99 Sandeep Gopalan and Akshaya Kamalnath, ‘Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility as a Vehicle for 
Reducing Inequality: An Indian Solution for Piketty and the Millennials’ (2015) 10(1) Northwestern Journal of 
Law and Social Policy 34, 129; Bala Balasubramaninan, ‘Strengthening Corporate Governance in India: A 
Review of Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives in 2013-2014’ (Working Paper No 447, Indian Institute of 
Management, 23 June 2014).  
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are contained in s 135 of the Companies Act 2013, specifying which companies are subject to 
this section and the obligations of these companies.100   
Section 135 requires companies satisfying certain size or annual profit thresholds to spend at 
least 2 per cent (2%) of their net profits averaged over the preceding three financial years on 
what are in the statute described as ‘corporate social responsibility’ activities.101 Most 
importantly is that all publicly traded and privately held companies with operations in India 
(including foreign-owned companies) from any sector are subject to s 135 if they fall within 
the set threshold. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs promulgated a set of rules in 2014 that 
regulates procedural and reporting requirements and provides a list of the activities that 
satisfy the requirement for CSR spending.102 The combined effect of the s 135 provisions and 
the rules are described below.  
The Boards of Companies that satisfy the threshold requirement under s 135 must establish a 
CSR committee consisting of three or more directors; at least one of them must be 
independent.103 This committee is responsible for framing the company’s CSR policy 
outlining the activities to be undertaken, and the amount that should be spent by the company 
on these activities. The committee must then recommend this policy to the board.104 Once the 
board approves the recommended CSR policy, it must be disclosed in the annual board report 
and also displayed on the company website, if the company has one.105 It is then the board’s 
responsibility to ensure the required amount is spent on the activities outlined in the policy, 
                                                             
100 Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘The Impact of Mandated Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evidence from India’s Companies Act of 2013’ (2018) 56 International Review of Law and 
Economics 92, 104.  
101 Section 135 of the Companies Act is applicable to companies that have net worth of rupees 500 crore or more 
(equivalent USD 70 million dollars) or those that have an annual turnover of rupees 1,000 crore or more 
(equivalent USD 140 million dollars). Note, in India, a crore equal 10 million.  
102 Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules (issued in 27 
February 2014; amended in 23 May 2016) (hereafter referred to as CSR Rules) 
<http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesActNotification2_2014.pdf>.    
103 Companies Act 2013, No 18, s 135(1).  
104 Ibid, s 135(3). 
105 Ibid, s 135(4). 
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and (where applicable) for explaining why the firm failed to do so.106 The CSR committee is 
charged with regularly monitoring the company’s CSR policy.107   
Only specified types of activities qualify as ‘CSR’ activities.108 Schedule VII of the 
Companies Act 2013 sets out activities qualifying for CSR compliance purposes.109 The 
activities listed are very broad and cover a large area of what is typically considered as 
community welfare spending such as spending on education, health, poverty eradication, 
gender equality, environment, some designated government programs,110 and funds for 
technology incubators in government academic institutions.111 Contribution to the Prime 
Minister's National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government for 
socio-economic development and relief and welfare qualifies for CSR. But there will always 
be an issue whether those funds might be subject to political influence. This requires careful 
monitoring to ensure that those funds are used for proper purposes. This leaves companies 
                                                             
106 Ibid, s 135(5). 
107 Ibid, s 135(3) (c). 
108 Balasubramaninan, above n 99, 9.  
109 There was a question as to whether Schedule VII of the Companies Act 2013 provides an illustrative or 
exhaustive list of activities.  The Ministry of Corporate Affairs in its General Circular No 21/2014 clarified that 
the items under Schedule VII must be ‘interpreted liberally’ to catch the essence of the subjects counted in the 
Schedule. The Circular clearly explains that the items listed in the amended Schedule VII of the Act are ‘broad-
based and are intended to cover a wide range of activities.’ For instance, as the Ministry of Corporate Affairs 
clarified in the Annexure of the General Circular, ‘consumer protection services’ are eligible under CSR. 
Specifically, ‘promoting education’ of Section VII could be broadly interpreted to include consumer education 
and awareness. See, Gopalan and Kamalnath, above n 99; see also, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Clarifications 
with Regard to Provisions of Corporate Social Responsibility under Section 135 of the Companies Act 2013, 
General Circular No 21/2014, (18 June 2014)  
<http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_21_2014.pdf>. 
110 For example, corporations have engaged, as part of their corporate social responsibility, in a large sanitary 
project named Swachh Bharat Abhiyan launched by the Government of India in 2014. See the discussion at 
4.5.2.    
111 Schedule VII of the Companies Act 2013 outlines the flowing activities:  
(I) eradicating extreme hunger and poverty; (II) promotion of education; (III) promoting gender equality and 
empowering women; (IV) reducing child mortality and improving maternal health; (V) combating human 
immunodeficiency virus, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, malaria and other diseases; (VI) ensuring 
environmental sustainability; (VII) employment enhancing vocational skills; (VIII) social business projects; (IX) 
contribution to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government or 
the State Governments for socio-economic development and relief and funds for the welfare of the Scheduled 
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, other backward classes, minorities and women; and (X) such other matters as may 
be prescribed. It should note that these activities are further extended by the Annexure of the General Circular 
No 21/2014, above n 109.   
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with considerable discretion in directing their CSR spending and selecting activities from 
among the listed items that they believe would serve their companies’ mission and business 
objectives or values.112  
Expenditures that would have been undertaken in the normal course of business, that are 
meant to benefit only their employees or political parties, or that relate to activities occurring 
outside India will not count as CSR spending according to CSR Rules.113 For instance, CSR 
projects or programs that benefit only the employees of the company and their families will 
not be considered as CSR activities in accordance with s 135 of the Act.114 According to the 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs Clarifications in 2014, the expenses incurred in the course of 
complying with any legislative requirements will not count as CSR. As a result, compliance 
with applicable legislation such as labour laws or environmental statutes does not qualify. 
CSR activities are further distinct from activities undertaken in pursuance of company’s 
normal course of business.115 Consequently, CSR under the Indian legislation clearly 
excludes activities required by law or activities that benefit the companies or their employees. 
Finally, the reporting requirements of the company board have been considerably extended 
by the Act. A CSR Report must be included in the directors’ annual report to shareholders, 
along with the financial statements.116 In the CSR Report, companies are required to provide 
an outline of their CSR policy including an overview of the projects or programs to be 
undertaken and a web-link to the company website where the CSR policy and programs are 
                                                             
112 Dharmapala and Khanna, above n 100.  
113 CSR Rules (4).  
114 CSR Rules (4)(5). For example, running an informal school by DLF Company, a large real estate developer 
in India, for children of its low-income construction workers cannot be regarded as CSR activities because it is 
solely for the benefit of its employees and their family. See, Dharmapala and Khanna, above n 100.  
115 However, some Indian companies have mistakenly deemed normal business activities as CSR. For example, 
United Spirits considers the identification and use of sustainable technology for its business operations as part of 
its CSR. Similarly, Cipla (a company operating in India) cut the price of cancer drugs as part of its 
‘humanitarian’ activities. The Act does not see these activities as CSR since there is no resulting expenditure 
that can be listed based on reduction in the prices of cancer medication, or use of sustainable technologies. The 
Act clearly states that CSR will not include business activities. See, Gopalan and Kamalnath, above n 99. 
116 Companies Act 2013, s 134(3).  
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outlined in detail.117 The report must also clarify the composition of the CSR committee, the 
average net profit of the company for the last three financial years, the prescribed CSR 
expenditure, the details of CSR spending during the financial year (including the amount 
spent, and the amount allocated but not spent), and the manner in which the amount was 
spent.118 The Indian Government had initially adopted a ‘comply-or-explain’ approach. This 
approach presupposed that in case the companies have failed to spend the required amount on 
CSR activities in a year, then they must explain the reasons for not doing so in their Board 
reports, see the discussion on this approach at 4.6.2.  
It is important to note that the Act initially did not specify a penalty for companies that do not 
comply with the CSR spending requirements but imposed penalties for non-reporting based 
on a ‘comply or explain’ approach (see above).119 However, in the most recent amendment in 
2019, the Companies Act adopted formal enforcement for CSR requirements and set out 
penalties for non-compliance.120 This legislative development makes CSR completely 
mandatory in India and highlights the need for similar provisions in other countries such as, 
Iraq.  
Available data on compliance shows that companies are responding well to the mandatory 
CSR obligations. A high percentage (95 %) of obligated companies have a CSR policy and 
board-level CSR committee. The percentage of companies that are spending more than the 
                                                             
117 Gopalan and Kamalnath, above n 99.  
118 CSR Rules.  
119  The failure to report on CSR activities would make the company subject to a penalty set out in s 134(8) of 
the Companies Act. This is because the expression of CSR as a board function implies that non-compliance with 
the provision ought to trigger the penalties stipulated for breach of directors’ duties. See Gopalan and 
Kamalnath, above n 99.  
120 According to the Companies Act amendment in 2019, a company that failed to comply with CSR 
requirements (sub-section 5 or 6 of s 135) could be punished by fines ranging from 50 thousand rupees 
(equivalent USD 702) up to 2500 thousand rupees (equivalent USD 35,104). In addition, every officer of such 
company who is in default could be punishable with prison up to three years, a fine, or both. Companies Act 
2013, s 135(7). 
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prescribed amount on CSR is increasing.121 Energy and oil companies (National Thermal 
Power Corporation Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) were reported to be in the top 10 CSR 
spenders over the last four years.122  This has to be evaluated in the light of the government’s 
measures to monitor the implementation of CSR policies. In April 2018 the government set 
up a centralised scrutiny and prosecution mechanism to examine records of the top 1000 
companies obliged to spend on CSR. Based on this review preliminary notices were issued to 
many companies and prosecution filed against companies who did not comply with CSR 
requirements and did not give valid reasons for not doing so.123 It is anticipated that this 
harsher regime and continuing monitoring are likely producer greater compliance. 
Overall, the Indian legislation recognises the importance of corporations undertaking 
activities that benefit the community. The Indian legislation again provides an option that 
Iraq may consider.  Whether it is appropriate for Iraq is discussed in chapter six. 
      5.5.2 Nigeria  
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, and its economy is mainly dependent on crude 
oil revenues.124 Oil reserves are concentrated in the southern part of the country, known as 
the Niger Delta.125 Oil production in the Niger Delta has resulted in significant negative 
environmental and social impacts. Despite these natural resources and the vast revenue made 
from the sale of crude oil, the Niger Delta has suffered from deprivation and lack of 
development and, as a consequence, increasing violence and instability, particularly in the 
                                                             
121 Girija Srinivasan and Narasimhan Srinivasan, India CSR Report 2019: Trends and Prospects of CSR (SAGE 
2019), 19.   
122 Ibid, 37. 
123 Ibid, 21.  
124 According to the World Bank, oil and gas sector contributes 99 percent of the country's export revenues, and 
85 percent of government revenues. World Bank, Niger Delta Social and Conflict Analysis (May 2008) ix 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-1168615404141/3328201-
1172597654983/Niger_Delta_May2008.pdf>. 
125 The Niger Delta region comprises nine oil-producing states. The region population is estimated to be over 28 
million people. The region hosts many oil producing companies including, for example, Total, Petrobras, 
Chevron, Shell, and Exxon Mobil. Ibid.  
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late 1990s. Furthermore, oil extraction in the region has caused environmental degradation 
resulting from oil spillages and gas flaring, which in turn negatively impacts other industries 
such as fishing and agriculture (the two main occupations in the region).126 The development 
of the Niger Delta has remained a major challenge for the Nigerian authorities with local 
communities increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction with government and its 
unsuccessful development initiatives.127 To address these significant challenges, Nigeria has 
enacted the Niger-Delta Development Commission Act in 2000 and the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Act in 2010. Both Acts seek to overcome the social and 
environmental problems in the Niger Delta mostly caused by the oil industry and to promote 
the development of the region.   
A. The Niger-Delta Development Commission Act 2000 
The Niger-Delta Development Commission Act 2000 (NDDC Act) established the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC), in order ‘to offer a lasting solution to the socio-
economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region’ by ‘facilitat[ing] the rapid, even and 
sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, 
socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.’128 This requires the 
Commission to tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from oil exploration 
and production in the region and coordinate with the Federal Government, the member States 
and oil companies on all matters for prevention and control oil spillages, gas flaring and 
environmental pollution.129 The Commission is further required to formulate policies for the 
development of the Niger Delta and implement projects and programs for sustainable 
                                                             
126 Ibid.  
127 The federal government had created special agencies for development intervention in the Niger Delta 
including the Niger Delta Basin Development Board established in 1965 and, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission in 1992. However, those initiatives were unsuccessful in addressing social and 
environmental difficulties in the Niger Delta. 
128 Niger Delta Development Commission, The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (2006) 103.   
129 Niger-Delta Development Commission Act 2000, No 6, ss 7(h), (i).  
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development in fields such as health, education, housing, roads, water supply, electricity, 
etc.130  
The NDDC Act provides an important model that could be used in other oil-producing 
countries and possibly in Iraq. Under the Act, the commission consists of members 
representing the Federal Government, oil producing States and oil producing companies.131 It 
requires all oil and gas producing companies operating in the Niger Delta area to fund this 
commission with 3 per cent (3%) of their total annual budgets.132 This approach has many 
advantages. It brings together key stakeholders in one official commission which facilitates 
the process of formulating a comprehensive development policy that considers the real needs 
of the region. To clarify, the NDDC has authority to plan and implement projects and 
programs for sustainable development and ‘ensure sound and efficient management of the 
resources of the Niger Delta region.’133 This avoids the disadvantages where each oil 
company implements its own CSR projects that may not be necessarily useful for the local 
community. Nonetheless, NDDC Act does not prevent oil companies engaging in CSR 
outside the NDDC plan. In such a case, the commission is empowered to monitor any project 
being funded or carried out by oil or gas companies, as well as ensuring that funds released 
for such projects are properly utilised.134 This may provide a useful model for Iraq, and is 
discussed further at 6.3.  
B. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act  
The object of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010 (Content 
Development Act) is to enhance the contribution of the oil and gas industry to the country’s 
                                                             
130 Ibid, s 7(1)(b).  
131 Ibid, s 1, 2. For more details about the functions and powers of the NDDC see Niger-Delta Development 
Commission Act 2000, s 7.  
132 Ibid, s 14.  
133 See Niger Delta Development Commission, Making a Difference (2018) 
<http://www.nddc.gov.ng/about%20us.html>. 
134 Niger-Delta Development Commission Act 2000, s 7(1)(g).  
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sustainable development.135 Assuming that the principal negative externalities are dealt with 
directly by statute (eg NDDC Act 2000, discussed above), the Content Development Act 
concentrates on the positive aspects of CSR in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. It provides a 
comprehensive legal framework for local content in the oil and gas industry and sets out three 
governing policies. These policies promote Nigerian content, reporting requirements for 
companies and create a regulatory body to oversee these provisions.136 The Act explicitly 
provides for specific categories of activities to be procured locally to the oil and gas sector; 
local content targets are set between 80 and 100 per cent.137 For example, in order to 
stimulate development of local businesses and industries, Nigerian companies must be 
selected for the procurement of some goods and services.138 These requirements will enhance 
the oil industry’s contribution to the economic development and value creation.139 The 
Content Development Act also requires all companies operating in the oil and gas industry to 
employ only Nigerians in junior or intermediate positions; foreigners may fill a maximum of 
5 per cent of management posts.140   
Companies operating in the oil and gas industry must submit to the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board specific plans covering all their projects and activities 
                                                             
135 Miriam Weiss, ‘The Role of Local Content Policies in Manufacturing and Mining in Low- and Middle-
income Countries’ (Working Paper No 19, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2016) 18 
<https://www.unido.org/api/opentext/documents/download/9929070/unido-file-9929070>.     
136 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Cathleen Cimino, Local Content Requirements: Report on a Global 
Problem (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013) 107.   
137 See Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, Schedule A. For example, goods and 
services such as steel pipes and plates, cables, valves, cement, audit services and geographical survey services 
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138 Isabelle Ramdoo, ‘Local Content Policies in Mineral-rich Countries an Overview’ (Discussion Paper No 193, 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, May 2016) 5 <http://ecdpm.org/wp-
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139 Theophilus Acheampong, Marcia Ashong and Victoria Svanikier, ‘An assessment of local-content policies in 
oil and gas producing countries’ (2016) 9 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 282, 302. According to 
the last estimates, the implementation of the Act has resulted, until early 2017, in attracting investments worth 
USD 2 billion into the country and created about 38,000 job opportunities. See KPMG, Recent Developments on 
Nigerian Content law in the Oil and Gas Industry (Newsletter, 15 March 2017)  
<https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/ng/pdf/tax/ng-recent-developments-on-nigerian-content-law-oil-
and-gas-industry.pdf>. 
140 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010, s 35.  
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such as ‘Nigerian Content Plan’,141 ‘Employment and Training Plan’,142 ‘Technology 
Transfer Plan’143 and others. These plans require companies to demonstrate their current 
levels of compliance with the Nigerian content requirements (or a timeline for reaching the 
target levels) or otherwise be subject to penalties for non-compliance. The Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board is granted a broad authority to guide, monitor, 
coordinate and implement the provisions of the Content Development Act.144 Particularly, the 
Board ‘appraises, evaluates and approves’ all required plans from foreign operators and 
awards the ‘Certificate of Authorization.’145 In case of non-compliance with the local content 
commitments by companies, the Board is empowered to impose penalties against non-
compliant companies that can lead to the cancellation of projects and fines equivalent to 5 per 
cent (5%) of the project value.146 Establishing a monitoring institution and empowering it 
with authority to impose sanctions is one reason why Nigerian local content regime is often 
viewed as successful,147 with other countries following this approach.148 In fact, it would be 
difficult to achieve and measure the value-add resulting from local content obligations 
without establishing mechanisms for effective monitoring and enforcement. 
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146 Ramdoo, above n 139, 5.  
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Regardless of the degree of implementation of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010 and its impact in Nigeria,149 the Act provides an approach that could 
be considered for Iraq. This is discussed further at 6.3.  
     5.5.3 Tanzania 
In 2010, Tanzania discovered significant quantities of natural gas after more than half a 
century of exploration for oil and gas.150 The rapid growth of the industry has challenged the 
Government to establish legal and institutional frameworks to manage the industry 
effectively.151  The government has formulated a comprehensive petroleum policy to guide 
the growth and development of the industry and maximising substantial benefits for its 
citizens.152 In 2015, Tanzania revised the legal framework for the petroleum industry by 
enacting the Petroleum Act 2015 and other related Acts.153 This Act imposes high standards 
for protecting the environment, and public health and safety in the petroleum operations 
(mitigates the negative impacts of petroleum activities).154  
Further, the Petroleum Act 2015 sets out explicit provisions for ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ programs; and obligations for the recruitment and training of Tanzanians, and 
local content. According to this Act, a contractor and licence holder155 must annually prepare 
                                                             
149 Ituma Calistus, ‘The Antithesis of Nigerian Local Content Act 2010 to Nigeria’s Laws, Global Trade and 
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production of natural gas was commenced. See Ministry or Energy and Minerals, The National Natural Gas 
Policy of Tanzania (October, 2013) 1  
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151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid, 16. 
153 The two other related Acts are The Tanzania Extractive Industry (Transparency and Accountability) Act 
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154 Petroleum Act 2015, ss 207-217. 
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a credible CSR plan be agreed with the relevant local government authorities.156 The prepared 
CSR plan should take into account environmental, social, economic, and cultural activities 
based on local government priorities of the host community.157 Thus, the CSR plan must be 
submitted to a local government authority for consideration and approval.158 This means that 
a CSR program is subject to negotiation between the licence holder and the local government, 
and cannot be decided by the licence holder alone. In this regard, every local government 
authority is required to prepare CSR guidelines having regarding their localities’ concerns. 
The local government authority is also empowered to oversee the implementation of the 
approved CSR action plan by the contractor or the licence holder.159  
In relation to the employment and training of Tanzanians, a licence holder and a contractor is 
required to provide training and recruitment of Tanzanians in all phases of petroleum 
operations and gas activities taking into account gender, equity, persons with disabilities and 
host communities concerns.160 For that purpose, a licence holder and contractor must 
annually submit to the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (discussed below) for 
approval a detailed programme for training and employment.161 The Act further requires the 
licensee to report to the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority annually on the execution 
of the training programme162 including their commitment to establish management and 
technical capabilities, maximise technology transfer and skills relating to petroleum and gas 
industry to Tanzanians who are employed in this sectors, and steps taken to close any 
identified learning gaps.163 Reporting to a regulatory agency about the efforts made and 
progress for training and knowledge transfer allows the state to monitor the progress. Iraq can 
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take advantage from this experience and implement similar requirements as will discussed 
further at 6.3.  
The Tanzanian Petroleum Act 2015 also places an obligation on a licence holder to give 
preference to Tanzanian goods and services.164 This provision has wide ranging implications 
for service providers including oil services companies, financial and insurance, legal, 
accounts and health matters. Where Tanzanian goods and services are not available, such 
goods and services must be provided by a company which has entered into a joint venture 
with a local company. The local company must hold no less than 25 per cent of the shares in 
such joint venture company.165 In other words, any foreign supplier must enter into 
partnerships with a local company to qualify for supplying the petroleum sector with goods 
and services. These requirements promote local enterprises. It would also stimulate the 
development of sectors other than the petroleum industry by enabling technology transfer and 
developing local capacity for Tanzanian companies.166 To ensure that local content 
requirements are carried out, the licence holder is required to submit to the Petroleum 
Upstream Regulatory Authority on an annual basis a report of their achievement and their 
contractor, and subcontractors’ achievement in utilising Tanzanian goods and services.167     
Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority is a body established by the Petroleum Act 2015 to 
regulate and monitor the petroleum sector.168 This Authority is responsible, among other 
functions, to ensure compliance by industry players with the provisions of the Petroleum Act 
and any other regulations or contract terms, for example, monitoring the implementation of 
local content, training and knowledge transfer in the petroleum sector.169 However, because 
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169 For more details about functions and responsibilities of Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority see 
Petroleum Act 2015, s 12.  
150 
 
petroleum projects in Tanzania are still under negotiation between the government and IOCs, 
no reporting on CSR, local content and training have issued yet. 
The illustrations from India, Nigeria and Tanzania provide alternative approaches for Iraq to 
consider in relation to the responsibility and accountability of multinational investors in the 
oil and gas industry, and the transparency of these processes in implementing local content 
and procurement, training and employment of locals, and sustainable development of the 
sector generally. Although the examples from Nigeria and Tanzania both set out monitoring 
mechanisms, Iraq will need to be alert to whether these provisions are able to avoid 
inefficiency and corruption risks and achieve the goals for which they were established as 
well as the viability of these approaches in the Iraqi context. This is further discussed in 
chapter six at 6.4.  
The next section examines the approach that has thus far been used in Iraq, that is, the use of 
Oil Contracts to impose obligations on IOCs.  
5.6 Corporate Social Responsibility in Oil Contracts  
In addition to international instruments and national legislation, contracts have been used as 
an important tool to promote CSR. Oil contracts addressed in this thesis are those entered 
into between an International Oil Company or companies and the host state or, in some 
cases, the National Oil Company.170 Oil contracts may require IOCs to protect the 
environment, employees and society from the impact of oil activities (preventing negative 
externalities), and also to provide for development of localities and the sustainable 
development of communities in which they carry out their activities (providing positive 
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contributions).171 In doing so, the host state can hold the IOC accountable for non-
performance, poor or part-performance, and performance which is substantially different 
from what was reasonably expected.172  
The oil contract, as a binding legal agreement, imposes contractual obligations on IOCs. 
Consequently, contractual conditions requiring IOCs to provide community programs etc do 
not qualify as CSR as defined for this thesis, see chapter four at 4.2.1. They are considered 
here as there is little prospect those IOCs will do much by way of voluntary CSR in Iraq, see 
discussion at 6.3. Direct CSR provision in the oil contract can be in three forms: explanatory 
to the legislative rules, confirming the legislative requirements, or it could impose new legal 
obligations under contractual clauses required by the host state authority.  
Contractual CSR provisions may complement or clarify or restate the provisions of the law. 
This can occur where the law only provides general statement of what is required without 
identifying the area of CSR interest or specifying the minimum percentage of CSR expense. 
This is not the position in Iraq as there are no ‘CSR’ style statutory obligations but it provides 
an option for consideration. The oil contract may have express provisions related to the 
impact of oil operations on communities and specify the social development work that must 
be carried out by the oil company. Since 2013,173 for example, the Mexican models of 
petroleum contracts developed by the Mexican national oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos 
                                                             
171 Ibid, 161-165; also see Appendix 2. 
172 Abbas Ghandi and Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contract around the World: A Review’ (2014) 3 
Energy Strategy Reviews 63, 71.  
173 In 2013, Mexico has implemented significant institutional reforms in the energy sector. These reforms led to 
the amendment of Mexico’s constitution to allow private investment in the petroleum sectors. These 
amendments, plus a series of laws enacted in 2014, end more than seven decades of monopoly held by two state-
owned companies. The energy reform authorised the national oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), to 
carry out bidding rounds and enter into contracts with the private sector for exploration and production activities 
through its subsidiary. Pursuant to the new contracting authorities, Pemex developed different models of 
petroleum contract for each bidding round which were implemented in contracts for many fields by 2015. For an 
in-depth analysis of energy reform in Mexico, see Richard Vietor and Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason, ‘Mexico’s 
Energy Reform’ (Case Study No 717-027, Harvard Business School, 23 January 2017); Tim Samples and Jose 
Vittor, ‘Energy Reform and the Future of Mexico’s Oil Industry: The Pemex Bidding Rounds and Integrated 
Service Contract’ (2012) 7 Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law 215, 240.   
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(Pemex), includes provisions which explain and determine the requirements under the 
Mexican Hydrocarbons Law 2014 on issues related to CSR. To illustrate, Article 118 of this 
law states that infrastructure projects in the hydrocarbons industry must respect human rights 
and follow the principles of sustainability.174 But the Law neither clarifies what ‘the 
principles of sustainability’ means nor what is required. In practise, clause 19(8) of the 
Mexican petroleum contract model stipulates that the Contractor must implement social and 
environmental responsibility programs, bearing in mind the contribution to sustainable 
development that benefits the communities located or close to the contract area.175 
Consultation with communities is required to prepare and monitor the CSR programs. The 
Contractor must spend on CSR programs, as a minimum, equivalent to 1 per cent of its 
annual budget.176 Annex 13 of the Mexican petroleum contract model further explains that 
the objective of CSR programs is to build trusting relationships between the community, the 
National Oil Company and the Contractor that contributes to obtaining the social license to 
operate.177 To achieve that, CSR programs must promote social benefit in the areas of 
education, health and sustainable productive projects; actions to support conservation, 
restoration and sustainable management of the natural resources; and enhance capacity-
building, transfer technology, organisational development etc.178 This contractual condition 
clearly explains what is required to contribute to the sustainable development of local 
                                                             
174 Hydrocarbons Law 2014 (Mexico), art 118.   
175 Pemex Exploration and Production, Modelo de Contrato para Producción de Hidrocarburos [Contract 
Model for Hydrocarbon Production] (published 20 December 2012), 19(8) 
<http://contratos.pemex.com/Documentos%20CIEP/Chicontepec_Modelo%20de%20contrato.pdf>.  
176 Ibid.  
177 Ibid, Annex 13.  
178 Ibid. For this purpose, Annex 13 stresses that CSR programs should be in the form of direct investments in 
sustainable development projects and donations or cash contributions are not accepted.    
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communities to implement the provisions of CSR mentioned in the Mexican Hydrocarbons 
Law 2014.179      
A second variation is that the CSR requirements in oil contracts may simply restate 
legislative requirements with the oil contract reconfirming those provisions. For example, in 
oil contracts, research and development investment obligation in Brazil derives from a 
combination of legal and contractual obligations. According to clause 24 of the Brazilian 
model of concession agreements, if production of oil or natural gas in a certain field reaches a 
specified volume of production, the concessionaire must invest an amount of 1 per cent (1%) 
of the production gross revenue of the field into research and development projects.180 The 
amount required to be spent on research and development is calculated from the gross 
revenue of the production so that these costs are borne by the concessionaire according to the 
concession agreements provisions.181 Up to half of that amount can be invested in the 
company’s internal research and development projects or through private partners. The 
remaining amount has to go to non-profit institutions, universities and other research and 
development related institutions accredited by the National Petroleum Agency.182 This clause 
set out CSR requirements restating the provision in Resolution No 33 of 2005183 issued by the 
National Petroleum Agency.184 Clearly, the contracting authority (National Petroleum 
                                                             
179 Armando Chiang, ‘Corporative Social Responsibility in the Mexican oil industry: The Social Impact 
Assessment as a tool for local development’ (Paper presented at 4th International Conference on CSR, 
Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, Perth, Western Australia, 26–28 July 2017) 4     
<http://www.promaco.com.au/events/csr2017/CSR_2017-Book_of_Full_Paper_Submissions.pdf>. 
180 Ministry of mines and Energy, Concession Agreement for the Exploration, Development and Production of 
Oil and Natural Gas, contract model, 2008, 24 
<http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Brazil,%20Model%20Concession%20Agreement,%20ANP%2010th%20Rn
d,%202008.pdf>. 
181 For instance, Clause 2(2) of the Brazilian model of concession agreements states that ‘the Concessionaire 
shall always assume, in an exclusive manner, all costs and risks related to the performance of the Operations and 
its consequences, bearing, in return, the sole, exclusive ownership of the Oil and Natural Gas which might be 
effectively produced and received by it at the Production Metering Point, pursuant to this Agreement,…’. Ibid, 
2(2).  
182 Ibid, 24(4).   
183 National Petroleum Agency, Natural Gas and Biofuels, Resolution No 33 of 2005.  
184 National Petroleum Agency, Natural Gas and Biofuels (Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP)) is a federal autarchy subordinated to the Ministry of Mines and Energy responsible for 
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Agency) includes these statutory obligations in contractual clauses. Similarly, the Ecuadorian 
Service Contracts models of 2011 and 2014 require the oil company to employ in the 
execution of services a minimum of 95 per cent of both Ecuadorian workers and 
administrative staff and 75 per cent Ecuadorian technicians. This is required by Article 31 of 
the Ecuadorian Hydrocarbons Law1978.185  
The third alternative is that a direct CSR provision in the oil contract may be included by the 
host state authority for the purpose of ensuring contributions to sustainable development, and 
increasing the protection of stakeholder interests, particularly when local petroleum 
legislation is weak, insufficient, or non-existent. In the absence of legislation, the remaining 
option is to use oil and gas contracts to require IOCs to contribute to the community. In 
relation to Iraq, the inclusion of clauses in oil contracts may be the only avenue for Iraq to 
force IOCs to contribute to Iraq’s development. Legislative solutions have little prospect of 
being passed. Iraq has not succeeded in passing the oil and gas law since it was first 
introduced into Parliament in 2007 (see discussion on the Draft Oil and Gas Law at 2.5.2). 
The Iraqi government’s strategy has been to include CSR provisions in oil and gas contracts. 
Such clauses with limited reach were included in the first bidding round hold in 2010 and 
subsequent bidding rounds (see discussion on the Oil and Gas Licensing Rounds at 2.2.2). 
Current Iraqi oil contracts require the contractor to allocate, as a minimum, an annual amount 
of USD 5 million to the Training, Technology, and Scholarship Fund.186 This is important in 
building capacity and expertise for Iraqi workers. But as will be seen, (at 6.3.2), there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the regulation, contracting and monitoring economic activities of the petroleum industry in Brazil. See The 
Regulation of the Petroleum Industry in Brazil 1997, No 9.478, arts 7, 8.  
185 Ecuadorian Hydrocarbons Law 1978, No 711.  
186 There is no signed oil contract publicly available but a contract model is available. See Technical Services 
Contract for the Rumaila Oil Field between BP, CNPC and Iraq, a contract model from the first bidding round, 
(2010) art 26 <http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Clean_copy__BP_CNPC_comments__27_July__on_PCLD_draft_dated_01.pdf
>; Exploration, Development and Production Contract, a contract model from the fifth bidding round, 2018 art 
26 <https://oil.gov.iq/upload/upfile/ar/659.pdf>. Extracts from those two contracts model provide in Appendix 
2. 
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evidence that the full amounts have not been spent nor has it led to the upskilling and 
recruitment of greater numbers of Iraqi workers. These provisions and criticisms are 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter (see 6.3).  
5.7 Conclusion    
This chapter examined the alternative approaches to CSR at both the international and 
domestic levels for the purpose of proposing a legal framework to implement CSR in the 
Iraqi oil and gas industry. At the international level, international instruments address CSR 
issues by setting norms, creating standards for best practice, and promoting policies in the 
areas of social, labour, and environmental protection. Many countries, including Canada, 
Brazil and EU, have included obligations to promote CSR in Trade Investment Agreements 
to achieve a balance between the social and ecological impact of foreign investor’s activities 
and guarantees and rights they receive under these agreements. The Brazilian model of 
agreements has been used to illustrate because it explicitly identifies the concept of CSR and 
addresses interests of the host state. The inclusion of CSR clauses in the international trade 
and investment agreements provides a new avenue to encourage corporate social and 
environmental behaviour beyond the current reliance on voluntary initiatives and national 
legislation.187 CSR codes set out in the international instruments are increasingly shaping 
investment policies at the national and international levels, particularly where they enforced 
by national law.188   
At the national level, governments have become increasingly proactive in promoting CSR 
and are the major CSR driver.189 Government policies and programs for CSR vary in their 
                                                             
187 Peels and Echeverria, above n 33.  
188 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, above n 10, 35.  
189 Jeremy Moon, ‘Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility’, above n 35, 17; Lozano et al, 
above n 35, 42; Peters and Röß above n 36; Steurer, ‘The Role of Governments in Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, above n 37.  
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regulatory strength ranging from endorsing, facilitating, partnering,190 to legal requirements 
either through legislation or under contract requiring corporations to act responsibly.  
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, CSR is defined in the thesis as voluntary 
activities which contribute to society by ‘doing the right thing.’ As noted, some jurisdictions 
do not rely on altruistic behaviour but legislatively require corporations to respect human 
rights, ensure appropriate labour conditions and contribute to community development. These 
provide important exemplars for Iraq.  As will be explained at 6.3, there is little evidence that 
IOCs will voluntarily engage in substantial CSR, absent any formal obligation to contribute 
to the community. The specific issues addressed by the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010, the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 and the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 
dealing with labour practices and supply chains are less important in the Iraqi context of 
IOCs. The legislation does demonstrate that the protection of workers is considered 
sufficiently important not to be left to the voluntary conduct of Corporations. 
The other area where governments have legislated is in relation to social and environmental 
programs that enhance sustainable development. India, Nigeria and Tanzania provided 
examples of this type of legislation. Nigeria and Tanzania are particularly interesting as they 
specifically deal with oil and gas corporations. However, while they offer a comprehensive 
legal framework for local content and value adding by oil and gas industry corporations, they 
lack a nuanced definition of what constitutes a CSR obligation. For this we have to look at 
the Indian legislation which defines CSR activities and excludes self-serving expenditure by 
companies, see above. This is its strength. It is suggested that the definition of CSR found in 
the Indian legislation be adopted alongside a mandatory requirement of a percentage of ‘gross 
profit’ or, still better, barrels of oil/crude extracted. Nevertheless, the problems confronting 
Iraq may be much more basic and, therefore, insurmountable given the influence of IOCs and 
                                                             
190 Fox et al, above n 39, 6; Knudsen et al, above n 40. 
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the Parliamentary gridlock in being unable to pass reforming oil and gas legislation. This last 
issue is discussed in 6.2.  
This chapter has also discussed oil contracts as a basis for contributions to the community. 
Brazilian petroleum contracts provide a model approach for requiring IOCs to contribute to 
the environment and community welfare. Whether Iraq should further develop its oil 
contracts to make similar provision is discussed at 6.3. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN IRAQ  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter argues that corporate social responsibility (CSR) should form an integral part of 
the operations of international oil companies (IOCs) investing in Iraq but the role of corporate 
social responsibility should complement rather than be an alternative to legislation protecting 
the environment and the community. This argument builds on the earlier discussion in 
chapter two setting out the Iraqi context, the role of oil and gas sector in the Iraqi economy, 
and the strengths and weakness that hinder investment stability and economic prosperity. It 
also builds on the earlier arguments in chapter four as to why international oil companies 
should undertake CSR, and the international experience in responding to corporate 
responsibility in chapter five. It has been argued in chapter two (see 2.7) that Iraq has 
substantial reasons for promoting CSR in the oil and gas industry. The issue examined in this 
chapter is to decide what the most appropriate mechanism to achieve this. The choice 
depends on the efficiency of the Iraqi legal system, the nature of institutions, the role of the 
financial market, and public awareness on social and environmental issues.1  
It was argued in chapter four (see 4.6.3) that the current status of the Iraq Stock Exchange 
and the fact that international oil companies are not listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange 
effectively prevents the adoption of the approach in many countries that requires listed 
companies to report CSR based on the comply-or-explain regime. The comply-or-explain 
approach is more likely to be effective where discipline is exercised by the financial market, 
                                                             
1 Suzanne Young and Magalie Marais, ‘A Multi-level Perspective of CSR Reporting: The Implications of 
National Institutions and Industry Risk Characteristics’ (2012) 20(5) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 432, 450.  
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where there is strong shareholder activism and a critical financial press which create a market 
sanction rather than a legal one.2 Thus, the accountability mechanisms which might have 
been implemented through listing rules are not an option for Iraq, and therefore, alternative 
approaches need to be considered.  
Chapter five discusses jurisdictions where Corporations are statutorily required to protect the 
stakeholders (see 5.4) and contribute to development and community welfare (see 5.5). This 
provides possible models for Iraq. If a legislative approach is adopted, it could impose formal 
obligations on oil companies to carry out particular activities for the benefit of the community 
or stakeholders. Iraq has imposed legal obligations on IOCs through oil and gas contracts for 
development and community welfare. This chapter examines the potential role of CSR as a 
voluntary mechanism in the oil industry and the possibility of imposing formal obligations on 
IOCs, whether thorough regulation and/or oil and gas contracts, to carry out particular 
activities for development and community welfare. However, monitoring IOCs compliance 
with these obligations is crucially important in Iraq because of political influence in the oil 
industry and corruption risks.    
The chapter starts by addressing the suitable approach for implementing CSR in Iraq. Then, it 
examines a framework of CSR in the oil industry in responding to the Iraqi context. This 
includes corporate governance and stakeholder protection, training, local content and 
development projects for community welfare. Finally, the chapter recommends a framework 
for monitoring IOC compliance with legal requirements and implementing voluntary CSR in 
the oil industry.  
 
                                                             
2 Ramin Gamerschlag, Klaus Moller and Frank Verbeeten, ‘Determinants of Voluntary CSR Disclosure: 
Empirical Evidence from Germany’ (2011) 5(2-3) Review of Managerial Science 233, 262; Sridhar Arcot, 
Valentina Bruno and Antoine Grimaud, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach 
Working?’ (2010) 30 International Review of Law and Economics 193, 201.  
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6.2 Legislative and Contractual Approaches  
As noted previously CSR style obligations imposed by law do not qualify as CSR as defined 
in this thesis. Nevertheless, with relation to particular negative externalities (such as 
environmental protection) and contributions to development and welfare, States have 
effectively forced corporations to act as good citizens. This section examines whether the 
imposition of legal obligations, through legislation or contractual obligations, provide the 
most appropriate approach fort Iraq. This is based on the view that oil companies have not 
voluntarily undertaken responsibility for the negative externalities created by their activities 
and have not significantly and meaningfully contributed to the community. Legislation 
should make oil companies responsible for the harm caused to stakeholders and the 
community as a consequence of their operations, see discussion below at 6.3.1. Rather than a 
comply-or-explain approach, which is unlikely to be effective in Iraq (see 4.6.3), sanctions 
and penalties should apply for breach. This can be done through environmental law, 
petroleum law as well as petroleum contracts. Legislation may be the preferred option for 
many reasons including gaps in the existing petroleum legislation, corruption and lack of 
judicial experience. These aspects are discussed below.  
Despite the significance of petroleum resources including oil and gas for the government 
revenue and the whole economy (see chapter two at 2.2.1), the government has been unable 
to enact a modern law that sets up specific technical and management requirements for the 
sector. The problem is twofold: first, the difficulty in passing legislation relating to oil and 
gas law and second, the content of the possible law. Since 2007, the government has 
submitted a draft on oil and gas law to the Parliament multiple times.3 A political stalemate 
and other obstacles (discussed at 2.5.2) prevented the proposed law being passed. This is not 
expected to be solved in the near future. If the potential for the imposition of legal obligations 
                                                             
3 Draft Oil and Gas Law, 2007.  
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in relation to negative externalities or positive contributions to the community in amendments 
to the oil and gas law is not likely, other alternatives need to be considered. The Draft Oil and 
Gas Law makes no mention to CSR. If the barriers to enactment of a modern oil and gas law 
are overcome, this would provide a suitable vehicle for including provisions for the 
environment, labour and community protection, local content and general development.  
The second barrier to implementing a legislative solution for CSR is corruption. The 
Corruption Perception Index shows that Iraq, over a decade, is perceived as one of the ten 
most corrupt countries in the world4 and in 2018 was ranked as one of the worst with a 
ranking of 168th out of 180 countries.5 The Transparency International Organisation suggests 
that wars, political instability, internal conflicts and terrorism are some of the reasons for the 
increase in corruption in Iraq, particularly political corruption.6 This is relevant to the 
question whether CSR could be implemented through financing social programs that are 
implemented by the IOCs themselves. If CSR is in the form of monetary payments, 
corruption is a serious risk if IOCs are required to pay for CSR initiatives to the government 
or state-owned companies. It must also be investigated whether the funding and 
implementation of CSR programs by IOCs ensures the quality and the efficiency of those 
programs. Although IOCs have the financial and technical capacity to implement social and 
environmental programs, unless there is formal accountability and monitoring there is no 
certainty that the objectives of any CSR programs will be achieved (see discussion below at 
                                                             
4 Iraq’s rank on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index was 178 out of 180 countries in 
2008 and 166 out of 176 countries in 2016. See, Transparency International Organisation, Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index 2008  
<http://media01.commpartners.com/acc_webcast_docs/TI_CP_Index_2008.pdf>; Transparency International 
Organisation, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,  
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-
2016/$FILE/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-2016.pdf>.  
5 Transparency International Organisation, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 
<https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2018_CPI_Executive_Summary.pdf>. 
6 Transparency International Organisation, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, 
above n 4.    
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6.3.2 about IOCs implementing training requirements and at 6.3.3 about IOCs implementing 
local employment requirements).  
The third problem is where accountability mechanisms are incorporated into legislation 
enforceable through the judicial system. The judicial system lacks resources and experience.7 
There is a lack of experience and knowledge of international law and standards, 
environmental protection, human trafficking, legal empowerment mechanisms, money 
laundering and arbitration.8 The Iraqi Judiciary, like other official bodies, also suffers from 
slow and cumbersome procedures.9  
Although the Iraqi Constitution guarantees judicial independence, political and sectarian 
identity continues to influence appointments and decisions.10 Members of the judiciary are 
often exposed to significant pressure including physical threats, particularly in pursuing 
corruption cases.11 With relatively inexperienced judges, cronyism, intimidation, and slow 
and cumbersome procedures, the judiciary in Iraq is unlikely to play an effective role in 
enforcing CSR where there is mandatory legislation or awarding adequate compensation to 
victims in the event of any petroleum accident.  
These challenges must be taken into consideration when deciding the best options for Iraq in 
relation to CSR. These difficulties might be lessened if clear and explicit CSR obligations are 
set out in both the oil and gas law and in oil contracts. Lack of judicial expertise could be 
                                                             
7 There is a broad consensus, among officials, advisors and experts that courts in Iraq need more judges with 
specific expertise. See, Jim Freedman and Abbas Balasem, ‘Iraq - Support to the Rule of Law and Justice 
Project Final Project Evaluation’ (United Nations Development Programme, August 2012) 16  
<file://ad.uws.edu.au/dfshare/HomesPTA$/90928758/Downloads/Iraq%20-
%20Support%20to%20the%20Rule%20of%20Law%20and%20Justice%20Project%20Evaluation%20Report%
202012%20(5).pdf>. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘DFAT Country Information Report Iraq’ 
(26 June 2017) 27 <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/country-information-report-iraq.pdf>. 
11 Maxime Agator, ‘Iraq: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption’ (Transparency International, Report No 
374, April 2013) 7  
<https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/374_Iraq_overview_of_corruption_and_antico
rruption.pdf>. 
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addressed by extensive training programs on emerging issues in Iraq such as environmental 
pollution, protection of cultural heritage, protection against enforced labour, achieving gender 
equity and so on.12  
As noted in the introduction, the objective of this chapter is to identify a suitable CSR 
framework for Iraq’s oil and gas industry. The next section will discuss the content and 
enforceability of CSR provisions.    
6.3 Corporate Social Responsibility Framework for the Iraqi Oil and Gas Industry 
The previous section examined approaches to implementing corporate social responsibility 
for the Iraqi oil and gas industry. This section investigates the content of CSR for this 
industry. As mentioned above, the Iraqi government’s strategy has been to include ‘CSR’ 
type obligations for IOCs through oil contracts.13 The government has followed this strategy 
since the first bidding round held in 2009, see 2.2.2. The Technical Services Contract (TSC) 
model usually incorporates such a provision, see 2.5.3 and Appendix 2.14 The problem is that 
although there have been provisions in oil contracts requiring IOCs to provide training etc, 
the requirements are very limited and modest amounts set aside for these purposes have not 
been fully expended with no monitoring mechanisms in place. Under the model Technical 
Services Contract currently used in Iraq (see Appendix 2) IOCs undertake obligations in 
relation to training, local content and development projects (see below). 
Viewing these contractual obligations as CSR assumes that CSR is not limited to purely 
voluntary undertakings by IOCs but extends to contractual commitments intended to benefit 
stakeholders and community interests. This is contrary to the accepted view that CSR 
involves voluntary conduct, see chapter 4. Nevertheless, it is a mechanism whereby IOCs can 
                                                             
12 For further discussion on training Iraqi judges and recommendations for future programs see Freedman and 
Balasem, above n 7, 43-44.  
13 They are not technically CSR as they are obligatory, see 4.2. 
14 An overview of these contracts is given at 2.5.3 and extracts from this contract model provide in Appendix 2. 
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be forced to act as good corporate citizens. But it is apparent that even in relation to 
contractual obligations, for example in relation to training, these have had modest success.  
This calls into question whether imposing CSR style obligations under contract has any 
greater chance of success. 
At the very minimum, CSR can be seen as requiring the corporation to eliminate negative 
externalities caused by its activities (see 4.2.1 and 4.3.1). This is because, as noted in chapter 
3 (see 3.3), it is in the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders to do so. It is 
one thing to require companies to address negative externalities caused by their operations, 
but should CSR extend to companies engaging in activities which promote community 
welfare? This section examines the experience of other countries in implementing CSR in the 
petroleum industry discussed in chapters four and five, and are now considered in the Iraqi 
context. The discussion includes corporate governance and stakeholder protection, training, 
local content and development projects.  
     6.3.1 Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Protection  
In Iraq protecting the environment and communities is a particular concern because, as noted 
in chapter two, oil and gas facilities in Iraq are widespread and go through areas with high 
biological diversity, high population and areas of cultural heritage (see 2.7.1and Figure 2.2). 
Thus, any oil pollution, even small amounts, may cause serious harm. Many Iraqi giant oil 
fields are located on or close to the southern marshlands which are places of international 
cultural heritage. Chapter four provided examples of the negative impacts of oil company’s 
operations on communities and the environment and specifically mentioned the negative 
impacts of oil activities on the southern marshlands (see 4.3.2). To protect the environment 
and key stakeholders, this section argues that corporate social responsibility should form an 
integral part of the operations of oil companies operating in Iraq.  
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Protecting the environment and other stakeholder should not just be a matter of choice for oil 
companies where their operations cause damage to the environment. It is argued that 
corporate social responsibility should complement rather than be an alternative to legislation 
protecting the environment and the community.15 In relation to environmental harm, 
governments usually impose legal obligations, specifically in the extractive industry, to 
reduce the risks of damage from oil activities and thus internalising costs to the corporation. 
These obligations are enforced by law. In developed countries, international oil companies 
usually comply with this mandatory environmental and social legislation.16 In developing 
countries, however, even if there are existing legal regulation to protect the environment and 
society, enforcement is a serious problem. This is particularly because the high levels of 
corruption that impede meaningful enforcement of existing legislation, see discussion at 
4.4.1. 
Iraq has also imposed legal obligations to protect the environment and communities in both 
the Environmental Protection and Improvement Law 200917 and in oil and gas contracts.18 
However, the difficulty lies in enforcing these obligations and monitoring IOCs compliance. 
For example, two oil spill incidents occurred in April and August 2012 from a gas separation 
station in the Zubair oil field. The responsible companies for those two incidents were Ente 
                                                             
15 Forest Reinhadt, Robert Stavins and Richard Vietor, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic 
Lens’ (2008) 2(2) Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 219, 239; see also, Commission of the 
European Communities, Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibilities, COM/366 final (18 July 2001) 7  
<http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/LW/Data%20reports%20and%20studies/Reports%20and%20%20communicati
on%20from%20EU%20Commission/20110830-103712_com_2001_366enpdf.pdf>. 
16 Elin Boasson et al, for example, found that all the nine major oil companies (from eg US, UK, Norway, 
Canada and France) in their survey complied with mandatory social and environmental legislation. Elin 
Boasson, Jorgen Wettestad and Maria Bohn, ‘CSR in the European Oil Sector: a Mapping of Company 
Perceptions’ in Regine Barth and Franziska Wolff (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe : Rhetoric 
and Realities (Edward Elgar, 2009) 65, 67.   
17 see Environmental Protection and Improvement Law No 27 of 2009, art 21.  
18 Technical Services Contract model (2010), art 41. There is no signed oil contract publicly available. Only the 
model of a Technical Services Contract for the first bidding round is publicly available, see 
<http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Clean_copy__BP_CNPC_comments__27_July__on_PCLD_draft_dated_01.pdf
> Extracts from this contract model provide in Appendix 2. 
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Nazionale Idrocarburi company (Italian oil and gas company) and its partner the Basrah Oil 
Company (a state-owned company, previously known as South Oil Company) who jointly 
invested in the Zubair oil field. Despite the significant damage caused by these pollution 
incidents, the measures taken by the government to force companies to clean up were 
inadequate,19 and oil companies were slow to clean up following these incidents.20 This is 
attributed to weak enforcement of existing regulations for environmental protection (whether 
general environmental regulations, or oil and gas contracts). Moreover, the clean-up of the 
pollution was not reported. This demonstrates lack of monitoring of IOCs environmental 
responsibilities. Iraq should develop the necessary institutional framework to monitor 
compliance with environmental legislation and contractual obligations and ultimately protect 
the environment and other stakeholders. This is further discussed below at 6.4.   
In addition, Iraq should enact specific provisions to protect the southern marshlands 
considering their national and international significance and other cultural heritage areas. At 
the same time, oil and gas contracts should also include provisions that are consistent with 
regulations. These provisions should hold oil companies responsible for harm caused by their 
activities to the environment and the community.  
 
 
 
                                                             
19 The Iraqi government action in those two cases was limited to imposing a fine (ID 8.300 thousand equal to 
USD 6.95 thousand) for each incident on Basrah Oil Company (the state-owned company) only for each month 
of delay in the removal of the pollution according to Environmental Protection and Improvement Law No 27 of 
2009, art 33(2). Those two cases show that the Iraqi authority did not impose fine on the Italian oil company, 
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi. The reason for this is not clear. See Man Ali, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Oil 
Environmental Pollution, with Special Reference to Basra Governorate’ (Arabic version) (2015) 31(25) Gulf 
Economist 179, 213 [author’s trans]. 
20 Environment Protection and Improvement Council in Basrah province has asked oil companies several times 
during 2015 to treat the pollutants caused by their extractive and exploration processes. However, companies do 
not remove these pollutants quickly. See Ali, above n 19.  
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     6.3.2 Training   
As mentioned above, Iraq regulates relationship with international oil companies operating in 
Iraq through oil contracts, namely, the Technical Services Contract (TSC). This type of 
petroleum contract is intended to provide for long-term development, capacity building and 
knowledge transfer. Training of nationals is one of the contractor's substantial commitments 
that must be implemented in good faith. The TSC contract model requires the contractor(s) to 
allocate, as a minimum, an annual amount of USD 5 million to the Training, Technology, and 
Scholarship Fund (referred to hereinafter as the Training Fund).21 The Training Fund must be 
used for two purposes: first, financing academic education and on-the-job training and 
practical experience in petroleum operations both inside and outside Iraq; and second, 
supporting oil and gas related technology and research including the establishment or 
upgrading of research institutes inside Iraq.22 The amount paid to the Fund is not recoverable 
as costs of production, namely, these costs are borne by the international oil company and the 
government is not obliged under the contract to refund these costs to the IOC.23 In 
comparison with petroleum contracts in Afghanistan and Indonesia,24 the Iraq’s oil contracts 
are advanced in terms of allocating a large amount of money for training and petroleum 
education paid for by the IOC. This is a significant achievement for knowledge transfer and 
capacity building if properly implemented. A contractual obligation does not, however, 
qualify as CSR as formally defined, see 4.2.1. It suggests that the preference for the Iraqi 
                                                             
21 See Technical Services Contract model, above n 18, art 26; see Appendix 2.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid, art 26(3) and art 19(5)(d).  
24 For example, petroleum contracts from Afghanistan and Indonesia required the contractor to fund training 
programs, but training expenses are considered as recoverable costs. Afghanistan’s Production Sharing Contract 
for Amu Darya Basin requires the contractor to spend USD 50 thousand on its training programs in the first 
year; this amount will increase by USD 5 thousand annually in the years thereafter. But the training costs are 
recoverable from the government. Another example is from Indonesia’s Production Sharing Contract for the 
Ganal Block. Although this contract did not specify an amount that should spent on training programs, it 
included training costs and expenses as operating costs. See, Tim Boykett et al, Oil Contracts: How to Read and 
Understand a Petroleum Contract (Times Up Press, 2012) 138  
<http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%202016/Oil%20Contratcs,%20How%20to%20Read%20and%20U
nderstand%20them%202011.pdf>. 
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government is to create binding obligations for training rather than rely on voluntary 
contributions to community welfare by oil companies as part of its corporate social 
responsibility programs. 
Based on these contractual training requirements most IOCs in Iraq carry out such training 
programs for existing employees to undertake on-the-job training (reservoir and production 
engineering, excavation engineering, oil and gas production, etc) that require higher 
qualifications and skills, as well as training staff for management positions. For example, 
Rumaila Operating Organization (a joint management committee consisting of BP, 
PetroChina and the government owned Basra Oil Company was established to supervise and 
control the petroleum operations in the Rumaila oil field)25 has provided a comprehensive 
training curriculum through the Rumaila Academy. The Rumaila Academy program focuses 
on training the local workforce (Rumaila project’s workforce is seconded from Basra Oil 
Company) by undertaking job-specific courses relating to wells, subsurface, operations, 
projects, and finance to transfer expertise and knowledge from BP and PetroChina and other 
international contractors in these fields. The program also covers leadership, English 
language and IT training aimed at developing the capacity of the next generation of Iraqi 
managers.26 Similarly, Lukoil set up its training centre for Iraqi nationals in Basra. Graduates 
of the centre have been hired for various specialised jobs at West Qurna-2 oil field developed 
by Lukoil.27 Total signed an agreement with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, in 2009, to provide 
training to the Ministry’s administrative staff. Based on this agreement, four training sessions 
                                                             
25 Rumaila Operating Organization was established according to the article 13 of oil contract between BP, 
PetroChina and Basra Oil Company (previously known as South Oil Company) for Rumaila oil field signed in 
2010. The joint management committee is described in chapter two at 2.5.3; see also Appendix 2.  
26 Rumaila Operating Organization, ‘Rumaila Operating Organization Celebrates Five Successful Years of 
Partnership’ (12 August 2015)  
<http://www.rumaila.iq/english/img/news-press-releases/Rumaila_5-years_EN.pdf>. 
27 Lukoil, ‘West Qurna-2: Key Facts and Figures’ (March 2014) 7.  
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for approximately 70 managers from the ministry are scheduled quarterly every year.28 Total 
also partners with universities and many technical institutes in Iraq and has developed and 
implements various educational programs that benefit more than 250 people every year.29  
However, there are issues relating to the expenditure of an annual sum of USD 5 million per 
oil field to the Training Fund. There appears to be no formal monitoring of programs or 
expenditure to make sure that IOCs fully implement their training obligations and that the 
fund achieves its objectives. IOCs do not spend the entire amount required under the contract 
to be allocated to the Training Fund. The Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(IEITI) recorded that most IOCs over six years (2010 to 2015) of contracting in Iraq did not 
spend even half of the training budget amount (see Table 6.1 below).30 For example, out of 
USD 30 millions of total training budget for each company (5 million a year), Lukoil spent 
about USD 18 million, USD 14 million for Petronas and USD 11 million for BP. Likewise, 
Exxonmobile and Shell almost spent USD 5 million and USD 9 million respectively31 out of 
USD 29 millions of total training budget.32 Table 6.1 shows that IOCs failed to meet their 
contractual obligations for the Training Fund. Moreover, actual expenditure for training 
appears is excessive having regard to the small number of Iraqi participants over six years as 
indicated in the Table below. This demonstrates the difficulties in ensuring that oil companies 
comply with their legal obligations. It suggests even greater difficulties if oil companies are 
left to voluntarily undertake activities for the benefit of the community. 
 
                                                             
28 Total, ‘Total in Iraq: Facts and Figures’ (November 2014) 
<https://www.total.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/total_in_iraq_en_ara.pdf>. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Extractive Activities in Iraq 2015 (December 2016) 17 
<https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2015_iraq_eiti_report.pdf>.  
31 Ibid.  
32 The total training budget of Exxonmobile and Shell is different from other companies due to their shares in 
the contract or maybe because of the date of the contract entered into force.  
170 
 
Table 6.1: IOC’s Training Program Amounts for the years (2010 to 2015) 
IOC’s Budgeted Amount 
(USD) 
Actual 
Spent 
(USD) 
Remaining Amounts 
(USD) 
Number of 
Participants 
Lukoil Company 
(2010 –2015) 
30,000,000 18,119,811 11,880,189 64 participants/ 
One workshop 
(5 participants) 
ENI Company 
(2010 –2015) 
29,328,765 10,360,593 39,689,358* 
(18,968,172)33 
135 participants 
Petronas Company 
(2010 –2015) 
30,000,000 14,187,202 15,812,798 80 participants 
/One workshop (2 
participants) 
Exxonmobile 
(2010 –2015) 
29,200,000 5,155,826 24,184,174 39 participants 
BP Company 
(2010 –2015) 
30,000,000 11,352,937 18,647,063 175 participants 
Shell Company 
(2010–2015) 
29,166,667 9,533,305 
 
19,633,362 107 participants 
/7 workshops 
(63participants) 
Exploration no  
9 (2013–2015)  
2,916,000 0 2,916,000 - 
Exploration no 
10 (2013–2015) 
3,000,000 1,998,145 1,001,855 64 participants 
Exploration no 
12 (2013–2015) 
3,000,000 0 3,000,000 - 
Kuwait Energy 
(2011–2015) 
4,500,000 1,357,355 3,642,644 10 participants 
 
Source: Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2016) (emphasis added) 
* This number is taken from the report see footnote 33.  
 
There may be a number of different reasons for failure to implement the Training fund 
commitments. First, the terms of the oil contract do not stipulate in detail the mechanism for 
disbursing the amounts allocated for training nor determine the share for each category of the 
fund (training, technology, and scholarship). This has allowed companies to design and 
implement training programs (if any) according to their interests rather than Iraq’s actual 
needs. It may also allow them to finance just one category. For example, companies may 
prefer to fund academic scholarships rather than on-the-job training for Iraqi employees. 
Sending employees to schools and colleges is useful but it may be more important to give 
                                                             
33 There is an error in this table as it adds rather than deducts the amount expended from the budgeted amount. 
Unless there are other variations, the amount remaining should be (18,968,172).  
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them the hands-on experience working alongside experienced foreign workers. Thus, there is 
a need to review the provisions of the Training Fund, mainly, in term of designing training 
programs and monitoring them (see below). 
Secondly, weakness in monitoring the work of IOCs may be the other reason for not fully 
implementing their training commitments. Evidence from the actual practice supports this 
claim. According to the Technical Services Contract, the parties are required to establish a 
joint management committee (JMC) for the purpose of general supervision and control of 
petroleum operations that consists of equal numbers of members representing the IOC(s) and 
the state-owned oil company as a government partner34 (the joint management committee is 
described in detail at 2.5.3). The JMC is authorised to approve training programs for Iraqi 
personnel as required by the contract and supervising the implementation of approved 
programs.35 That is, the JMC has an exclusive power to plan, carry out training programs and 
supervise the implementation of such programs. In other words, planning and implementing 
training programs is managed by the JMC without external monitoring or reporting 
requirements. Although the Iraqi authorities participate in the JMC through a state-owned oil 
company (as a government partner in the oil contract), however, it appears that state-owned 
oil company does not play an active role –or it has failed for some reason– in preparing a 
suitable training plan or supervising the implementation of the agreed training program. Since 
the state-owned oil company is a contractual partner, then its performance should be subject 
to third party monitoring similar to the IOCs.   
                                                             
34 Technical Services Contract model, above n 18, art 13(1); see Appendix 2.  
35 Ibid, art 13(2)(f).  
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The government has responded by amending the provisions governing the Training Fund in 
the oil contracts for the fifth bidding round held in 2018.36 Under the amended contract 
IOC(s) are required to pay the annual amount allocated for the Training Fund into a bank 
account established and managed by the Ministry of Oil (through the state-owned oil 
company); and the fund’s amount should be aggregated if not paid annually.37 Consequently, 
this method may force IOCs to pay the full amount allocated for training fund to a bank 
account created for this purpose. However, there remains the issues relating to that is the 
quality and quantity of the training. It may also create governance problems because the bank 
account will be completely managed by the government partner. As explained previously (see 
6.2 above), weak transparency and inadequate monitoring of the Ministry of Oil and state-
owned oil companies opens up corruption risks. Therefore, creating a special unit to monitor 
the Training Fund and ensuring that the purpose of the fund is achieved is urgently needed. 
For monitoring purposes IOCs may be required to report to the oversight agency on their 
training programs in term of plans and achievements. The IOCs training performance may 
also be subject to public monitoring by interested agencies such as NGOs, unions, local 
community and press (this is discussed at 6.4). 
 It is vital to ensure sound management of the Training Fund so as to achieve its purposes as 
part of long-term development and capacity building. The fund should be used to transfer 
knowledge and build the capacity of state-owned oil companies’ personnel in respect of both 
petroleum operations and administration. If this is achieved, then state-owned oil companies 
may not only invest in local natural resources based on the latest oil technology and sound 
governance, but they can extend their operations to invest overseas.  Past experience shows 
                                                             
36 Exploration, Development and Production Contract, a contract model from the fifth bidding round, 2018. 
There is no signed oil contract publicly available. Only a model of this contract is publicly available, see 
<https://oil.gov.iq/upload/upfile/ar/659.pdf>; Extracts from this contract model provide in Appendix 2.  
37 If the amount is not paid by contractor (IOC), then the state-owned oil company has the right to deduct the 
aggregated amount from the invoices submitted by contractor; ibid, art 26(2).  
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that many national oil companies can benefit from cooperation with foreign oil companies to 
transfer knowledge and build domestic capacity, and provide opportunities for running 
successful global oil investments such as PetroChina, the Malaysian Petronas, and Norwegian 
Statoil, to name but a few.38      
As a proposal for sound management of the Training Fund, the annual sum of USD 5 million 
to the Training Fund could be partially reallocated. Instead of spending that entire amount on 
petroleum training that has not been particularly successful in practice (see above); part of it 
can be allocated for research and development in other sectors.  For example, the Training 
Fund can be used to support Iraq’s universities and upgrading other educational institutions. 
In this way oil investment will increase the general development in the country rather than 
developing the oil industry only. As discussed before (see chapter five at 5.6), this approach 
has been used in the Brazilian petroleum industry. For instance, the Brazilian model of 
concession agreements required the concessionaire to invest an amount of 1 per cent (1%) of 
the production gross revenue of the field into research development projects.39 Up to half of 
that amount can be invested in the company’s internal research and development projects and 
the other half has to go to non-profit institutions and universities.40  
It is also suggested that training should be extended to cover wider categories beyond 
petroleum operations. This will assist in increasing skilled labour in Iraq and in turn reduce 
unemployment. Part of the Training Fund can also be used to fund vocational training 
programs for local communities. For instance, many families from villages located within or 
                                                             
38 See Silvana Tordo, Brandon Tracy and Noora Arfaa, ‘National Oil Companies and Value Creation’ (Working 
Paper no 218 volume 2 (Case Studies), The World Bank, March 2011)  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/336099-1300396479288/NOC_Vol_II.pdf>; Bruce 
Gale, ‘Malaysia's National Oil Corporation’ (1981) 21(11) University of California Press 1129, 1144.  
39 Concession Agreement for the Exploration, Development and Production of Oil and Natural Gas, a contract 
model, 2008 (Brazil) art 24  
<http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Brazil,%20Model%20Concession%20Agreement,%20ANP%2010th%20Rn
d,%202008.pdf>. 
40 Ibid, 24(4).   
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around oil fields live in poverty, with few opportunities for a better life. Offering vocational 
training and qualifications for them can help locals to gain employment, support their 
families or establish their own business. In this way, oil companies increase employment 
opportunities for residents living in the community near oil fields. This is important to 
achieving sustainable development and building strong relationships with local communities. 
Consequently, oil development could be used to contribute to the development of other 
sectors and supporting economic development that enhances sustainability as argued in 
chapter two at 2.7.2. 
Some IOCs have already engaged in training in local communities. For example, Rumaila 
Operating Organization (consisting of BP, PetroChina and Basra Oil Company, see above) 
provided training to the community of Qarmat Ali village in Basra (a village near Rumaila oil 
field). Rumaila Operating Organization funded a women’s training centre in August 2015.41 
By 2016, over 400 local women, most of whom were the main breadwinners for their 
families, have completed voluntary training courses to learn new skills. Many of those 
women have gone on to set up their own businesses.42 In addition, men from surrounding 
villages have also benefited from a vocational training program, undertaking certified training 
courses in welding, construction, and electrical work.43 According to Rumaila Operating 
Organization, these initiatives were decided following consultation with local communities 
such as the Rumaila Community Committee.44 This initiative supports the long-term 
development of local communities and enhances collaboration with them. It is not clear from 
available information whether these training programs are funded by the Training Fund set 
                                                             
41 Al-Khora Community Centre for Women is located in Qarmat Ali and has teaching classrooms that offer a 
range of courses such as sewing, design, hairdressing, beauty, and craftworks, as well as lessons in literacy, 
computer usage, and human rights. See Rumaila Operating Organization, Making a difference – the Al Khora 
Community Centre for Women (2018) <http://www.rumaila.iq/english/story-community-centre-for-
women.php>. 
42 Ibid.  
43 See Rumaila Operating Organization, Working with Our Community (2018) 
<http://www.rumaila.iq/english/social-welfare-fund.php>.  
44 Ibid. 
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out in the oil contract or by BP and PetroChina as voluntary initiatives as part of their 
voluntary CSR programs.45  
     6.3.3 Local Content  
Many countries have implemented a local content policy in the extractive industries, 
especially in the petroleum industry. As explained in chapter five (see 5.5) Nigeria, Tanzania, 
and Ecuador have implemented strong local content policies in their petroleum industry. 
However, as will be seen from the discussion below, Iraqi oil contracts (the main source of 
IOCs’ legal obligations with no modern oil and gas legislation) do not include suitable local 
content policies that are compatible with the size and importance of oil for the Iraqi economy. 
This chapter argues that Iraq must develop a comprehensive framework for local content in 
the oil and gas industry and set out governing policies that enhance the contribution of the oil 
and gas industry to the country’s long-term development and value creation. According to 
Iraqi oil contracts, the local content, including local goods and services and the use of Iraqi 
employees, is regulated as follows. 
In relation to local goods and services, Article 30 of the Iraqi oil contract states that 
preference should be given to locally manufactured and/or available goods, materials, 
equipment and the like,  if  'their technical specifications, availability, prices, and time of 
delivery are comparable to those available in the international market.’46 Similarly, in terms 
of services performed in Iraq, preference should be given to Iraqi entities and firms if 'their 
relevant capabilities and prices are competitive with those available in the international 
market.’47 A general stipulation like this does not serve Iraq's interest in promoting non-oil 
                                                             
45 According to Rumaila Operating Organization, these training programs were paid for by the Rumaila 
Operating Organization’s Social Welfare Fund, money that set aside to invest in local initiatives to aid 
communities in and around the oil field. Ibid.  
46 Technical Services Contract model, above n 18, art 30(2); see Appendix 2.  
47 Ibid, art 30(1).  
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sectors through oil investments.48 The reasons are, as previously explained in chapter two 
(see 2.7.2), that Iraqi industry was destroyed due to wars and sanctions, and consequently 
local goods and services are unlikely to be competitive in terms of price, quality and quantity. 
Additionally, there is not a level playing field because IOCs and their foreign subcontractors 
are exempt from fees while Iraqi subcontractors are not.49 This makes goods provided by 
Iraqi suppliers more expensive than those offered by foreign suppliers. So IOCs, with no 
adequate monitoring, will find reasons for non-compliance with this requirements and Iraq 
cannot force them to do so.    
In relation to the employment of local employees, Iraqi oil contracts do not require IOCs to 
employ a certain percentage of Iraqi nationals in technical or administrative positions; the 
number of Iraqi employees is left to the preference of these companies. Article 26(1) of the 
model Iraq oil contract states: 
Without prejudice to the right of Contractor and Operator to select and employ such number 
of personnel as, in the opinion of the Contractor or Operator, are required for carrying out 
Petroleum Operations in a safe, cost effective and efficient manner, Contractor and Operator 
shall, to the maximum extent possible, employ, and require Sub-Contractors to employ, Iraqi 
nationals having the requisite qualifications and experience.50 
The contract does not set numerical requirements but uses the phrase as ‘to the maximum 
extent possible.’ There is no explanation of what this phrase means or how it can be met.51 
Without specific terms in the oil contract to employ certain number of Iraqis, IOC may prefer 
                                                             
48 Similarly, the Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007 requires that preference should be given to ‘Iraqi products and 
services whenever they are competitive in terms of price, comparable in terms of quality and available on a 
timely basis in the quantity required.’ Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007, art 15(B).  
49 See Law of Exempting Foreign Companies and Foreign Subcontractors Contracted in Licensing Rounds from 
Fees (Arabic Version) No 46 of 2017 [author’s trans]. 
50 Technical Services Contract model, above n 18, art 26(1) (emphasis added).  
51 Similarly, the Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007 requires the IOCs to undertake 'to the maximum reasonable extent' 
to employ Iraqi citizens having appropriate qualifications. But the bill went further and required IOC to 
undertake to train and prepare potential candidates towards this objective. Nevertheless, it does not explain how 
to identify the 'maximum reasonable extent'. Draft Oil and Gas Law 2007, art 15(C). 
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to use foreign employees rather than local. Practical evidence supports this argument. For 
instance, in 2015, 29 per cent of the total employees in the Iraqi oil fields from bidding 
rounds were foreign.52 In some oil fields the number of foreign employees is very high. For 
example, in the Badra oil field53 and the Garraf oil field54 the percentage of foreign 
employees in 2015 was 90 per cent and 63 per cent respectively (see Table 6.2).55 What 
makes it very difficult for Iraq is that the high salaries and remuneration of foreign employees 
are petroleum costs 56 which are deducted prior to determining final payments to IOCs.57 This 
effectively doubly disadvantages Iraq who bears the burden of high petroleum costs and 
national employment opportunity loss. Furthermore, without imposing responsibilities on 
IOCs to employ a certain percentage of Iraqis in the technical and administrative positions, or 
requiring IOCs to train and prepare potential candidates for these positions (see below), the 
possibility of building local capacity and skilled employees is decreased. Obviously, the 
current Iraqi local content policy in the oil industry is weak and not adequate to promote 
long-term development and capacity.  
As set out in chapter two (see 2.7.2), Iraq has to develop appropriate local content framework 
in the oil and gas industry that supports the enhancement of long-term development and value 
adding. Iraq has two options. The first is to adopt a local content policy and requirements for 
local goods and services, and requiring the employment of Iraqis in all phases of oil 
development including management positions. This approach has been implemented in many 
developing oil-producing countries, such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Kazakhstan and others. For 
                                                             
52 It is not clear whether foreign employees were just in the senior positions of management and engineering or 
in jobs that do not need specific qualifications.  
53 Badra oil field is operated by JSC Gazprom Neft, Korea Gas Corporation, PETRONAS CarigaliSdn. Bhd, and 
Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi since 2011, see Appendix 1.  
54 Garraf oil field is operated by Petronas and Japan Petroleum Exploration since 2010, see Appendix 1.   
55 Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, above n 30, 123.  
56 Petroleum costs are ‘recoverable costs and expenditures incurred and/or payments made by Contractor in 
connection with or in relation to the conduct of Petroleum Operations…’ Technical Services Contract model, 
above n 18, art 1(63); see Appendix 2.  
57 Ibid, art 19.  
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example, in Nigeria all companies operating in the oil and gas industry are required to 
employ only Nigerians in junior or intermediate positions, and for management positions only 
5 percent of foreigners is allowed.58 In Kazakhstan, the minimum requirement for the 
employment of nationals is 95 per cent.59 All oil companies in Angola require employing at 
least 70 per cent of Angolan nationals and foreign workers can only be employed when no 
Angolan worker with the equivalent qualifications is available.60 
Table 6.2: Total Number of Iraqi and Foreign Employees in the Oil Fields in 2015 
 
Source: Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2016)  
 
From the experience of these countries, Iraq can develop local employment policies that 
require IOCs operating in Iraq to employ Iraqi nationals. The Table above suggests that 
requirements should reflect the level of employment attained by the best performing oil 
fields. It is suggested that Iraq can require IOCs to employ 70-80 per cent Iraqi in the first 
year at all phases of petroleum operations, to be increased up to 95 per cent by three years. 
This flexibility would solve the problem when insufficient numbers of Iraqi nationals have 
                                                             
58 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, s 35.  
59 Isabelle Ramdoo, ‘Local Content Policies in Mineral-rich Countries: an Overview’ (Discussion Paper No 193, 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, May 2016) 4 <http://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-193-Local-Content-Policies-Mineral-Rich-Countries-2016.pdf>. 
60 Ibid.  
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the requisite qualifications and experience. The second phase of the suggested policy is that 
IOCs must undertake training programs to prepare potential Iraqis candidates for future 
employment as well as training staff members for skills and management positions (assuming 
they have the qualified degree) to achieve the proposed percentage (95 per cent mentioned 
above) of Iraqi employees by the end of the third year. This suggested policy does not give 
training and local employment priority over protection of the environmental and wildlife.  It 
is recommended because Technical Services Contracts, the current Iraqi model, has been 
used to provide for long-term development, capacity building and knowledge transfer. Thus, 
training of nationals, local employment technology transfer are a contractor's primary 
commitments that must be implemented in good faith.   
For that purpose, IOCs must annually submit to the oversight agency (this is discussed at 6.4 
below) for approval a detailed program for training and employment. They must also report 
annually on the implementation of the training program including their commitment to 
establish management and technical capabilities, maximise technology transfer and skills 
relating to petroleum and gas industry for Iraqis who are employed in this sectors, and steps 
taken to close any identified training gaps.61 Reporting to an oversight agency would help 
ensure that IOCs fulfil their obligations and that the state’s targets in term of training and 
knowledge transfer are achieved. Otherwise, the number of foreign employees in the oil and 
gas industry is likely to remain high (see Table 6.2 above) at the time when there is high 
unemployment in Iraq.62 This proposal depends upon legal obligations for training and 
employment. It does not depend upon voluntary CSR by oil companies.  In taking this 
                                                             
61 See eg Tanzanian’s experience with local employment requirements as discussed at 5.5.3; See also Tanzanian 
Petroleum Act 2015, ss 220, 221.  
62 The unemployment rate in Iraq is conservatively estimated at 15 per cent with higher levels for youth. World 
Bank, Iraq Economic Monitor from War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery (2018) 10 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/771451524124058858/pdf/125406-WP-PUBLIC-P163016-Iraq-
Economic-Monitor-text-Spring-2018-4-18-18web.pdf>. 
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approach, it suggests that it is not realistic to expect that oil companies will voluntarily 
engage in significant relevant projects which benefit the community.     
In relation to local goods and services, developing oil-producing countries may also impose 
local content requirements. For example, Mexico requires a domestic content target of 25 per 
cent for 2015, increasing to 35 per cent by 2025 for shallow water projects.63 In the Nigerian 
oil industry, local content targets for some goods and services are set between 80 and 100 per 
cent with exclusive consideration given to Nigerian companies for providing specific 
categories of goods and services.64 Iraq could adopt similar provisions by requiring oil 
companies to purchase a certain percentage of domestic goods and services. This could be 
done either by provisions incorporated into oil contracts or by regulation.65 It should specify 
the level of Iraqi content to be achieved per activity or input used by operators in the oil and 
gas sector.66 Where goods and services are not available in Iraq or not available competitively 
(quality, quantity, and price) as set out in Article 30 of the TSC contract (mentioned above, 
Appendix 2), Iraq could require (either by regulation or oil contract) that such goods and 
services provided by a foreign supplier, but under a joint venture arrangement with a local 
company. In other words, any foreign supplier must enter into a partnership with an Iraqi 
company to supply the petroleum sector with goods and services. In this case, the local 
company must hold no less than 50 per cent of the shares in such joint venture company. This 
approach is implemented in the petroleum industry in Tanzania as discussed in 5.5.3.67 Then 
the consequence of such provisions is that local content requirements would support 
industrial development, job creation, value addition, and maximise national benefit. It could 
                                                             
63 This includes local goods and services, and national employees. Ramdoo, above n 59, 5.  
64 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010, Schedule A.  
65 See eg Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010, Schedule A.  
66 Consideration can be given to locally manufactured and/or available products such as floating products, 
storage, steel pipes and plates, cables, cement, bricks; and services such as geographical survey services, 
offloading vessels, drilling, transport, insurance, banking and so on.   
67 In Tanzania, for example, the local company must hold no less than 25 per cent of the shares in a joint venture 
company established with a foreign company for the purpose of providing the petroleum sector with goods and 
services. See Tanzanian Petroleum Act 2015, s 219(3).  
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also lead to stimulating the development of non-oil sectors as partnerships with international 
companies can result in technology transfer, reputation enhancement, and developing 
competence for Iraqi companies. As a result, the goal of enhancing the contribution of the oil 
and gas industry to the development of sectors other than petroleum, and overall economy, 
can be achieved (see the arguments set out in chapter two at 2.7.2). But, as noted earlier, the 
choice is to legislatively or contractually require oil companies to contribute to development 
in Iraq rather than leave this to voluntary benevolence. Although as noted in chapter three, it 
may be in the long-term interests of shareholders and sustainability of corporations to take 
into account interests of stakeholders, and to avoid negative externalities, corporations’ 
responsibilities do not include general welfare. The proposals set out above recognise that 
unless oil companies are required to contribute to local development, they will see their 
duties as primarily to their shareholders with recognition of stakeholder interests where this is 
important to longer term interests of the company and its shareholders, see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.   
An issue that needs to be considered is whether local content requirements may violate World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.68 Iraq, however, is not yet a WTO member,69 so 
Iraqi policymakers still have some room to implement local content policies. Moreover, Iraq 
can be a signatory of the WTO Agreements without being a party to the Government 
Procurement Agreement. Nevertheless, WTO agreements provide a certain degree of 
flexibility to developing countries if this is needed to help them address their development 
concerns.70 Furthermore, countries that become WTO members may have years to adapt their 
                                                             
68 See eg General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed 30 October 1947, (entered into force 1 January 1995) 
art III; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, signed 15 April 1994, (entered into force 1 January 
1995) art 2.  
69 Iraq applied for observer status in January 2004 and was accepted in February 2004. World Trade 
Organisation, General Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting’ (11 February 2004) [21].  
70 Isabelle Ramdoo, ‘Local Content, Trade and Investment: Is there Policy Space Left for Linkages 
Development in Resource-rich Countries?’ (Discussion Paper No 205, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, December 2016) 15 <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP205-Local-Content-Trade-
Investment-Ramdoo-December-2016.pdf>; Miriam Weiss, ‘The role of local content policies in manufacturing 
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national regulations to WTO requirements. So, if Iraq acceded to the WTO, which is not 
expected to occur soon, Iraq could ask for a transitional period to eliminate the local content 
requirement. For example, when Kazakhstan acceded to the WTO Agreement in 2015, the 
Government of Kazakhstan agreed not to require local content in procurements of goods 
when signing new contracts with investors.71 However, for existing contracts, Kazakhstan 
requested a significant transitional period (around 6 years) to enable investors to remove their 
local content commitments in the procurement of goods starting from 1 January 2022.72   
     6.3.4 Development Projects  
A further step in ensuring that oil wealth benefits Iraq is the proposal to mandate a specific 
amount or a percentage of annual revenues for each oil project to fund development projects 
in the local area of the oil companies’ operations. As argued earlier in chapter two (see 2.7.2), 
oil and gas are of such fundamental importance to the Iraqi economy, so investments in this 
sector must be for the benefit of all citizens. Further, IOCs have profited significantly from 
investing in oil in Iraq (see 2.7.3). Oil companies can contribute to local communities by 
financing some important development projects. Since, Iraq has not been able to provide 
basic infrastructure needs to its citizens due to UN sanctions and massive destruction 
resulting from wars, imposing CSR on oil and gas companies assists in meeting those needs 
(see 2.7.3). 
In 2014, some IOCs agreed to finance development projects for the benefit of communities 
surrounding oil fields or exploration areas up to USD 5 million annually for each oil 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and mining in low- and middle-income countries’ (Working Paper No 19, United Nations Industrial 
Organization, 2016) 9  
<https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2017-
01/UNIDO_Working_paper_Local_content_policies_FINAL_15803__0.pdf>. 
71 Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan, WTO Doc WT/L/957 (30 July 2015) (Decision of 27 July 2015).  
72 Accession of Kazakhstan, WTO Doc WT/ACC/KAZ/87 (8 September 2014) (Additional Questions and 
Replies) para 675.  
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contract.73 This amount is in addition to the USD 5 million set out annually for the Training, 
Technology, and Scholarship Fund discussed above at 6.3.2.74 In contrast to the money 
allocated to the Training, Technology, and Scholarship Fund that is not recoverable by the 
government, the money allocated for development projects is considered as petroleum costs 
paid by Iraq.75 This means it is the government who actually bears this cost, not the IOC.  
For the first time in Iraq, the oil contract model for the 2018 fifth bidding round requires the 
IOC to establish an Infrastructure Fund in addition to the Training, Technology, and 
Scholarship Fund mentioned above.76 IOCs are required to deposit annually in a bank account 
designated by the state-owned oil company (as the government partner) an agreed amount for 
the Infrastructure Fund. If the agreed amount is not deposited in any given year, the IOC is 
obliged to deposit an aggregated amount.77 If it is not paid, it can be deducted by the state-
owned oil company from the invoices submitted by the IOC.78 Once again, the money 
allocated for the Infrastructure Fund is considered as petroleum costs, so ultimately the 
government bears the costs of this development fund, in contrast to the Training Fund. 
Effectively the IOC is simply the vehicle to carry out local development which is reimbursed 
by government.79 As noted in chapter five at 5.5, this is contrary to the approach adopted in 
many oil producing countries which require IOCs to contribute and pay for local 
development. Such a provision would require the government to amend the provisions of 
                                                             
73 The Energy Committee of the Council of Ministers allowed the Ministry of Oil to negotiate with IOCs to 
allocate an amount up to USD 5 million annually for each oil contract to finance development projects but the 
amount is considered as petroleum costs paid by the Iraqi government. See the decision of the Energy 
Committee No 139 (23 December 2013) (This document is not available online).  
74 Allocating USD 5 million for development projects is provided for in a separate agreement between the Iraqi 
Government and the relevant IOC in 2014 to amend the oil contract from various bidding rounds. While the 
original oil contract is not publicly available, the Technical Services Contract model (extracted in Appendix 2) 
used in this thesis is based on the 2010 version.    
75 See footnote n 56 above.  
76 See Exploration, Development and Production Contract, above n 36, art 26(5). Extracts from this contract 
model provide in Appendix 2. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid.  
79 The government used this method maybe because the provisions of the oil contract allow the government to 
spread the petroleum costs over years (based on agreement) rather than immediately, so IOCs can pay for 
development projects and the government will repay the costs later. 
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existing oil contracts or at least insert similar provisions in future oil contracts. If in the 
future, the amount spent on development projects is not to be counted as petroleum costs, this 
could be a significant step towards requiring IOCs to positively contribute to community 
welfare. 
To increase accountability in the oil industry, the next section discussed a framework for 
monitoring IOC compliance with legal requirements and implementing voluntary CSR in the 
oil industry.  
6.4 Monitoring Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil Industry 
The above discussion argues that Iraq should not rely on oil companies operating in Iraq to 
engage in voluntary and meaningful corporate social activities. This is because there is no 
evidence that IOCs operating in Iraq have acted so as to avoid negative externalities caused 
by their activities. Additionally, even in relation to contractually required obligations, the 
evidence suggests that these contractual obligations have not been fully honoured, at least in 
relation to training, see 6.3.2. It is argued that IOCs should be required to contribute to 
community welfare. This can be achieved either by primary oil and gas law or by specific 
legislation with an official unit or an oversight agency to monitor compliance.80  
The proposed oversight agency should be independent or attached to the Cabinet (see 2.3). 
This would give it the necessary status and authority to monitor the Ministry of Oil and 
related state-owned oil companies and international oil companies.81 This agency must have 
                                                             
80 For example, in India the Ministry of Corporate Affairs monitors the implementation of s.135 of the Indian 
Companies Act, 2013 that regulates corporate social responsibility, see 5.5.1. The Niger Delta Development 
Commission established in 2000 monitors IOCs operating in the Niger Delta. Similarly, the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board established in 2010 has a broad authority to guide and monitor the 
implementation of local content requirements by foreign oil companies and empowered to impose penalties 
against non-compliant companies. This is further discussed in chapter five at 5.5.2.  
81 This could also eliminate the overlap between the executive authorities of the Ministry of Oil (as the Ministry 
of Oil through a state-owned oil company shares in the oil contract) and its regulatory authorities (as the 
Ministry of Oil through a state-owned oil company participates with the IOC in the joint management 
committee of the oil field). 
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oversight of the implementation of CSR in the oil industry. This is because neither IOCS nor 
state owned oil companies are listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange. This means that the most 
effective method of monitoring their operations is to force them to report to an independent 
oversight agency as discussed earlier (see discussion at 4.6.3). The oversight agency must 
have powers to enforce of obligations imposed by statute. The oversight agency should 
consist of experts representing ministries of oil, finance, industry, commerce, and 
environment. It may also include representatives of local governments of provinces 
producing oil and/or gas, labour unions and civil society. This wide diversity will bring 
together the key stakeholders in one formal agency which facilitates the process of 
formulating comprehensive development, training and local content policies as well as 
assessing the negative and positive impacts of oil investment on the economy, the 
environment, employees and society. The oversight agency would operate by a voting system 
in which the government has the majority voting rights. The agency can also be a link 
between the federal government and the local governments of provinces producing oil and/or 
gas which will contribute to develop a national unified CSR policy that considers the real 
needs of local communities.  
The proposed agency could also be given the role of reviewing and approving social 
responsibility plans submitted by international oil companies that are competing in a bidding 
round for an oil or gas investment. The social responsibility plans may include environmental 
impact, training and technology transfer, employment, local content and general 
development. Examining CSR plans during the bidding round process could influence the 
selection of IOC(s) that have the best corporate social responsibility programs in addition to 
its other oil-specific capacities. Including CSR programs in the license conditions would 
encourage the IOCs to undertake social responsibility more seriously and adopt well-
designed CSR policies to obtain the investment license. Likewise, the oversight of CSR 
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during the investment period can be achieved by monitoring the implementation of CSR 
plans set forth in the bidding round and measuring the effectiveness of these plans in practice. 
For this purpose, IOCs should be required to report to this agency annually on the progress of 
implementing their contractual and legislative obligations discussed above (see 6.3.2 and 
6.3.3) as well as their voluntary CSR programs. This would help the government to ensure 
that IOCs are fulfilling their legal obligations and measuring the potential role for corporate 
social responsibility initiatives in promoting the overall development.   
6.5 Conclusion  
As chapter two addresses multiple rationales for implementing corporate social responsibility 
in the oil and gas industry in Iraq, this chapter examined the feasibility of a legal framework 
for implementing and monitoring CSR in this industry. Corporate social responsibility 
requires IOCs to voluntary act to prevent the negative consequences of oil activities on the 
environment and communities, and also requires IOCs to engage in positive activities to 
improve the lives and prospects for the Iraqi community. However, the protection of the 
environment and other stakeholders should not just be a matter of choice for oil companies 
where their operations cause damage to the environment. The discussion set out above 
recognises that voluntary CSR is not an effective mechanism to ensure that IOCs pay for the 
costs their activities cause to their stakeholders and the community. The preferred outcome is 
that contractual obligations and/or statutory requirements require IOCs to internalise the costs 
of their activities. Contractual and statutory obligations do not, however, qualify as CSR as 
formally defined, see 4.2.1.  
It is further recommended that IOCs also contribute to development and community welfare 
through training, local content and community development activities as part of the costs of 
engaging in oil activities in Iraq. The discussion shows that unless oil companies are required 
to contribute to local development, they will see their duties as primarily to their shareholders 
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with recognition of stakeholder interests where this is important to longer term interests of the 
company and its shareholders. Although one purpose for using the Technical Services 
Contract in Iraq in preference to other types of petroleum contracts is to promote long-term 
development and capacity building, the training and local content requirements in this 
contract are weak and inadequate. It is argued that Iraq must develop a comprehensive 
framework for training and local content (Iraqi employees, goods and services) in the oil and 
gas industry and set out governing policies that enhance the contribution of the oil and gas 
industry to the country’s long-term development and value creation.  
Iraq could require IOCs (either by regulation or oil contract) to purchase a certain percentage 
of domestic goods and services similar to other oil-producing countries. Where goods and 
services are not available in Iraq, or not available competitively (quality, quantity, and price), 
it can be provided by a foreign supplier, but under a joint venture arrangement with a local 
company. This would support industrial development, job creation, value addition, and 
maximise national benefit. It could also lead to stimulating the growth of non-oil sectors 
because partnerships with international companies can result in technology transfer, capacity 
building, reputation enhancement, and developing competence for Iraqi companies. 
However, without adequate monitoring it would be difficult to ensure that oil companies are 
complying with their legal or contractual obligations. There are even greater difficulties if oil 
companies are left to voluntarily undertake activities for community benefit.  
Although the Iraqi authorities participate in the Joint Management Committee through a 
state-owned oil company (as a government partner in the oil contract), it appears that state-
owned oil companies do not play an active role in supervising the implementation of the oil 
contract (the reason for this is unclear). It is recommended that Iraq should establish an 
oversight agency consisting of experts and key stakeholders to monitor IOCs operations. For 
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this purpose, IOCs should be required to report to this agency annually on the progress of 
implementing their contractual and legislative obligations as well as their voluntary CSR 
programs. This would help the government to ensure that IOCs are fulfilling their legal 
obligations and measuring the potential role for corporate social responsibility initiatives in 
promoting the overall development.   
The following chapter will draw together the threads of the argument set out in this thesis by 
summarising the key findings and make recommendations for future policy in Iraq.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis examines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the context of international oil 
companies operating in Iraq. International Oil Companies (IOC) are the focus for 
consideration of CSR in Iraq as the oil and gas industry is the backbone of the Iraqi economy 
and the primary source of income for the Iraqi people, see chapter two at 2.2.1 and 2.7.2.   
As chapter four indicates Corporate Social Responsibility requires the corporation to 
voluntarily act as a good corporate citizen. At the very minimum, the corporation should be 
accountable for negative externalities, that is, the harm created by its activities in relation to 
which the public rather than the corporation pays. Effectively, the corporation should 
internalise the costs of harm caused by its activities.1 But since the experience in Iraq is that 
voluntary CSR has not resulted in IOCs taking steps to avoid negative externalities, formal 
legislation is required for the protection of stakeholders, in particular the environment and the 
community. These obligations could, alternatively or additionally, be included in oil and gas 
contracts, see 6.3. The problem, however, is one of enforcement which is addressed below, 
see 7.3.5.  
Whilst a corporation should be responsible for the harm caused by its operations, should it 
also contribute positively to community welfare? This is answered by reference to the key 
theories of corporate governance. Modern corporate governance rules incorporate such views 
requiring corporations to act in the longer-term interests of shareholders and corporations, see 
                                                             
1 Berger-Walliser, Gerlinde and Inara Scott, ‘Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Globalization and Regulatory Hardening’ (2018) 55(1) American Business Law Journal 167, 218. 
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3.3.1. But what these theories don’t do is to require the corporation to voluntarily devote 
substantial corporate profits to general welfare unrelated to the long term interests of 
shareholders and the corporation. Contributions to community welfare intended to overcome 
negative publicity and reputational damage can be considered to be in the long term interests 
of the corporation.2 There is a clear relationship between these views and voluntary CSR, see 
discussion at 4.2.2. CSR activities that are unrelated to the long term interests of the 
corporation or its shareholders breach the duties of directors of the corporation and are a 
breach of director’s fiduciary duties to its shareholders and the company, 3.3.1. This means 
that if the Iraqi government wishes IOCs to contribute to general welfare or development, 
there must be legal obligations imposed on corporations to this effect. Corporations, and their 
directors, must obey the law. As indicated above these obligations would ideally be imposed 
through legislation as well as oil and gas contracts. Chapter 5 provided examples of 
jurisdictions where this has been done. There is sector specific legislation requiring IOCs to 
contribute to development such as in Nigeria, see 5.5.2.3 In contrast, the Indian legislation 
imposes obligations more generally on large corporations to positively contribute to 
community welfare. What is unique about the Indian legislation is that it defines in general 
terms what qualifies as ‘CSR’ and also excludes certain types of activities as not qualifying 
as CSR for statutory purposes, for example, where the company stands to benefit from the 
activity, see 5.5.1. 
Legislation to make IOCs accountable for negative externalities as well as requiring positive 
contributions to community welfare faces almost insurmountable hurdles. There are serious 
                                                             
2 David Spence, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Shale Patch’ (2017) 21(2) Lewis and Clark Law Review 
387, 425; Prakash Sethi, Terrence Martell and Mert Demir, ‘Building Corporate Reputation Through Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports: The Case of Extractive Industries’ (2016) 19(3) Corporate Reputation 
Review 219, 243.  
3 For example, Shell-operated ventures contributed USD 202 million in 2014 alone to the Niger-Delta 
Development Commission as required by law. Shell Nigeria, ‘Shell Emerges Best Company in CSR Innovation 
at 2015 Seras’ (23 November 2015) <https://www.shell.com.ng/media/2015-media-releases/shell-emerges-best-
company-in-csr-innovation.html>. 
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issues in relation to the ability of the Iraqi Parliament to legislate nationally in relation to the 
oil and gas industry. This is because of constitutional difficulties in relation to the Kurdistan 
region and also because of the inability of the Assembly to pass new oil and gas laws, see 
2.5.2. Consequently, it is doubtful whether legislation can be enacted which will protect 
stakeholder interests, particularly the environment, or require positive contributions to 
development or community welfare. The alternative to legislation is to impose these 
requirements under oil and gas contracts, 2.5.3. But in relation to existing contractual 
requirements, such as training, there has been limited success, despite the participation of 
state-owned oil companies in joint management committees responsible for these programs, 
see 6.3. As argued below, this means that in order for contractual conditions to effectively 
provide for protection of stakeholders and contributions to community welfare, there must be 
effective oversight and monitoring of contractual compliance, see 6.4. 
The key issue is whether promoting voluntary CSR or legislative or contractual requirements 
to contribute to development and avoid negative externalities are the only possible 
approaches. Taxation is a more general mechanism which can achieve these outcomes. But 
for Iraq, the influence of IOCs, coupled with the risks of corruption, make this less appealing. 
It is arguable that the benefits of targeted welfare closely monitored with greater transparency 
and accountability could be the preferred response. What is clear is that existing contractual 
arrangements have not, so far, been particularly successful in the limited areas where they 
have operated, see 6.3. As argued what is needed is a skilled oversight committee which 
monitors compliance and in relation to which there is both transparency and accountability, 
see 6.4. 
The next section will provide an overview of Corporate Social Responsibility in the oil 
industry and suggest recommendations for IOCs accountability in Iraq to protect key 
stakeholders and maximise benefits and social welfare from massive natural resources.   
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7.2 Overview  
Corporate social responsibility requires corporations to voluntarily act to protect stakeholders 
from the negative impacts of their operations by identifying, preventing and mitigating the 
possible adverse impacts of their operations.4 This involves two aspects, prevention and 
response to harm when it occurs. Under the preventive aspect, the company takes proactive 
steps to avoid causing harm to society by anticipating the externalities that may arise from its 
activities and takes pre-emptive measures (due diligence initiatives) to address them.5 In 
contrast, the responsive aspect is concerned with the way the company reacts to negative 
externalities after they have occurred,6 see 4.3.1. 
Chapter three discussed the modern developments of the shareholder primacy theory. 
Accordingly, enlightened shareholder value requires corporations to take into account 
stakeholder interests where this is in the long term interests of the company and its 
shareholders, see 3.3. This principle is captured in the UK Companies Act 2006, s 172 (1), in 
the US in the concept of ‘corporate constituency’7 and in the Indian Companies Act 2013, s 
166 (2) (discussed at 3.3.1). More recently, it has been argued that shareholders’ interests 
reach beyond dividends to broader interests in sustainability, the environment and the 
community, the shareholder welfare approach.8 The consequence is that companies in acting 
for the long term interests of the company and shareholders must take into account 
stakeholder interests.9 A further step is proposed under the Accountable Capitalism Bill 
                                                             
4 Edwin Mujih, Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Gower, 2012) 36; Commission of the European Communities, A Renewed EU 
Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM/681/Final (25 October 2011) 6 
<http://www.accessibletourism.org/resources/csr_communication_ec_com2011681.pdf>. 
5 Mujih, above n 4, 45.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Edward Adams and John Matheson, ‘A statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns’ (2000) 49(4) 
Emory Law Journal 1085, 1135.  
8 Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales, ‘Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value’ (2017) 
2(2) Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 247, 275. 
9 Marshall Magaro, ‘Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the 
Shareholder-Primacy Norm’ (2010) 85 Indiana Law Journal 1149, 1167.  
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which would impose additional obligations on large US companies to act as good corporate 
citizens (see 3.3.1). These modern elaborations of shareholder primacy take into account 
stakeholder interests in so far as it is in the long term interests and sustainability of the 
company and its shareholders. Chapter four discussed the negative impacts on the 
environment and communities arising out of IOCs operations (see 4.3). It is in the long term 
interests of oil companies to protect stakeholders by preventing negative externalities 
associated with their operations and undertake due diligence initiatives to mitigate risks 
caused by their operations. The difficulty lies in getting IOCs to recognise responsibilities to 
stakeholders and how the government should respond if this does not occur.   
Although CSR is concerned with voluntary conduct, modern corporate governance rules, 
either legislatively or through stock exchange listing rules, require corporations to take into 
account the interests of stakeholders, see 3.3.2. Corporations need to do both, to be proactive 
against the risk of damage and to have appropriate measures to deal with damage when it 
occurs. CSR is also recognised by the international community, through its relevant 
institutions (eg the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development), who have accepted as a norm that companies 
should act in a responsible and sustainable manner. This has been expressed in many 
international instruments that set the norms for corporate social responsibility such as the UN 
Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ISO 26000, and many 
others.10 There is also a growing trend for international instruments to incorporate CSR 
covering a wide range of issues including health and safety matters, environmental 
protection, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery,11 see 5.2.1 and Appendix 3.  
It is argued that Iraq should also seek to incorporate similar CSR clauses in future bilateral 
trade agreements, see 5.2.2 and 7.3.2 below.  
                                                             
10 See generally, Deborah Leipziger, The Corporate Responsibility Code Book (Routledge, revised 3rd ed, 2017).  
11 See, Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L 330/1.  
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It is argued in this thesis that it is not sufficient to just consider negative externalities but that 
IOCs should contribute positively to community welfare.12 This can be in the form of 
education and health care programs for local communities or investments in local 
infrastructure like roads, electricity, sanitation and housing, see 4.5.1.13 The motivations for 
developing CSR policies in developed countries may be different to that of developing 
countries. Developed countries usually have a stable political, economic and investment 
environment, as well as high levels of general public awareness. In this environment it is 
usual for legislation to impose mandatory requirements preventing negative externalities 
resulting from companies’ operations such as, for example, strong environmental protection 
legislation. In these countries CSR usually has as its focus strengthening the protection of 
companies' stakeholders rather than legislating for positive contributions to community 
welfare.14 
In contrast, in developing countries, legislation may, to a smaller or greater degree, provide 
some or inadequate protection against negative externalities. This legislation may not 
adequately address negative externalities with the further difficulty that enforcement may be 
weak. Despite problems of lack of enforcement, developing countries (eg India, Nigeria) may 
by legislation demand that large corporations contribute to community welfare and 
development, see 5.5. Legislation may, in addition, impose obligations on companies to 
support local content and local employment or give preference to local goods and services (eg 
Tanzania, Ecuador, and Nigeria),15 discussed at 5.5. The thesis argues that IOCs should, in 
                                                             
12 Ibid, Mujih, above n 4, 36. 
13 David Spence, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Shale Patch’ (2017) 21(2) Lewis and Clark Law 
Review 387, 425.  
14 Jonathan Doh and Terrence Guay, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Public Policy, and NGO Activism in 
Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder Perspective’ (2006) 43(1) Journal of Management 
Studies 47, 73. 
15 World Trade Organization agreements limit the use of local content policies but there are still avenues 
available for developing countries, see Miriam Weiss, ‘The Role of Local Content Policies in Manufacturing 
and Mining in Low- and Middle-income Countries’ (Working Paper No 19, United Nations Industrial 
Organization, 2016) 9; Isabelle Ramdoo, ‘Local Content, Trade and Investment: Is there Policy Space Left for 
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addition to contributing to the development of host communities, be required to contribute 
through regulations which address technology transfer, employment of a certain percentage 
of Iraqis in technical and administrative positions and local content requirements be imposed 
through legislation and oil contracts, see 6.3. 
Chapter two set out the arguments as to why IOCs should do more than just pay the costs for 
the harm caused by their operations. The principal reason is the huge profits obtained by 
IOCs and the view that the Iraqi people have not adequately shared in the benefits of their 
natural resources. It may reflect the inability of the government to obtain a fair deal in 
negotiating or amending oil contracts whereby the Iraqi government, but not IOCs, suffered 
huge losses with the downturn in oil prices, see 2.7. It may also reflect Iraq’s inability to get 
essential legislation relating to the oil and gas industry through Parliament, 2.5.2, and the 
difficulty in ensuring compliance with contractual terms see 6.2. The problem remains 
whether there is any real prospect of passing legislation requiring contributions to 
development and welfare. The avenue likely to be more fruitful is through the new bidding 
rounds for oil contracts with much stronger monitoring of compliance.  
As explained previously in chapter five, states use various mechanisms for establishing 
corporate social responsibility regimes. These include national laws, general companies' law, 
stock market listing requirements, non-financial disclosure and reporting, or sector specific 
laws.16 There may be specific provision in petroleum legislation as well as provisions in oil 
and gas contracts, as explained at 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. This method mostly exists in the 
extractive industries. The issue for Iraq is whether the best approach is through formal 
legislative regimes. Any proposals to this effect must take into account the lack of success in 
enacting modern oil and gas legislation in Iraq. One of the most critical obstacles to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Linkages Development in Resource-rich Countries?’ (Discussion Paper No 205, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, December 2016) 15 <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP205-Local-
Content-Trade-Investment-Ramdoo-December-2016.pdf>. 
16 For example the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 and California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010.  
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developing the oil industry in Iraq is the absence of modern petroleum legislation that sets up 
specific technical and management requirements concerning the sector. Although the Oil and 
Gas Law was drafted in 2007 and redrafted multiple times, the law has not yet been enacted. 
The main obstacles are the outstanding political issues and the different interpretation of the 
constitutional provisions.17 In the absence of a national oil and gas law, the remaining option 
for the Iraqi government is to impose obligations on oil companies through oil contracts. 
However, a close examination of oil contracts shows that the contract obligations are 
inadequate to protect the environment and society from the adverse impact of oil operations 
or to increase the benefits of society. Although oil contracts require IOCs to develop training 
and education programs and set aside USD 5 million a year for that purpose, evidence shows 
that IOCs are not adequately implemented these requirements, see 6.3.2. This is largely due 
to weak accountability mechanisms and lack of government monitoring. 
The next section makes recommendations for future policy to implement CSR in the oil 
industry. 
7.3 Recommendations  
This section proposes a framework for CSR in the oil and gas industry. This involves a multi-
stage response beginning with developing a national CSR policy, including requirements in 
the oil and gas law and other necessary legislation, improving the oil contract model and 
contractual conditions as well as promoting the monitoring mechanisms and raising public 
awareness about CSR issues. 
     7.3.1 Developing a National Policy to Implement Corporate Social Responsibility  
First of all, Iraq needs to establish a clear and comprehensive national policy to protect a 
wide range of stakeholders who may be affected by oil activities as well as policies to 
                                                             
17 For fuller discussion on the Draft Oil and Gas Law see chapter two at 2.5.2. 
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increase social welfare for host communities. This may require the government to impose 
legal obligations on international oil companies to ensure that the community is not paying 
for the adverse effects of their operations, negative externalities. It may also decide that oil 
companies should positively contribute to community welfare, particularly for host 
communities, by requiring them to commit a certain level of expenditure for particular types 
of development. This could take the form of legislation such as in Nigeria (see 5.5.2) or the 
more broadly based Indian provisions (see 5.5.1). The purpose is to ensure that natural 
resources are managed in a sustainable manner. This requires Iraq to have an explicit CSR 
vision to support the overall development and promote the benefit to its citizens from oil and 
gas assets. In recent years, governments have become the drivers for corporate social 
responsibility18 compared to business, society, and even the international organisations.19 
Iraq should adopt an integrated package of consistent measures for the oil and gas industry 
which are directed to addressing shared priorities of the government and the community 
(economic, environmental, and welfare/development), promoting economic growth and 
enhancing sustainable use of natural resources, namely ensuring the rights of present and 
future generations to these resources. Iraq can learn from the experience of other developing 
countries such as India, Tanzania, Ecuador, and Nigeria.20 This is further explained in the 
following recommendation on stakeholder protection and social welfare, see 7.3.3. 
Once the policy framework has been established, implementation can be achieved through a 
variety of legislative or executive tools. The suggested CSR framework might be 
implemented at different levels of government through related projects and programs. It may 
                                                             
18 Josep Lozano, Laura Albareda,Tamyko Ysa, Heike Roscher and Manila Marcuccio, Governments and 
Corporate Social Responsibility : Public Policies Beyond Regulation and Voluntary Compliance (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 42; Reinhard Steurer, ‘The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe’ (2010) 43(1) Policy Sciences 49, 72; Jeremy Moon, 
‘Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative Perspective’ (Research 
Paper No 20-2004, International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, 2004) 17.  
19 For fuller discussion see chapter five, section 5.3.   
20 For fuller discussion about the approach implemented in these countries see chapter five, section 5.5.   
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also apply to foreign trade policy and international relationships, namely Bilateral Investment 
Agreements. 
     7.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility in Bilateral Agreements  
Iraq can also consider whether to include CSR requirements in all future trade and investment 
agreements such as has been done in the Iraq-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
This confirms the commitment to CSR under those types of agreement.21 This is however, 
likely to be only a minor aspect for Iraq.22 As noted previously, see 5.2.2, typically 
investment treaties dealing with CSR only obligate contracting states to use their best 
endeavours which falls well short of enforceable legal obligations. There are, in addition, 
international guidelines such as the OECD Guidelines, UN Global Compact, UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights; and those specific industry standards like ISO 
26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility and EU Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (see 5.2.1). It is to be noted that 
these are Guidelines for action and the focus is on human rights rather than development and 
consequently may not, even if domestically legislated, achieve the proposed objectives of the 
Iraqi government. A further limitation is that Iraq has little experience in entry into free trade 
agreements so that incorporation of such provisions into free trade agreements is not likely to 
take matters very far. 
     7.3.3 Stakeholder Protection and Social Welfare 
As recommended above, the Iraqi government should develop a national policy for 
stakeholder protection and enhancing social welfare particularly for the oil industry. This 
                                                             
21 For fuller discussion on regulating CSR in the Trade and Investment Agreements see 5.2.2.  
22 The problem is that developed nations have standard provisions in free trade and regional agreements and so 
negotiability of terms may prove difficult for Iraq. There is the further issue that companies may incorporate in 
countries without similar free trade agreement provisions and so avoid the CSR obligation. 
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policy should be translated into legal obligations in the oil and gas regulations or other 
special legislation issued for this purpose as well as contractual obligations, see below 7.3.4. 
The government must develop modern oil and gas law that is adequate to achieve 
comprehensive development in the oil industry in particular which will benefit the whole 
economy. This requires the government to enact an oil and gas law which includes clear and 
precise provisions protecting the environment and society from the adverse impact of oil 
companies’ activities as well as requiring oil companies to contribute to the welfare of host 
communities. Given that oil and gas activities create a wide range of negative impacts on the 
environment and communities during each phase of operation, Iraq needs to have hard law to 
protect the environment and local communities. IOCs should be mandated by the law to 
undertake due diligence initiatives to mitigate any possible risks caused by their operations 
on the environment and the negative consequences on the local communities and cultural 
heritage in the areas of their operations (see discutient at 4.4). Therefore, Iraq should increase 
corporate accountability to hold oil companies responsible for their actions by issuing strong 
environmental protection regulations whether contained in general environmental regulations 
or specific oil and gas regulations. These regulations must include specific provisions to 
protect the southern marshlands considering their national and international significance and 
other cultural heritage areas. These recommendations do not see the voluntary engagement in 
CSR as providing an adequate approach to protecting the environment and communities 
against negative externalities caused by oil companies operations. This does not mean that 
CSR has no role to play at all. It can be seen as a complement to legal obligations by 
encouraging IOCs to further promote community welfare.23 
                                                             
23 Forest Reinhadt, Robert Stavins and Richard Vietor, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility through an Economic 
Lens’ (2008) 2(2) Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 219, 239; see also, Commission of the 
European Communities, Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibilities, COM/366 final (18 July 2001) 7    
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Furthermore, Iraq can consider the experience of other oil producing countries (eg Brazil, 
Mexico, Nigeria and Tanzania) discussed at 5.5 and 5.6. These countries have exploited the 
investment in the natural resources to develop other related and non-related sectors, building 
the capacity of individual and communities, addressing urgent social problems and enhancing 
overall development. In addition, Iraq can benefit from the Indian experience and require 
large oil companies to spend a minimum percentage of their profit on programs to enhance 
sustainable development.24   
     7.3.4 Corporate Social Responsibility Clauses in Oil and Gas Contracts  
In the absence of modern oil and gas legislation, and in the light of the Iraqi government’s 
political difficulties passing the national oil and gas law,25 the only feasible approach to make 
oil companies accountable for the harm caused by their activities (negative externalities) and 
to contribute to social welfare is through oil and gas contracts. Even if there is oil legislation, 
oil and gas contracts should also include provisions that are consistent with regulations.26 It 
could be argued that this is in the long term interests of oil companies and their shareholders 
based on the modern elaborations of shareholder primacy which take into account stakeholder 
interests. The promotion of host community-industry relations provides legitimacy and a 
stable investment environment.27 To this end, the local community should be actively 
involved in the process of designing and implementing community projects etc, given that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
<http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/LW/Data%20reports%20and%20studies/Reports%20and%20%20communicati
on%20from%20EU%20Commission/20110830-103712_com_2001_366enpdf.pdf>.  
24 For a full discussion on Indian experience to mandate contributions to community welfare see 5.5.1. But the 
Indian legislation operates on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis which may not be suitable in the Iraqi context, see the 
discussion at 6.3.1. 
25 For fuller discussion on the barriers that prevent enacting the oil and gas law see chapter two at 2.5.2.  
26 Andrews Doku and Benjamin Appiah-Kubi, ‘Internalizing the Negative Externalities of Mining in Ghana: 
Should Corporate Social Responsibility Be Voluntary?’(2014) 4 (15) Developing Country Studies 76, 83.  
27 Uchechukwu Nwosu, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility of EXXON-Mobil in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria and 
Community-industry Relation: a Sociological Jurisprudence Prism’ (2017) 4(2) International Journal of Peace 
and Conflict Studies 164, 179; Jedrzej Frynas, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Oil Multinational and 
Social Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 117-120.  
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success of these initiatives depend on the level of community participation in such projects.28 
In addition to contract clauses, Iraq can use the bidding rounds tender process (see 6.4) and 
negotiations to take into account as a key factor IOCs undertakings in relation to community 
development and service, in selecting the preferred bidder.  IOCs would be required to submit 
a development plan for the contract area before bidding. As noted above the monitoring of 
the implementation and outcomes in relation to these plans should be undertaken by an 
oversight agency, discussed next. 
     7.3.5 Monitoring Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil Industry 
The above proposal suggests stronger environmental protection legislation and requires IOCs 
to make positive contributions to the lives and prospects for the Iraqi community. If 
legislation is not possible, these obligations should be imposed by contract. It is argued that 
this should not be left to voluntary benevolence and that any legislative or contractual 
obligations should also set up an official unit to oversight the implementation of corporate 
social responsibility in the oil industry either by a primary oil and gas law, by specific 
legislation or failing that through oil contracts. This agency should monitor all companies 
operating in the oil industry in Iraq, including national and international oil companies as 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
Ideally, the oversight agency should consist of elected group representing the key 
stakeholders. This formal agency would be responsible to facilitate the process of formulating 
a comprehensive CSR policy and officially assesses the negative and positive impacts of oil 
investment on the economy, the environment, employees and society.  
                                                             
28 Frynas, above n 27, 124-126; Eghosa Ekhator, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Chinese Oil 
Multinationals in the Oil and Gas Industry of Nigeria: An appraisal’ (2014) 28 Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 
119, 140; O Alabi and S Ntukekpo, ‘Oil Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility in Nigeria: An 
Empirical Assessment of Chevron’s Community Development Projects in the Niger Delta’ (2012) 4(2) British 
Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 361, 374.    
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The proposed agency must exercise its oversight function not only during the life of the 
contract but also during the bidding process by reviewing and approving social responsibility 
plans submitted by international oil companies competing for an oil or gas investment. This 
would assist the government in ensuring that IOCs are fulfilling their obligations and 
measuring contributions to overall development, see 6.4.  
7.4 The Way Forward 
Iraq should establish institutional, well-developed and sustainable policies to manage the oil 
and gas industry because these massive natural resources are the backbone of the Iraqi 
economy and the primary source of income for the Iraqi people (see chapter two at 2.2.1 and 
2.7.2). The continuing stabilisation of Iraq, reduction in conflict and improved conditions for 
democratic processes provide the foundations for a stronger government hand in managing 
the oil industry. 
Despite reductions in demand for oil in the face of growing use of solar and clean energy, 
Iraq is still a very important player in the global oil supply29 and makes a significant 
contribution to the stability of global oil markets.30 The Iraqi national oil policy should aim to 
achieve growth and development in the oil industry as well as in other related sectors (eg, 
mining, cement, bricks, drilling, transport and so on), see discussion at 2.7.2 and 6.3.3. 
Developing sectors other than oil would assist in reducing reliance on oil revenues as the 
main source of the country’s income and help to buffer the economy from the risks of falling 
                                                             
29 Iraq has approximately 10 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves. World Bank, Iraq Systematic Country 
Diagnostic (Report No 112333-IQ, 3 February 2017) 13  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/pdf/IRAQ-SCD-FINAL-cleared-
02132017.pdf>; see also, Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 6th Report of the Iraqi Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative 2014 (April 2016) 16 <https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/iraq-eiti-
report-2014.pdf>.  
30 International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report (9 October 2012) 
119 
<https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO_2012_Iraq_Energy_OutlookFINAL.pdf>. 
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oil prices.31 It should also take into account the long-term negative impacts of oil activities 
and the protection of the environment and other stakeholders including traditional 
communities (see discussion at 2.7.1 and 6.3.1).  
This policy must be reflected in the specific oil sector legislation. However, since it is 
doubtful whether legislation can be enacted which will protect stakeholder interests, 
particularly the environment, or require positive contributions to the development or 
community welfare, 2.5.2, the alternative to legislation is to impose these requirements under 
oil and gas contracts, 2.5.3. As already noted above, the avenue likely to be more fruitful is 
through new bidding rules for oil contracts with much stronger monitoring of compliance. 
The new bidding rules for oil contracts should also include a mechanism to share with IOCs 
the risks of oil price fluctuations to avoid paying a high fixed amount where the price of oil 
has fallen. This is to restore the economic balance between the parties; ensuring a fair 
distribution of the wealth and profits from oil and avoid a repetition of the financial crisis in 
Iraq due to sharp drop in oil price in 2014, see discussion at 2.7.3.    
To increase accountability in the oil industry, Iraq should take measures to monitor IOC 
compliance with legal requirements and implementing CSR in the oil industry. This may 
include, first, enhancing the role of state oil bodies on joint management committees to 
provide better oversight; and second, establishing an oversight agency that consisted of the 
key stakeholders to assess the negative and positive impacts of oil investment on the 
economy, the environment, employees and society see 6.4. This may require introducing 
better reporting mechanisms as well as measures to eliminate corruption. Iraq must also take 
measures to increase public awareness about corporate behaviour (what it does and what 
corporations should do), specifically in relation to environmental protection, safety issues, 
                                                             
31 Oil price is usually governed by supply and demand rules (eg the US has reduced the reliance on oil by 
producing shale oil), but sometimes it may influence by the alteration in the political and security situation in the 
Middle East region and in the global in general.  
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human rights, indigenous communities, and CSR issues in general. Research shows that 
corporations do engage in CSR in response to stakeholder pressure.32 This suggests that if 
civil society (including NGOs, unions, media etc) put pressure on corporations to engage in 
more CSR activities, oil companies may change their behaviour and act in ways conforming 
to responsible conduct expected by society. Implementing the recommendations proposed in 
this thesis can be a promising step in making international oil companies more accountable 
and socially responsible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
32 Frynas, above n 27, 6; Herman Aguinis and Ante Glavas, ‘What We Know and Don’t Know About Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda’ (2012) 38(4) Journal of Management 932, 968.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A-1: IOCs Awarded Oil Contracts in Iraq and their Participation1 
 Bidding 
Round 
Contract 
Area 
Consortium Contractors 
Participation 
State 
partner 
and 
Share 
Effective 
Date 
1 Zero Ahdeb AL Waha 
Petroleum 
75 SOMO 
25% 
10 Nov 2008 
2  
 
 
First 
Rumaila BP 47.63 SOMO 
6% 
17 Dec 2009 
Petro China 46.37 
3 Zubair ENI 41.56 MOC 5% 18 Feb 2010 
Occidental 29.69 
Kogas 23.75 
4 West Qurna 
(phase 1) 
Exxonmobil 32.7 OEC 5% 1 March 2010 
Petro China 32.7 
Shell 19.6 
Pertamina 10 
5 Missan Fields Cnooci 63.75 IDC 25% 2 Dec 2010 
Tpao 11.25 
6 Second West Qurna 
(phase 2) 
Lukoil 75 NOC 25% 1 March 2010 
7 Majnoon Shell 45 MOC 
25% 
1 March 2010 
Petronas 30 
8 Halfaya Petro China 45 SOC 10% 1 March 2010 
Petronas 22.5 
Total 22.5 
9 Garraf Petronas  45 NOC 25% 10 Feb 2010 
JAPEX 30 
10 Badra Gazprom 30 OEC 25% 18 Feb 2010 
Kogas 22.5 
Petronas 15 
Tpao 7.5 
11 Qaiyarah Sonangol 75 SOC 25% 18 Feb 2010 
12 Najmah Sonangol 75 IDC 25% 18 Feb 2010 
                                                             
1 Source: based on information presented in the Iraqi Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Extractive 
Activities in Iraq 2015 (December 2016) 33- 41  
<https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2015_iraq_eiti_report.pdf> 
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13 Third Akkas Kogas 75 NOC 25% 15 Nov 2011 
14 Mansuriah Tpao 37.5 OEC 25% 18 July 2011 
Kuwait 
Energy.co 
22.5 
Kogas 15 
14 Siba Kuwait 
Energy.co 
45 MOC 
25% 
1 July 2011 
Tpao 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
APPENDIX 2 
Extracts from Iraqi Oil Contract Models1 
A. Extracts from Technical Services Contract Model2 
Article 13 – Joint Management of the petroleum Operations  
13.1 The Parties shall establish, within thirty (30) days from the Effective Date, a 
joint management committee, referred to herein as the "Joint Management 
Committee" or "JMC", for the purpose of general supervision and control of 
Petroleum Operations. The JMC shall consist of eight (8) members. The ROC shall 
nominate four (4) members, including the Chairman. Contractor shall nominate four 
(4) members, including the Deputy Chairman and the Secretary. The Parties shall also 
designate one alternate to each of their members and shall promptly inform each other 
in writing of any change of the members or alternates.  
13.2 The JMC shall have the following duties and authorities related to Petroleum 
Operations:  
(a)  review and recommendation of Plans and any Revisions thereof;  
(b) review and approval of annual Work Programs, Budgets and production 
schedules, and any Revisions thereof;  
(c)  review and approval of operating procedures prepared pursuant to Article 9;  
(d)  review and/or approval of the award of sub-contracts and purchase orders as 
applicable pursuant to Article 9;  
(e)  approval of training programs and Iraqization plans for developing Iraqi personnel 
pursuant to Articles 9 and 26;  
(f) supervision and control of the implementation of approved Plans and Work 
Programs and the overall policy of Operator;  
(g)  review and approval of manpower strength and organisation chart of Operator;  
                                                             
1 This Appendix includes selected articles from the Technical Services Contract model and the Exploration, 
Development and Production Contract model. These articles were selected because they were the most relevant 
articles to this research and mostly referred though the thesis.  
2 There is no signed oil contract publicly available. Only a model of Technical Services Contract for the 
Rumaila Oil Field between BP, CNPC and Iraq from the first bidding round held in 2010 is publicly available, 
see <http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/Clean_copy__BP_CNPC_comments__27_July__on_PCLD_draft_dated_01.pdf
>.  
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(h)  review of Quarterly statements, annual accounts and other financial statements;  
(i)  review of periodical and other reports submitted by Contractor or Operator and 
issue of comments and recommendations to ensure proper implementation of 
Petroleum Operations; and  
(j)  recommendation of the appointment of the independent international auditor as 
per Article 20.  
13.3 Decisions of the JMC shall be taken by unanimous vote of the members or their 
alternates present at the meeting or by proxy. In the event that the JMC is unable to 
reach unanimous decision in respect of any issue, then the issue shall be promptly 
referred to the senior management of the Parties for resolution. Quorum shall be at 
least three (3) members or alternates of each Party. Decisions taken by the JMC shall 
be recorded in official minutes signed by the members present and communicated by 
Operator to the Parties.  
13.4 The JMC shall meet whenever necessary or expedient for the implementation of 
this Contract and at any time a Party requests a meeting to be held. In any event the 
JMC shall meet at least once every Quarter. A meeting of the JMC may be convened 
by either Party giving not less than twenty (20) days prior written notice to the other 
Party or, in a case requiring urgent action, by giving reasonable shorter notice, with 
decisions by way of circulated written resolutions. Operator shall prepare the agenda 
and necessary documents prior to such meetings and communicate the same to the 
members of the JMC. Either Party may add any matter related to Petroleum 
Operations not listed by Operator to any JMC meeting agenda.  
13.5 The JMC may adopt such procedures as it deems appropriate regarding the 
conduct of its functions, meetings, and other related matters. For the purpose of 
facilitating the conduct of its functions, the JMC may appoint such appropriate sub-
committees as shall from time to time be required.  
13.6 All costs incurred by Contractor and approved by the JMC for carrying out JMC 
duties shall be considered as Petroleum Costs.  
Article 19 – Supplement Fees and Service Fees  
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19.1 For the Petroleum Operations performed under this Contract, Contractor is 
entitled to Supplementary Fees and Service Fees. In accordance with this Article 19, 
Supplementary Fees shall be comprised of Supplementary Costs. Service Fees shall 
be comprised of Petroleum Costs and a Remuneration Fee.  
19.2 Supplementary Costs  
Contractor shall start charging Supplementary Costs to the Operating Account as from 
the Effective Date, in accordance with this Contract and Accounting Procedure but 
the same shall be due and payable according to the following:  
(a)  the signature bonus paid under Article 4 shall be amortized and recovered over 
twenty (20) equal Quarterly payments beginning with the ninth Quarter following the 
Quarter in which the Effective Date occurs;  
(b)  de-mining costs incurred pursuant to Article 7.3 shall be recovered over eight (8) 
equal Quarterly payments beginning with the first Quarter following the date on 
which de-mining costs start being incurred;  
(c) costs or expenses incurred pursuant to Articles 10.6, 12.6, and 17.7 for additional 
facilities shall accrue and be payable beginning in the first Month of the Calendar 
Quarter following their payment date;  
(d)  costs or expenditures incurred pursuant to Article 41.16 for remediation of pre- 
existing environmental conditions shall accrue and be payable beginning in the first 
Month of the Calendar Quarter following their payment date; and  
(e)  outstanding balances on all Supplementary Costs shall bear interest at LIBOR 
plus one percent (1%) from the date when Supplementary Costs are incurred until the 
date when Supplementary Fees are received.  
19.3  Supplementary Fees  
The Supplementary Fees due to Contractor shall be paid in Export Oil at the Delivery 
Point or, at ROC’s option, in cash, in USD, within sixty (60) days of the submission 
of an invoice pursuant to Article 9 of the Accounting Procedure. For payment in 
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Export Oil, the Export Oil Price shall be in accordance with Article 18. ROC shall 
notify Contractor of its election whether to pay Supplementary Fees in cash or in 
Export Oil within ten (10) days of receipt of Contractor’s first invoice for payment of 
Supplementary Fees. Such election shall remain in effect for the remainder of this 
Contract, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.  
(a)  Supplementary Fees shall be deemed to cover all amounts due to Contractor for 
Supplementary Costs.  
(b)  Supplementary Fees shall become due and payable as detailed in Article 19.2 and 
shall be paid to the extent of ten percent (10%) of the deemed revenues of the 
Baseline Production.  
(c)  Any due and payable Supplementary Fees that remain unpaid in respect of any 
Calendar Quarter shall be carried forward and paid in succeeding Quarter(s) until 
fully paid.  
(d)  ROC reserves the right at any time by notice to Contractor to decrease the 
amortization periods specified in Articles 19.2(a) and 19.2(b), and/or increase the 
percentage of Baseline Production specified in Article 19.3(b).  
19.4 Petroleum Costs  
Contractor shall start charging Petroleum Costs to the Operating Account as from the 
Effective Date, in accordance with this Contract and Accounting Procedure, but the 
same shall be due and payable only after the Service Fee Eligibility Date.  
19.5 Remuneration Fee  
Contractor shall become entitled to the Remuneration Fee and shall start charging the 
same to the Operating Account only after the Service Fee Eligibility Date.  
(a) For each Calendar Quarter, commencing with the Calendar Quarter following the 
Quarter in which the Service Fee Eligibility Date occurs, the Remuneration Fee shall 
be an amount equal to the product of the Remuneration Fee per Barrel applicable to 
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such Quarter, multiplied by the Incremental Production applicable to such Quarter and 
subject to the performance adjustment in Article 19.5(e).  
(b)  The Remuneration Fee per Barrel of Crude Oil applicable for all Calendar 
Quarters during any given Calendar Year shall be determined on the basis of the R-
Factor calculated at the end of the preceding Calendar Year for the Field as follows:  
 
(c)  For the purposes of calculating Baseline Production and Incremental Production, 
the Baseline Production Rate for any Quarter, expressed to the nearest barrel of oil per 
day, will be calculated according to the product of the Initial Production Rate and a 
Decline Factor for that Quarter according to the formulae:  
           BPRn =         IPR * DFn  
                  and 
          DFn =        D raised to the power ((n-1)/4)  
          where:  
         BPRn =     Baseline Production Rate for Quarter n  
         IPR =      Initial Production Rate 
         DFn =      Decline Factor for Quarter n  
       n =         Number of the Quarter following the Quarter in which the Effective 
Date occurs  
       [for Bai Hassan 
   n =          Number of the Quarter starting with the Quarter after the Quarter in which 
the tenth (10th) anniversary of the Effective Date occurs] 
      D =       0.95  
(d) The R-Factor achieved by Contractor as at the end of any Calendar Year shall be 
calculated by dividing the aggregate value of Cash Receipts from the Effective Date 
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up to and including that Calendar Year by the aggregate of Expenditure over that 
same time frame.  
For the purposes of calculating the R-Factor:  
Aggregate "Cash Receipts" of Contractor from Petroleum Operations as of the end of 
any Calendar Year is the aggregate value from the Effective Date up to and including 
that Year of:  
(i)  Service Fees paid to Contractor as provided in Articles 19.9; plus  
(ii)  any Contractor’s incidental income (of the type specified in the Accounting 
Procedure) arising from Petroleum Operations; and  
Aggregate "Expenditure" made by Contractor for Petroleum Operations as of the end 
of any Calendar Year is the aggregate value from the Effective Date up to and 
including that Year of:  
(i) Petroleum Costs; plus  
(ii) Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund as per Article 26. For the avoidance 
of doubt, this expense is included as Expenditures for purposes of determining the R-
Factor, but shall not be Petroleum Costs.  
(e) During the Plateau Production Period the Remuneration Fee payable in respect of 
any Quarter shall be adjusted by multiplying by the Performance Factor. However, 
any adjustment to the Remuneration Fee under this Article shall cease for so long as 
the following cases apply: (i) Government imposed production curtailment under 
Article 12.5; and (ii) where normal production is curtailed or suspended through 
failure of Transporter to receive the same at the Transfer Point through no fault of the 
Operator or Contractor.  
19.6 Service Fees  
(a)  The Service Fees due to Contractor shall be paid without interest, preferably in 
Export Oil at the Delivery Point or, at Contractor's option, in cash, in USD, within 
sixty (60) days of the submission of an invoice pursuant to Article 9 of the 
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Accounting Procedure. For payment in Export Oil, the Export Oil Price shall be in 
accordance with Article 18. Contractor shall notify ROC of its election whether to 
receive Service Fees in cash or in Export Oil no later than the end of the 
Rehabilitation Period. Such election shall remain in effect for the remainder of this 
Contract, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.  
(b)  The Service Fees shall be deemed to cover all costs, expenses, liabilities and 
remuneration to Contractor under this Contract. ROC shall not be obliged to pay any 
other compensation whatsoever to the Contractor for the fulfilment of its obligations 
under this Contract.  
(c)  Service Fees shall become due and payable starting with the first Calendar 
Quarter following the Quarter in which the Service Fee Eligibility Date occurs and 
shall be paid to the extent of fifty percent (50%) of the deemed revenues of the 
Incremental Production. It is understood that payment of due and payable Petroleum 
Costs shall have priority over the payment of due and payable Remuneration Fees.  
(d)  Any due and payable Service Fees that remain unpaid in respect of any Calendar 
Quarter shall be carried forward and paid in succeeding Quarter(s) until fully paid.  
19.7 For the purpose of payment of Supplementary Fees and Service Fees, Baseline 
Production and Incremental Production of Crude Oil shall be valued at the average 
over the Quarter of the Export Oil Price, pursuant to Articles 17 and 18, taking the 
simple average of the Export Oil Price for different destinations where these exist.  
19.8  Subject to Article 8, any due and payable Supplementary Fees and Service Fees 
that remain outstanding at the expiry or termination of this Contract shall become 
immediately due and payable within thirty (30) days thereof, or under such other 
terms as may be agreed by the Parties.  
  19.9 In case the Supplementary Fees or Service Fees are paid in Export Oil, ROC      
shall arrange with SOMO to deliver to Contractor at the Delivery Point an amount of 
Export Oil, at the relevant Export Oil Price, equivalent to the amount of 
Supplementary Fees or Service Fees owed and payable hereunder. Contractor’s 
Quarterly lifting of Export Oil shall be estimated in advance on the basis of unpaid 
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Supplementary Fees or Service Fees carried forward, production schedule and 
estimated Export Oil Price. Contractor’s final lifting shall be adjusted on the basis of 
actual amounts of Supplementary Fees or Service Fees owed as computed under this 
Article 19, and on the applicable Export Oil Price in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 18 and Addendum Four.  
Article 26 – Employment, Training, and Technology Transfer  
26.1 Without prejudice to the right of Contractor and Operator to select and employ 
such number of personnel as, in the opinion of the Contractor or Operator, are 
required for carrying out Petroleum Operations in a safe, cost effective and efficient 
manner, Contractor and Operator shall, to the maximum extent possible, employ, and 
require Sub-Contractors to employ, Iraqi nationals having the requisite qualifications 
and experience.  
26.2 Through a Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund, Contractor and Operator 
shall offer and facilitate for an agreed number of Iraqi nationals, as designated by 
ROC, the opportunity, both inside and outside of the Republic of Iraq, for on-the-job 
training and practical experience in Petroleum Operations, and academic education. 
The Fund shall also be used for supporting oil and gas related technology and research 
including the establishment or upgrading of research institutes inside the Republic of 
Iraq.  
26.3 As a minimum, Contractor shall allocate during the Term an annual amount of 
five million USD (US$ 5,000,000) to the Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund. 
The Fund payment shall not be recoverable as Petroleum Costs.  
26.4 Not later than six (6) months after the Effective Date, Contractor shall, in 
consultation with ROC, establish and implement training programs for staff positions 
in each phase and level of Petroleum Operations including skilled, technical, 
executive and management positions, with a view to ensuring increased employment 
of Iraqi nationals and a commensurate reduction of expatriate employees.  
26.5 The Companies shall separately negotiate, in good faith, technical assistance 
agreements with ROC whereby every Company may make available commercially 
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proven technology and information of a proprietary nature for use in the Republic of 
Iraq by the ROC and its Affiliates.  
Article 27 – Participation  
27.1 The State Partner shall have twenty-five percent (25%) of Contractor's total 
Participating Interest and the Companies shall have the remaining Participating 
Interest of seventy five percent (75%).  
27.2 Companies shall pay for all of the State Partner’s share of Petroleum Costs and 
Supplementary Costs during the Term and any extension thereto. The Companies 
shall have entitlement to all Petroleum Costs paid as Service Fees and Supplementary 
Costs paid as Supplementary Fees, while the State Partner will be entitled to receive 
twenty- five percent (25%) of any Remuneration Fee paid.  
27.3 Participation shall further be subject to the provisions of Addendum One.  
Article 30 – Local Goods and Services  
30.1 Works and services performed in the Republic of Iraq through sub-contracts 
shall be carried out on a competitive basis. Preference shall be given to Iraqi entities 
and firms, or foreign firms in association therewith, provided that their relevant 
capabilities and prices are competitive with those available in the international 
market.  
30.2 Preference shall be given to locally manufactured and/or available goods, 
materials, equipment, consumables and the like provided that their technical 
specifications, availability, prices, and time of delivery are comparable to those 
available in the international market. 
30.3 Contractor and Operator shall ensure that sub-contracts with Sub-Contractors, 
agents, assignees and employees contain similar provisions of this Article 30. 
Article 41– Protection of the Environment  
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41.1 In performance of this Contract, Operator shall conduct Petroleum Operations 
with due regard to concerns with respect to protection of the environment and 
conservation of natural resources and shall in particular:  
(a)  adopt Best International Petroleum Industry Practices in conducting and 
monitoring its Petroleum Operations and take necessary and adequate steps to:  
(i)  make all efforts to prevent environmental damage and, should some adverse 
impact on the environment occur, to minimize such damage and the consequential 
effects thereof on property and people;  
(ii)  prevent harm or degradation of livelihood or quality of life of surrounding 
communities and, should some adverse impact occur, minimize such impact and 
ensure proper compensation for injury to persons or damage to property caused by the 
effect of Petroleum Operations; and  
(b)  comply with the requirements of the Law and reasonable requirements of ROC.  
41.2 If Operator fails to comply with the provisions of Article 41.1(a)(i) or 
contravenes any relevant Law, and such failure or contravention results in any 
environmental damage, Operator shall forthwith take all necessary and reasonable 
measures to remedy the failure and the effects thereof.  
41.3  If ROC has good reason to believe that any works or installations erected by 
Operator or any operations conducted by Operator are not in accordance with the Law 
and are endangering or may endanger persons or any property of any person, or are 
causing or may cause pollution, or are harming or may harm fauna or flora or the 
environment to a degree which ROC deems unacceptable, ROC shall give notice to 
Contractor and Operator to promptly consider and develop for JMC approval a 
remedial action plan and measures to mitigate such environmental damage within a 
reasonable period as may be determined by ROC and to repair any such damage. If 
ROC deems it necessary, it may also require Operator to suspend Petroleum 
Operations in whole or in part until Operator has taken such remedial measures or has 
repaired any damage caused.  
41.4  The measures and methods to be used by Operator for the purpose of complying 
with the terms of Article 41.1(a)(i) shall be determined in timely consultation with 
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ROC and Contractor upon the commencement of Petroleum Operations or whenever 
there is a significant change in the scope or method of conducting Petroleum 
Operations and shall take into account the international standards applicable in similar 
circumstances and the relevant environmental impact study carried out in accordance 
with Article 41.5. Contractor shall notify ROC and Operator, in writing, of the 
measures and methods finally determined by Contractor and approved in accordance 
with Article 12 and shall cause such measures and methods to be reviewed from time 
to time in the light of prevailing circumstances.  
41.5 Contractor shall cause a person or persons with special knowledge on 
environmental matters, to carry out two environmental impact studies in order:  
(a)  to determine at the time of the studies the prevailing conditions relating to the 
environment, human beings and local communities, the flora and fauna in the 
Contract Area and in the adjoining or neighbouring areas; and  
(b)  to establish the likely effect on the environment, human beings and local 
communities, the flora and fauna in the Contract Area and in the adjoining or 
neighbouring areas in consequence of the relevant phase of Petroleum Operations, and 
to submit, for consideration by the Parties, methods and measures contemplated in 
Article 41.4 for minimizing environmental damage and carrying out site restoration 
activities.  
41.6 The first of these environmental impact studies shall act as the baseline study for 
the purposes of Article 41.14 and shall be concluded promptly after the Effective Date 
but in any event before commencement of any fieldwork.  
41.7 The second environmental impact study shall be submitted by Contractor as part 
of the Enhanced Redevelopment Plan.  
41.8 The studies mentioned in Article 41.5 above shall contain proposed 
environmental guidelines to be followed in order to minimize environmental damage 
and shall include, but not be limited to, the following, to the extent appropriate to the 
respective study taking into account the phase of operations to which the study 
relates:  
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            (a)  proposed access cutting;  
            (b)  clearing and timber salvage;  
(c)  wildlife and habitat protection; (d)  fuel storage and handling;  
(e)  use of explosives;  
(f)  camps and staging;  
(g)  liquid and solid waste disposal;  
(h)  cultural and archaeological sites;  
(i)  selection of drilling sites;  
(j)  terrain stabilization;  
(k)  protection of freshwater horizons;  
(l)  blow-out prevention plan;  
(m)  flaring during completion and testing of Gas and Crude Oil Wells;  
(n)  abandonment of wells;  
(o)  rig dismantling and site completion;  
(p)  reclamation for abandonment;  
(q)  noise control;  
(r)  debris disposal; and  
(s)  protection of natural drainage and water flow.  
41.9 Subject to the provisions of the Law on the protection of the environment, any 
new project or expansion or modernization projects for Petroleum Operations for 
which a proposal, other than a Plan, is submitted by Contractor, ROC shall consider 
the assessment of the project and convey a decision with respect to environment 
clearance within a period of ninety (90) days from the receipt of the requisite 
documents and data. Subject to receipt of the necessary environmental clearance, the 
JMC shall decide upon the proposal of Contractor within thirty (30) days thereafter.  
41.10 Contractor and Operator shall ensure that:  
(a)  the pertinent completed environmental impact studies are made available to its 
employees and to its Sub-Contractors to develop adequate and proper awareness of 
the measures and methods of environmental protection to be used in carrying out 
Petroleum Operations; and  
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(b)  the contracts entered into between Contractor and Operator and their Sub- 
Contractors relating to Petroleum Operations shall include the provisions stipulated 
herein and any established measures and methods for the implementation of 
Contractor's and Operator's obligations in relation to the environment under this 
Contract.  
41.11 Operator shall, in cooperation with Contractor, prior to conducting any drilling 
activities, prepare and submit for review by ROC contingency plans for dealing with 
crude oil spills, blowouts, fires, accidents and emergencies, designed to achieve rapid 
and effective emergency response. The plans referred to above shall be discussed with 
ROC and concerns expressed shall be taken into account.  
(a)  In the event of an emergency, accident, oil spill or fire arising from Petroleum 
Operations affecting the environment, Operator shall forthwith notify ROC and 
Contractor and shall promptly implement the relevant contingency plan and perform 
such site restoration as may be necessary in accordance with Best International 
Petroleum Industry Practices.  
(b)  In the event of any other emergency or accident arising from the Petroleum 
Operations affecting the environment, Operator shall, in consultation with Contractor, 
take such action as may be prudent and necessary in accordance with Best 
International Petroleum Industry Practices.  
41.13 Where the Contract Area is partly located in areas forming part of certain 
national parks, sanctuaries, mangroves, wetlands of national importance, biosphere 
reserves and other biologically sensitive areas passage through these areas shall 
generally not be permitted. However, if there is no passage, other than through these 
areas to reach a particular point beyond these areas, permission of the appropriate 
authorities shall be obtained by ROC for the benefit of Operator.  
41.14 The obligations and liability of Contractor and Operator for the environment 
hereunder shall be limited to damage to the environment which:  
(a)  occurs after the Effective Date and prior to the expiry or termination of this 
Contract; and  
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(b)  results from an act or omission of Contractor or Operator.  
41.15 Except for cases of Gross Negligence and Wilful Misconduct on the part of 
Contractor and/or Operator, all costs incurred towards protection of the environment 
shall be treated as Petroleum Costs.  
41.16 Any costs approved by the ROC and incurred by the Contractor in remediation 
of conditions existing prior to the Effective Date and identified in the first study noted 
in Article 41.6 shall be considered Supplementary Costs.  
41.17 In the event that Petroleum Operations are delayed, curtailed or prevented due 
to extended delays in acquiring necessary environmental approvals, the Parties shall 
meet and agree an appropriate extension of the Term together with all rights and 
obligations hereunder, subject to the provisions of Article 8.  
B. Extracts from Exploration, Development and Production Contract Model3 
Article 26–Employment, Training, Technology Transfer and Scholarship Fund and 
Infrastructure Fund 
26.1 Without prejudice to the right of Operator to select and employ such number of 
personnel as, in the opinion of the Operator but subject to Article 13.2, are required 
for carrying out Petroleum Operations in a safe, cost effective and efficient manner, 
Operator shall, to the maximum extent possible, employ and require Sub-Contractors 
to employ Iraqi nationals having the requisite qualifications and experience. 
Employment of Iraqi nationals shall be performed in a manner that engaged them in 
carrying out Petroleum Operations jointly with Operator and aiming to assume full 
responsibility of management and carrying out of Petroleum Operations by Iraqi 
nationals in accordance with Article 9.12 (a). 
26.2 Starting from the first Calendar Year after Effective Date and throughout the 
Term, Contractor shall pay into a bank account established and managed by the 
Ministry of Oil / ROC, an annual amount of _____ US Dollars (US$____) for an 
Employment, Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund. Fund payments shall not 
                                                             
3 There is no signed oil contract publicly available. Only a model of Exploration, Development and Production 
Contract from the fifth bidding round held in 2018 is publicly available, see  
<https://oil.gov.iq/upload/upfile/ar/659.pdf>. 
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be recoverable as Petroleum Costs, and if not paid annually, the Fund amount shall be 
aggregated, and if not paid by Contractor, ROC shall have the right to deduct the 
aggregated amount from the invoices submitted by Contractor. 
26.3 The Employment, Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund shall be used for 
programs of on-the-job training and practical experience in Petroleum Operations, 
academic education and to support oil and gas related technology and research 
including the establishment or upgrading of research institutes inside the Republic of 
Iraq. Operator is required to coordinate with and provide the necessary support to 
ROC inside and outside Iraq in order to fulfill the Employment, Training, Technology 
and Scholarship programs. 
26.4 In order to ensure employment of Iraqi nationals and the gradual and progressive 
reduction or replacement of expatriates, no later one (1) year after the Effective Date 
Operator shall, in consultation with ROC, establish and implement training programs 
for ROC employees to be qualified for and subsequently assume staff and other 
operational positions in each phase and level of Petroleum Operations including 
skilled, technical, executive and management positions. 
26.5 Within thirty (30) days of the approval of any Work Program and Budget in 
accordance with Article 12, Contractor shall deposit in a bank account designated by 
ROC for the benefit of the Infrastructure Fund, an amount equal to ____ US Dollar 
(US$ ____), which shall be considered as Petroleum Costs. If such Fund shall not be 
deposited in the said bank account, it shall be aggregated, and if not paid by 
Contractor, it shall be deducted by ROC from the invoices submitted by Contractor. 
26.6 Operator may establish, inside the Republic of Iraq, in consultation with ROC or 
its designated Iraqi entity a joint research center to provide technical support in 
respect of the Petroleum Operations. The cost of such center’sestablishment shall be 
part of the Employment, Training, Technology and Scholarship Fund as per Article 
26.2, but if the said Fund is not sufficient, the additional cost incurred by Contractor 
shall be considered as Petroleum Costs. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Table A-3: Themes of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Economic 
 
Ø Economic value created (e.g., revenue and 
retained earnings) 
Ø Economic value distributed (e.g., to 
employees, through community investment 
and donations , to governments – through 
taxes and royalties) 
Ø Financial impacts of climate change  
Ø Coverage of pension plan 
Ø Financial assistance received from 
government 
Ø Wages 
Ø Employment of locales 
Ø Use of locale suppliers  
Ø Public infrastructure investment 
Ø Public services rendered   
 
Environment  
 
Ø Material use and recycling  
Ø Energy consumption (e.g., efficiency, 
conservation, renewable vs. non-
renewable) 
Ø Water use and recycling  
Ø Biodiversity impact and protection  
Ø Polluting emission (e.g., greenhouse and 
ozone depleting) 
Ø Polluting effluents  
Ø Waste (both hazardous and nonhazardous) 
Ø Environmental impacts of products and 
services  
Ø Environmental impacts of transport  
Ø Compliance with environmental laws  
 
Social  
Labour and the Workplace  
Ø Characteristics of workforce 
Ø Employee turnover 
Ø Employee benefits 
Ø Labour/management relations 
Ø occupation health and safety  
Ø Training and education  
Ø Diversity and equal opportunity 
 
Human rights 
Ø Investment and procurement practices 
Ø Non-discrimination  
Ø Freedom of association and collective 
bargaining  
Ø Child labour  
Ø Forced and compulsory labours  
Ø Security Practices  
Ø Indigenous rights  
 
Society  
Ø Community impact of operations from 
entering operating and exiting  
Ø Corruption  
Ø Public police (e.g., government lobbying 
and political interactions)  
Ø Anti-Competitive behaviour  
Ø Compliance  
 
Product Responsibility  
Ø Customer health and safety  
Ø Product and service labeling  
Ø Marketing and communications 
Ø Customer privacy  
Ø Compliance 
Source: Michael Kerr et al, 20091 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 This table summarises CSR Issues addressed in the economic, environmental, and social performance 
indicators of the Global Reporting Initiative. Source: Michael Kerr, Richaed Janda and Chip Pitts, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A legal Analysis (LexisNexis, 2009) 12.  
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APPENDIX 4 
Article 9 of the Brazil-Malawi Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments 
2015 
1. Investors and their investment shall strive to achieve the highest possible level of contribution to 
the sustainable development of the Host Party and the local community, through the adoption of 
a high degree of socially responsible practices, based on the voluntary principles and standards 
set out in this Article. 
2. The investors and their investment shall develop their best efforts to comply with the following 
voluntary principles and standards for a responsible business conduct and consistent with the 
laws adopted by the Host Party receiving the investment: 
a) Stimulate the economic, social and environmental progress, aiming at achieving sustainable 
development; 
b) Respect the human rights of those involved in the companies’ activities, consistent with the 
international obligations and commitments of the Host Party; 
c) Encourage the strengthening of local capacities building through close cooperation with the local 
community; 
d) Encourage the development of human capital, especially by creating employment opportunities 
and facilitating access of workers to professional training; 
e) Refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions that are not established in the legislation of the 
Host Party, relating to environment, health, security, work or financial incentives, or other issues; 
f) Support and maintain good corporate governance principles, and develop and apply good practices 
of corporate governance; 
g) Develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management systems that foster a 
relationship of mutual trust between the companies and the society in which the operations are 
conducted; 
h) Promote the knowledge of workers about the corporate policy, through appropriate dissemination 
of this policy, including programs for professional training; 
i) Refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against the employees who submit grave reports 
to the board or, whenever appropriate, to the competent public authorities, about practices that 
violate the law or violate the standards of corporate governance that the company is subject to 
j) Encourage, whenever possible, the business associates, including service providers and 
outsources, to apply the principles of business conduct consistent with the principles provided in this 
Article; and 
k) Respect local political activities and processes.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the 
Republic of Malawi, signed 25 June 2015 (not yet in force) art 9.  
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